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Abstract 
 
The biotech sector has accumulated losses of around US$40 billion since its inception 
in the mid-1970s.  The reasons for this may lie with the science itself, with 
organization and strategy, with the underlying costs of developing biotechnologies 
and/or with the institutional environment that biotech firms operate within.  This 
thesis assumes that better organization and commercialisation strategy will improve 
overall returns in the biotech sector and asks the fundamental questions ‘how do 
biotech firms do strategy?’ and ‘how can biotech firms do strategy better?’ 
 
Strategy is the domain of the strategic management literature.  Contributions to the 
literature that bear directly on commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector are 
examined.  The sector’s unique institutional context is found to create an environment 
of high-risk and high-uncertainty.  The real options reasoning and dynamic 
capabilities literatures provided some useful ideas for strategy in this context.  
Overall, the literature identifies a shortfall in directly actionable advice for biotech 
practitioners.  Thus, the ‘great divide’ between academic research and practice is 
discussed.  This thesis seeks to narrow the gap by synthesizing academic theory and 
practitioner knowledge on commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector in the way 
that will extend the strategic management literature and provide a process to aid 
practitioners in strategic decision making. 
 
A two phase methodological approach is employed that begins with a historical 
review of the development of the biotech sector and three in-depth case studies.  
Strategic issues facing biotech start-ups at the industry-level and firm-level are 
examined and related to the business models that firms adopt as an embodiment of 
their commercialisation strategies.  A solid understanding of this relationship is then 
combined with real options reasoning and theory on dynamic capabilities to propose a 
model that may help biotech practitioners improve their approach to 
commercialization strategy.  The model is refined and validated in a second phase of 
research involving interviews with seasoned veterans of the biotech sector. The 
Commercialisation Options Model is the final output of this research.  
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collectively had a wealth of knowledge about biotech commercialization.  Each had 
some pearls to offer, though none knew it all. 
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strategic management literature that resonated strongly with me in terms of 
contributing processes that would help biotech firms to do strategy better.  In the end I 
have combined the academic knowledge in these areas with the practitioner 
knowledge I’ve distilled from my case study research. 
 
I initially sought to follow a grounded theory approach in my case studies – 
observing, describing and interpreting.  However, as I increasingly became an 
industry ‘insider’ as my research progressed, I moved away from grounded theory and 
have adopted an interpetivist / constructivist approach.  I have sought to combine 
academic and practitioner knowledge in order to enrich the strategic management 
literature and to provide biotech entrepreneurs with useful guidance for improving 
commercialization strategies.  I am a biotech practitioner and I believe my own 
knowledge and intuition has enriched the solution.  Whilst this approach is rather 
unusual for a doctoral research project I believe it is appropriate in terms of my goals 
to narrow the gap between academia and practice. 
 
The ultimate outcome of this thesis has been the proposal of a model for 
commercialization strategy that may be of value to biotech firms in building flexible 
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 1
1 Introduction and research questions 
 
Pharmaceutical firms, and biotech firms are amongst the producer companies in the 
field of healthcare, supplying therapeutic products that are just one part of the larger 
value chain of healthcare provision.  Although there is an overlap between these two 
types of firms (in that pharmaceutical firms may use biotechnologies, and biotech firms 
are involved in pharmaceutical development), the term ‘pharmaceutical firm’ is often 
used to describe the firms that were founded on chemistry-based small molecule 
products, and biotech firm to describe firms that were founded on biological approaches 
to disease treatment and which may base a therapeutic on proteins, peptides, 
monoclonal antibodies or some other biological component. 
 
Despite the development of important and novel products and revolutionary techniques, 
the financial performance of the biotechnology sector has been very disappointing.  
Social wellbeing has undoubtedly increased but the bottom-line performance for 
investors has – with a few notable exceptions – been quite disappointing in the 
aggregate (Pisano, 2006a).  The sector is estimated to have accumulated losses of 
approximately USD40 billion over the last 30 years (Hamilton, 2004).  It is obvious that 
something is awry in the process of translating research findings into commercial 
outcomes.  This problem sets the stage for this doctoral research project which describes 
how commercialisation strategy is approached in biotech firms and addresses the 
research problem of how it may be done better. 
 
The majority of biotech companies working on drug development are start-up or small 
companies that have been working on drug development for several years but have yet 
to make their first dollar of profit.  Their key focus is on commercialisation, the process 
of turning ideas into revenues and the vital step in realizing capital (intellectual and 
financial) tied up in entrepreneurial ventures. Commercialisation strategy is about how 
a firm interacts with its value chain – ‘where’ and ‘when’ it chooses to interact (plug 
in), and ‘how’ it interacts with (plugs into) the value chain.   
 
The strategic choices made regarding aspects of the commercialisation process are 
embodied in a firm’s business model. A business model is the way a firm organizes 
inputs, converts these into valuable outputs and gets customers to pay for them – how 
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the business is designed to generate profits (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).  The terms 
commercialisation strategy and business model are used frequently throughout this 
thesis.  They are almost synonymous but not quite.  An interpretation, which is inspired 
by Mintzberg (1978) is that the business model is an articulated intention of how a firm 
plans to interact with its value chain (to generate a return), whilst its commercialisation 
strategy reflects the choices that are actually made – whether consciously pre-planned, 
or ad-hoc responses (emergent) to developments in its internal or external environments. 
 
Strategy is the domain of the strategic management discipline, which examines the 
development, implementation and content of strategy, and provides the academic 
background against which commercialisation is examined in this thesis.  Traditional 
research approaches in strategic management are largely strategy content approaches.  
They typically concentrate on large established firms rather than taking an 
entrepreneurial view of strategy (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000).  They are also 
heavily focused on structures rather than processes (thus often not actionable), and 
frequently do not account for historical context and change (Pettigrew, 1992).  A review 
of the key themes in the strategic management literature failed to provide a theory that 
captured the holistic nature of commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector.  Whilst 
they shed some light on the problem of how biotech firms could improve 
commercialisation strategy, they did not take enough account of the specific strategic 
issues facing the sector, or individual firms. 
 
This limitation in strategic management research is revealed by the mounting 
disjunction between ‘practitioner knowledge’ and ‘academic knowledge’ in the field of 
management - there is a growing concern that academic research has become less useful 
for solving practical problems (e.g. Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006; Rynes, 2001, 
Starkey and Madan, 2001).  Practitioner knowledge is knowing how to deal with 
specific situations encountered in a particular set of circumstances (Van de Ven and 
Johnson, 2006) – it is the knowledge found within a community of practitioners 
(implicitly or explicitly and fragmented across individuals, firms and industries).  
Academic knowledge contributes to theory that may be generalized to a wider set of 
circumstances than that faced by individual practitioners.  In this thesis I draw on 
academic knowledge from the strategic management literature regarding 
commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector synthesizing it with practitioner 
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knowledge distilled from case study research.  This synthesis was an iterative process 
that evolved over time.  I then present this knowledge regarding commercialisation 
strategy in such a way that practitioners can learn from it and apply it in a new set of 
circumstances that they are not familiar with - a model is suggested that may be used as 
a guide or tool. 
 
 
The biotechnology/drug development industry is a particularly interesting place to study 
commercialisation strategy because the institutional, situational, and historical aspects 
of entrepreneurship are peculiar.  These peculiarities include the nature of the 
underlying science, intense regulatory scrutiny and a requirement for access to costly 
specialized complementary assets.  These factors lead to a very long and very expensive 
product development cycle that is characterized by high levels of uncertainty and risk.   
Context in this thesis is heavily focused on factors that enable and constrain 
commercialisation options and is consistent with Johns (2006) definition of context. 
 
Practitioners in the biotech sector recognize and know (at least tacitly) the term 
commercialisation strategy, although some have difficulty defining the process or 
talking about it in a general way.  A minority of practitioners are seasoned veterans, 
with a wealth of experience and many a battle scar.  A larger number of practitioners are 
relative new comers, and are often the scientist turned entrepreneur.  They may not fully 
appreciate that the commercialisation journey is frequented with choices and decisions 
that may create or limit future options for earning a return on an innovation.  Strategies 
and options are shaped by earlier decisions, past and present contexts, and guesses about 
future scenarios.  The strategic choices made by a biotech firm mold and define its 
commercialisation strategy in a way that may be planned or emergent (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).   
 
The primary goal of my research is to formalize and generalize practitioner knowledge 
regarding commercialisation strategy and to synthesize it with academic knowledge.  I 
have limited my research to the biotech sector rather than looking across a range of 
industries because the more substantive the theory produced by this research, the more 
easily it will be assimilated by practitioners.  However, the theory on commercialisation 
strategy developed herein may also hold lessons for other industries. 
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Two central objectives of this research are to understand how biotech firms do strategy 
in light of the issues they face and to propose how they could do it better.  These 
objectives are addressed by a two-phase research approach:   
 
The first phase involves exploratory research and ‘data immersion’ in three case studies, 
together with a review of the development of the biotechnology sector.  The aim here is 
to get a good understanding of the strategic issues facing small biotech firms, how they 
may change over time, and the impact they have on business models.  This phase of 
research was coupled with a review of the strategic management literature for theory 
that may aid in the development of commercialisation strategies. 
 
The second phase of research began with the generation of a model suggesting how 
biotech firms could do strategy better.  This model was then validated and refined 
through review and feedback by expert practitioners such as biotech company 
executives and venture capitalists.   
 
The final output of this thesis is a commercialisation strategy model that is a deliberate 
synthesis of both practitioner and academic knowledge and has two applications.  First, 
it provides strategic management theory with a processual model of commercialisation 
strategy under conditions that produce a very long, expensive and highly uncertain 
product development cycle. It is a model that is fully grounded in the realities of the 
entrepreneur.  Second, it provides a tool that biotech entrepreneurs may use as a guide 
in developing and constantly reassessing strategic options during the commercialisation 
process.  The model makes explicit many of the issues that biotech entrepreneurs 
regularly confront, and collectively have tacit knowledge about, and uses the academic 
framework of real options reasoning and the concept of dynamic capabilities to provide 
structure and processes that assist the entrepreneur in reflecting on and adapting to 
particular situations. 
1.1 Research Question 
 
‘Plugging into the value chain’ is the commercial event that high tech start-ups use to 
generate a return on an innovation.  The how and when of plugging in is the crux of 
commercialisation strategy, and the firm’s intentions with this regard are articulated in 
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its business model.  These intentions are formed in response to (perceived) strategic 
issues.  What are the perceived strategic issues facing biotech firms?   How do biotech 
firms do strategy and, recognizing the cumulative losses of the sector to date, how could 
they do strategy better?   
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Objective One 
To describe the strategic issues facing small biotech firms, through analyses at both 
the industry and firm levels, and to identify the common patterns between sets of 
strategic issues and common business models. 
 
Objective Two 
To propose a process model that provides biotech practitioners with a tool to help 
them in the commercialisation process and outline how biotech firms could do 
strategy.  This model will be a synthesis of academic and practitioner knowledge. 
Limitations of the model, together with suggestions for additional research will also 
be discussed.   
 
The following diagram and paragraph explains the relationship between these 
objectives.  
Strategic Issues Common Business Models
e.g. Lack of financial capital e.g. Licensing
Issue 2 Sale of product platform
Issue 3 Platform
Issue 4 Hybrid
Objective One
Analysis of the patterns between
Review of the strategic 
management literature
What do we know about 
commerciaisation strategy in 
biotech firms?
Proposal of a model for helping 
move from left to right
Objective Two
Brings up some interesting and 
useful ideas but establishes a gap 
in our knowledge
 
Figure 1-1 Relationship between research objectives 
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A review of the strategic management literature captures what is known about 
commercialisation strategy in biotech firms and establishes where the gaps in our 
knowledge are.  Objective One seeks to populate the boxes ‘Strategic Issues’ and 
‘Common Business Models’ by conducting both industry and firm level analyses and 
then describing the common patterns in the relationships between the two.  Objective 
Two uses input from the literature review and an understanding of the strategic choices 
discovered in objective one to propose a process model to assist biotech startups in 
moving from the left box (strategic issues) to the right box (business model).  The 
model may help biotech firms to do strategy better. 
1.3 Target audiences 
 
Since the explicit goal of this thesis is to bridge the gap between pure academic research 
and actionable practitioner knowledge, two target audiences are envisaged.  The 
primary audience is the academic community who are either specifically interested in 
biotech entrepreneurship and/or strategy, or more generally interested in the processes 
behind strategy in high-tech entrepreneurial firms.  The second target audience is 
practitioners in the biotech sector. 
1.4 Contribution 
 
This thesis aims to make the following contributions:- 
 
To the strategic management literature: 
 
- A review of the historical development of the biotech sector focusing on the 
strategic issues faced in key phases of the sector’s development, and the 
relationship between these strategic issues and popular business models. 
 
- An in-depth understanding of the relationship between firm-level context and the 
firm’s strategic choice in the New Zealand biotech sector.   
 
- Proposal of an explicitly processual model that combines real options reasoning 
and dynamic capabilities as a tool that can be used in commercialisation strategy 
in environments such as the New Zealand biotech sector that are characterised by 
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capital constraints, high regulatory hurdles and the need for highly specialized 
complementary assets and skills. 
 
- The application of real options reasoning to biotech commercialisation strategy 
through the proposal of an explicitly processual model for decision-making. 
 
- An extension of Gans and Stern’s ideas that commercialisation strategy is dyadic 
– purely a decision between the market for ideas and the product market – by 
showing that there are many more questions that need to be answered in 
commercialisation strategy – including ‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’. 
 
To practitioners in the biotech sector: 
 
- Biotech entrepreneurs often do not recognize that there is a range of ways to 
capitalize or profit from their science.  The model proposed in this thesis provides 
a guiding tool for New Zealand biotech entrepreneurs that can be used in 
unfamiliar commercialisation circumstances and may aid practitioners in doing 
strategy better. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline   
 
 
Chapter two provides the reader with background to the biotech industry, with specific 
focus on the ‘value chain’ as an understanding of this construct is a key to 
understanding commercialisation strategy in the biotech firm.  The historical 
development of the industry is critically examined, focusing on how typical business 
models have evolved in response to changes in the strategic issues facing the industry 
over time.   
 
Chapter three comprises the main body of literature review.  The unique context of the 
biotech sector is discussed and then contributions that bear directly on 
commercialisation strategy in the sector are examined.  Strategic management theory 
fails to provide an actionable explanation of strategy in the biotech firm.  The gap 
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between academic research and practice is then discussed and the chapter concludes 
with the framing of my empirical contribution. 
 
Chapter four begins with a discussion of the epistemological approach employed in this 
thesis.  It then explores the two phase research design and case study methodology 
utilised in addressing my research objectives. 
 
Chapter five is the first of two results chapters.  It presents the individual case studies, 
followed by the cross-case analysis. The focus is on strategic issues and how they drive 
the firms’ business models.  Chapter six discusses the case study results and proposes a 
model as to how biotech firms could do strategy using real options reasoning as a 
theoretical framework.   
 
The model was refined and validated through further practioner input gathered in a 
second phase of research.  Results from these practitioner interviews are found in 
chapter seven.  Chapter eight discusses these findings and then presents the final version 
of a model to guide biotech firms in commercialisation strategy.  Chapter nine provides 
a summary of the key findings of this research and examines the significance and 
implications of my findings for both target audiences – academics and practitioners.  
The limitations of this research are discussed and recommendations are made for further 
research required in this area. 
 
In summary, the purpose of this thesis is to enrich the strategic management literature 
through a better understanding of strategic choice in the context of capital constraints, 
high regulatory burden and the need for specialized complementary assets.  The biotech 
sector provides an appropriate environment for this research.  It is also anticipated that 
the findings of this research will aid biotech practitioners in developing better strategies 
for dealing with the commercialisation of high risk projects.
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2 Evolution of the biotech sector – strategic issues 
and business models    
 
‘The further backward you look, the further forward you can see.’      Winston Churchill 
 
‘Biotechnology industry’ is a commonly used term, although biotechnology really refers 
to a collection of related scientific disciplines (immunology, genetics, molecular, 
cellular and structural biology) that have applications in a number of areas such as 
healthcare, agriculture and industrial process.  The outputs of biotechnology in these 
fields may be physical products, intellectual property or services. 
 
Strictly speaking, in the field of healthcare, a biotechnology company is one that is 
developing diagnostic or therapeutic products that contains biological components such 
as peptides, proteins or antibodies.  The biological nature of the products distinguishes 
these biotech companies from those whose products were based on small molecule 
chemicals.  However, it is important to note that the distinction between biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical companies has become blurred as the methodologies employed in 
discovering, characterising and developing chemical based drugs may in turn utilise 
modern biotechnologies.  Colloquially ‘biotech company’ is often used to refer to 
smaller, younger companies in the field of drug development (even if they are 
developing chemical-based drugs) and ‘pharmaceutical company’ used to describe the 
larger well established companies even though most of them now develop biological 
drugs as well as small-molecule chemical drugs.  The use of the term biotech firm in 
this thesis intends this more colloquial use of the term. 
 
The application of biotechnology to drug development carries the promise of more 
effective treatments for disease, based on a better understanding of biology.  
Commercialisation is a vital step in realizing the capital (intellectual and financial) tied 
up in biotech ventures, and is the process by which these life enhancing treatments are 
brought to patients.  Whilst invention is the embodiment of a novel concept into a 
design, commercialisation is the process of taking the design from the drawing board or 
the laboratory and transforming it in such a way that it may be traded in the market 
place.  Commercialisation is only successful when returns are obtained that exceed the 
accrued investment.  However, over the thirty years that biotechnology has been applied 
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to the therapeutics sector, biotech start-ups have accumulated losses of more than 
USD40 billion (Hamilton, 2004).   
 
The sheer scale on which the therapeutic biotech sector operates magnifies the rewards 
gained from a better understanding of commercialisation strategy in these firms.  One of 
the objectives of this thesis is to provide a full description of the strategic issues facing 
biotech start-ups in the commercialisation process, as a first step in this direction.  This 
is approached in two ways.  The first is by examining the issues that have faced the 
industry as a whole since its inception until now, and is covered in this chapter.  The 
second way is through the examination of the strategic issues facing the case study 
companies, and is presented in the first results chapter. 
 
In addition to providing an understanding of key strategic issues in the industry, this 
chapter also provides a background to the case studies and empirical work in this thesis.  
I begin with an examination of why context is important to strategy research.  I then 
examine the concept ‘value chain’ and how it relates to product development in the 
biotech sector and to business models.  A historical overview of the business of drug 
development is then presented, from the early pharmaceutical companies and first 
biotechnology pioneers, to the current abundance of biotech start-ups and their close 
working relationships with big pharma.  Throughout this review the focus is on the 
strategic issues that have been faced in the commercialisation of biotechnologies and 
how these issues have driven typical business models.  
2.1 The importance of context 
 
This thesis is about commercialisation strategy – the process of earning a financial 
return on an innovation by interacting with its value chain either in the market for ideas 
or in the product market.  Commercialisation strategy is multi-faceted and necessitates 
the consideration of factors that are both internal and external to the firm. 
 
Pettigrew (1990) talks about the importance of context in studying organisational 
change – it is a rich explanation that describes equally well the importance of context 
when studying strategy.  He talks about the importance of embeddedness.  Strategy 
should be considered within interconnected levels of analysis.  For instance, the global 
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economic climate impacts the drug-development industry which in turn impacts 
individual biotech companies.  On another dimension, strategies are embedded within a 
temporal aspect and can be studied in relation to past, present or future phenomena.  
Johns (2006) also suggests these levels of analysis be considered in research design.  
Pettigrew talks about the need to explore context and action (Pettigrew, 1990; 1997b) – 
context is a product of action and vice versa.  Thus strategy needs to be studied through 
holistic and multi-faceted analysis.   
 
The biotech sector has some unique features – the majority of firms occupy a position 
between university-based basic research and the large pharmaceutical companies.  They 
typically undertake only a portion of the activities in the value chain required to bring 
an innovation to market as they rarely have the resources and capabilities that enable 
full product development and marketing.  On top of this there may be a high degree of 
technological uncertainty underlying the innovation itself.  These features of the sector 
no doubt influence the strategies that biotech firms employ during commercialisation. 
 
This chapter sets the scene for the rest of my thesis by exploring the relationship 
between context and commercialisation strategy over time at the industry level.  It will 
provide a high-level understanding of the environment in which the case-study firms 
operate. 
 
It begins with an overview of the value chain for drug development and then discusses 
how the industry value chain is related to a firm’s commercialisation strategy and 
business model.  I then review the historical development of the drug development 
industry from traditional big pharma companies to modern start-up biotechnology firms.  
My main focus is on how and why typical business models have changed over time.   
 
2.2 The value chain   
 
Porter (1985) introduced the concept of the value chain in his book Competitive 
Advantage, using the term to describe all the activities a firm performs and how they 
interact.  He described how a firm’s value chain is embedded in a larger stream of 
activities called the value system.  Typically, in the process of biotech drug 
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development, firms will take up one or a number of the activities required to take a 
product from discovery to market.  Although Porter originally coined the phrase value 
system to describe this entire process, practitioners typically refer to it as the value 
chain, using the term to cover activities carried out upstream, downstream and in 
parallel to the activities undertaken in their own firm.  The colloquial use of the term is 
used in this thesis. 
 
The value chain is an essential concept in biotech commercialisation strategy because it 
is composed of a matrix of supply chain relationships along the drug discovery process, 
with only a small handful of biotech companies engaged in the full value chain from 
research and development through to marketing (Saviotti, 1998).  The vast majority of 
biotech firms exploit a small or specialised niche in the chain.  The nature of the value 
chain is likely to evolve over the course of the product life cycle – through the stages of 
development, commercialisation, maximum profitability and generic substitution.  This 
added dimension significantly increases the complexity of the value chain concept.  For 
simplicity the value chain described here  relates only to the development and 
commercialisation phase of the life cycle.  The commonly understood generic value 
chain for drug development has been described in figure 2-1. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Generic value chain for drug development 
Source: Medicon Valley Drug and Device Development Guide 
 
The pharmaceutical value chain is characterized by two quite different focuses.  The 
first focus is on the business of scientific innovation – discovering and developing a 
lead drug candidate by taking it through various stages of screening and pre-clinical 
testing in the lab and phase I and II trials which involve testing the compound in a small 
number of human subjects.  A phase II trial is usually aimed at achieving a clinical 
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proof of concept.  The second focus is on commercialisation of the innovation and 
involves gathering information required by regulators and customers and 
communicating it to them.  Activities are targeted at phase III clinical trials, regulatory 
approval processes, marketing and selling, and phase IV post-marketing studies. 
 
In the pharma biotech sector the drug development process and value chain are often 
casually viewed as synonymous.  It is important to remember that the commonly 
understood drug development process characterizes an abbreviated and generic value 
chain.  Whilst it outlines the major stages involved in getting a drug from concept to 
market, it does not indicate how multiple parties may interact with the value chain 
around any one stage, and it lumps a lot of the downstream activities together under 
marketing and selling, without giving an indication of the myriad of different 
approaches that may be taken between regulatory approval and consumer consumption.  
The actual value chain applicable to any particular commercialisation project may vary 
significantly.  A better description may actually be the ‘value web’ (Davenport, Leibold 
and Voelpel, 2006) – as biotech firms are usually dependent on a tangled web of service 
providers and strategic partners.  The vast majority of biotech firms either contract or 
collaborate for access to a wide variety of skills and complementary assets that are vital 
to the development of their own innovation, or they provide know-how and services that 
other firms are reliant on.  
 
It is argued that each firm should aim to insert their product, service or intellectual 
property into the value chain at the point, and using a transaction mechanism, that will 
maximize its value creation.  Full integration is not an option for most biotech firms due 
to a limitation in financial and human resources.  One of the tasks in the development of 
a commercialisation strategy is to evaluate the costs, rewards and risks of participating 
further down the value chain, enabling the firm to control more of the product 
development, manufacturing and marketing activities.   
2.3 Commercialisation strategy and the business model 
 
A firm’s commercialisation strategy outlines ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ it will interact 
with its value chain to create value.  These decisions are embodied in its business 
model.  ‘What’ describes the final product offering.  In the pharmaceutical sector this 
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involves the therapeutic indications that will be sought with regulatory agencies.  For 
example, in the case of a product for relieving pain ‘what’ will need to differentiate 
between acute pain and chronic pain, the type of underlying disease that will be targeted 
(e.g. cancer pain or lower back pain) and the presentation of the product (e.g. tablet, 
transdermal patch or injection). ‘When’ describes the point in the value chain that a 
firms decides to earn a return on its innovation. For example a firm may decide to sell or 
license a drug candidate soon after its discovery, or after pre-clinical testing or after 
phase I, II or III clinical trials.  ‘How’ refers to the revenue model that the firm uses to 
create a financial return on its innovation.  Examples include direct physical product 
sales, licensing of technology for royalty payments, sale of technology and outright sale 
of the entire firm.  The revenue model describes the transaction mehanism through 
which value flows back to the firm. 
 
The business model describes aspects of how the firm interacts with its value chain.  
With limited financial resources, the vast majority of biotech firms start out life as 
RIPCOs – research intensive (or royalty income) pharmaceutical companies, with a 
focus on the earlier stages in the value chain such as discovery and pre-clinical 
development.  The RIPCO model covers platform and tool based companies seeking to 
commercialise drug targets, services and technologies that can be sold or licensed to 
other companies.  At some point in the product development process a RIPCO will plug 
into the value chain by contracting with one or more alliance partners who have the 
resources and/or capabilities to move the product development project further along the 
value chain.  A RIPCO may not necessarily earn revenues at the time that they initially 
plug into the value chain, as revenues may be contingent on achievements being made 
by the alliance partner further along the product development process.  A newly 
emerging business model is the FIDDO – fully integrated drug discovery and 
development organization (Burns, 2005).  In this model, platform companies are 
extending their existing capabilities in order to take an innovation further along the 
product development process, with the expectation of entering into an alliance or 
licensing agreement on more favourable terms than can be achievable under the RIPCO 
model.  Other typical business models include NRDO – the no research development 
only model whereby a company in-licenses product from big pharmaceutical companies 
that are already in preclinical or clinical testing e.g. The Medicines Company (Pfeffer, 
2005) and FIPCO/FIBCO – fully integrated pharmaceutical/biopharmaceutical company 
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whereby the company’s strategy is to build and fully integrate most parts of the drug 
discovery and development chain (Pfeffer, 2005).  Given the large amount of capital 
required, few biotech firms attain this model although many dream of it.  A more recent 
concept is the FIPNET business model, whereby companies may outsource / contract 
extensively for services at any point(s) in the value chain providing access to 
complementary assets outside the firm, in a way that they maintain control of the 
product development process and defer the point at which they plug into the value 
chain. Hybrid business models may be used by platform or tool based companies that 
enjoy stable revenues from licensing or sales, while attracting investors or utilizing their 
own income stream to develop products. 
 
Business models must be adaptable to changes within the organizational field in which a 
firm operates.  Biotech (drug development) firms operate within the organisational field 
of healthcare.  Biotech firms are generally targeting global markets with their 
technologies.  Thus their value chains have a complicated interdependence on the health 
systems of key international markets, many of which are rationalizing their cost 
structures meaning reimbursement policies of centralised government procurement 
agencies and managed healthcare organisations are a key element of consideration in 
commercialisation strategy.  Biotech companies also have a significant interdependence 
with the local and global capital markets that fund drug development.   
2.4 Drug development 
 
Pharmaceutical firms, and biotech firms are amongst the producer companies in the 
field of healthcare, supplying therapeutic products that are just one part of the larger 
value chain of healthcare provision.  Although there is an overlap between these two 
types of firms (in that pharmaceutical firms may use biotechnologies, and biotech firms 
are involved in pharmaceutical development), the term ‘pharmaceutical firm’ is often 
used to describe the firms that were founded on chemistry-based small molecule 
products, and biotech firm to describe firms that were founded on biological approaches 
to disease treatment and which may base a therapeutic on proteins, peptides, 
monoclonal antibodies or some other biological component. 
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Prior to the launch of the first biotech drugs in the early 1980s, products of the 
pharmaceutical industry were based on small chemical molecules that were typically 
used to bind to a target to start or stop a biological process. These molecules are called 
‘small’ as they are much smaller than the proteins found in biotech drugs.  Small 
molecules have the advantage of being able to be taken orally (usually), and in some 
cases of being able to cross the blood-brain barrier.  Most small molecule drugs are used 
to inhibit processes in the body.  Biotech drugs, are based on much larger, more 
complex structures such as proteins, peptides (protein fragments), or antibodies, which 
may be administered to supplement or replace molecules no longer being produced 
adequately in a disease state.  Being much larger molecules they are often destroyed if 
taken orally and are usually given by injection, inhalation or other novel approaches. 
 
Whether small molecule or larger molecule biotech drugs, the drug development 
process involves high risk, long time-frames and massive investment.  The typical time-
span for the development of a drug is 10-17 years.  A drug can spend 6-12 years in the 
pre-clinical optimisation stage and another 4-5 years in clinical trials.  High 
technological risk means that only around 2-3 drugs actually reach regulatory approval 
status for every 100 drug development projects that are initiated (and these in turn 
usually reflect around 10,000 compounds screened).  Conversely, this means that  there 
are 97-98 dry wells for every 2-3 drugs launched.  Of an average R&D cost of roughly 
US$800 million for every product that reaches market, around two thirds of the cost 
may be attributable to dry well efforts (Northup, 2005). 
Traditional pharmaceutical companies – ‘Big Pharma’ 
 
History 
Whilst the oldest biotech companies are only a little over thirty years old, the oldest 
pharmaceutical and chemical company in the world is Merck KGaA (Darmstadt, 
Germany) at well over 300 years old, having been founded as a pharmacy 1668.  It is 
still owned by the Merck family today (www.merck.de).   
 
The modern pharmaceutical industry was established around the 1870s and 1880s with 
the postulation by Paul Ehrlich of the existence of chemoreceptors that could be 
exploited therapeutically (Drews, 2000) and with the emergence of modern 
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transportation and communication which facilitated mass production and national and 
international distribution (Chandler, 2005).  The industry initially developed in quite 
different directions in Europe and the United States.  In Europe, modern pharmaceutical 
companies grew out of organic chemistry based chemical companies and focused on the 
development of patented prescription medicines. In the United States the first modern 
pharmaceutical companies were large wholesalers that sold both the patented 
prescription medicines manufactured by others (typically German and Swiss 
companies) as well as in-house developed age-old remedies which were more 
commonly sold as over-the-counter or ‘OTC’ drugs (Chandler, 2005).   
 
During World War I, German products were embargoed, leading the American drug 
companies to develop their own new products.  During the 1920s and 1930s several 
companies developed significant capabilities in the development of prescription 
medicines across multiple therapeutic categories, although most American companies 
retained their focus on OTC products.  Importantly, prescription and OTC product paths 
required different technical and functional capabilities.  Whilst prescription drug 
development depended on a research intensive path and selling drugs to pharmacists and 
doctors, the OTC path relied on branding, advertising and packaging products for mass 
consumer markets. 
 
World War II and the development of penicillin and sulfa drugs transformed the 
pharmaceutical industry, by providing funding to expand research and facilities, and 
bringing more companies into the production of prescription drugs – both in the US and 
in Europe.  Many novel drug classes followed the development of antibiotics, and 
included steroids, antihistamines, analgesics and drugs for heart disease, cancer, 
diabetes and other diseases.   
 
The war-driven wave of new drugs began to wane in the 1960s.  US pharmaceutical 
companies began to diversify.  The OTC focused companies tended to diversify into 
related consumer products such as soaps, cosmetics and cleaners, whilst the research 
intensive companies tended to diversify into the OTC and consumer product markets.  
Some began to enter the medical instrumentation and device markets.  The European 
pharmaceutical companies continued to focus on prescription drugs. 
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The 1970s saw two fresh waves of innovation in pharmaceutical development and an 
increase in focus by the American companies on prescription drugs. These included 
antidepressants (including Prozac) and antipsychotics, which they now recognised as a 
more generous source of profit than OTC drugs.  The sources of innovation came firstly 
from scientific breatkthroughs in biochemistry, microbiology and enzymology and 
secondly from the emergence of modern biotechnology.   
 
The pharmaceutical industry has a long-standing tradition in small-molecule chemical 
drugs.  The early firms accumulated learning that in time created powerful barriers to 
entry (Chandler, 2005) as did the economies of scope (including risk mitigation) that 
they enjoyed by sharing the costs of equipment, personnel and knowledge across 
multiple product lines. They also enjoyed a lower cost of money due to reinvestment 
from their positive cash flows (Northup, 2005).  This was evidenced by the fact that no 
new drug company had emerged since Syntex in the 1950s (Southwick, 1999), and no 
others since the 1920s.  The new learning in biochemistry, microbiology and 
enzymology expanded rather than displaced their capabilities giving them new tools in 
the discovery and R&D of small molecule drugs and taking them into the era of 
‘rational drug design’ as compared to the previous hit-or-miss approach. 
 
Present day issues 
Drug development is a long and risky process, with 10-12 years being the typical time-
span from discovery to market launch.  Drug fallout occurs all along the discovery time 
line, and the later a failure occurs the bigger the hole in the pipeline it creates.  In order 
to cushion the blow from inevitable failures pharmaceutical companies frontload the 
system with additional opportunities at each stage of the development process.  This 
means that they have more viable phase II candidates than are taken into phase III, more 
viable phase I candidates than are taken into phase II and so forth back through the 
development path.  Thus when one opportunity fails it is possible to reach back just one 
level to bring forward a new opportunity (Northup, 2005). 
 
With their focus on the rational design of small molecule drugs these big 
pharmaceutical firms were slow to realize the potential of the newly emerging 
biotechnologies that were outside their learned organisational capabilities (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986).  This meant that biotechnology innovations were typically developed 
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by start-up firms rather than the incumbent pharmaceutical giants.  By the time big 
pharma realized where biotechnology was headed they were well behind in capabilities 
and competencies.  At the same time many were struggling to front-end stack their 
pipelines based on their internal R&D programs.   
 
At first big pharma tried to develop their own in-house skills in the biotechnologies but 
they could no longer rely on their accumulated organisational capabilities and it turned 
out that they could not catch up with the flexible, entrepreneurial and innovative biotech 
companies that had emerged seemingly from nowhere.  By the late 1980s the 
pharmaceutical industry began to realize that they would be unable to maintain their 
growth rates solely on the basis of their internal research programs and began to look to 
the biotech sector as a source of innovation and products to feed their pipelines.  In-
licensing and partnering strategies also provide the ability to ‘plug-in’ development 
projects at exactly the right time to replace failed products (Northup, 2005).   
 
Traditional FIPCOs relied on a particular kind of pipeline to maintain their dominance.  
The pipeline of block-buster drugs was the key to having a sustainable competitive 
advantage in a large market.  A block-buster drug is one that has peak annual revenues 
of over US$1 billion and is labelled for use by the general population (Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, 2005).  In 2001 only 1.5% of the top selling 5,000 pharmaceutical molecules 
had revenues of over US$1 billion (Northup, 2005).  High revenue potential in the 
pharmaceutical industry is concentrated in a relatively small number of diseases.  For 
example 50% of the potential cumulative value is found in just 33 diseases, 75% in just 
70 diseases and 90% in just 116 diseases (Northup, 2005).  Blockbuster products were 
typically small molecule drugs targeting diseases or symptoms that had common 
occurrence in the general population such as pain, hypertension or gastric ulcer.   
 
Aspinall and Hamermesh (2007) suggest that the blockbuster model’s days are 
numbered.  The identification and development of new blockbuster treatments is 
becoming more difficult.  Although total R&D spend on drug development has tripled 
since 1990, the number of new molecular entities approved by the FDA has declined by 
nearly a quarter.  Furthermore, an increasing number of innovative new drugs are 
targeted in their action, meaning they are effective in treating only subpopulations of 
people with a given disease.  As a result, the major pharmaceutical companies have not 
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been able to create enough new blockbuster drugs to offset the decline in sales from 
those coming off patent. 
 
The implication of moving away from the blockbuster model is that scale will be less 
relevant.  Clinical trials will become smaller for targeted drugs, hence big pharma’s 
abilities to conduct large multi-country trials involving thousands of patients is of less 
value.  Drugs will be better differentiated and compete on merits, thus scale will be less 
relevant in advertising and sales too.  It is also likely that reimbursement models will 
change to reflect pay-for-performance to ensure that drugs are targeted only where they 
are effective (Beyond Borders, 2008).   
 
With the low hanging fruit plucked, the remaining unmet needs in drug therapy now 
require much more complex solutions than those typically provided by small molecule 
drugs.  These solutions are being sought from a wide range of technological 
innovations, which in turn require a wider range of R&D programs to deliver them.   
 
In addition to declining R&D productivity large pharmaceuticals also face a momentous 
loss in revenue due to the large number of block buster products that are and will be 
coming off patent in the next few years (see Figure 2-2).  Their response has been two-
fold in nature.  Firstly, they are buying pipeline assets.  This is attested to by the record 
numbers of deals done between pharmaceutical and biotech companies in 2006 and 
2007 (Beyond Borders, 2008).  Secondly, they are cutting costs through job reductions 
– many of which involve R&D personnel in addition to sales force staff.  In cutting back 
their in-house R&D capabilities large pharmaceutical companies are becoming more 
dependent on small biotechnology companies for the innovation required to drive their 
pipelines. 
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Figure 2-2 The problem: patent expirations 2007-2012 
 
What happened to the gale of creative destruction? 
One of the surprising observations during the evolution of the biotech sector is that the 
emergence of radically new competence destroying technologies (leading to a 
technological discontinuity) did not lead to an anticipated gale of creative destruction, 
with the older pharmaceutical companies being replaced by the newer biotechnology 
based companies.  The defining characteristic of a competence-destroying technological 
discontinuity is that a significantly new set of capabilities is required for product 
development (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  For example, biological drugs made 
from monoclonal antibodies use completely new discovery, screening and 
manufacturing techniques compared to traditional small molecule drug development.  
Usually such major changes in skill requirements and production processes are 
associated with major changes in the industry leadership (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986).  However, this has not been the case in the drug development industry.  Several 
new players have emerged (Genentech, Amgen, Biogen) but they have not wrested the 
dominant position from the larger pharmaceutical companies. 
 
Price and the unprofitability of replacing still serviceable water and steam operated 
manufacturing plants were behind the slow spread of electricity (David, 1990).  
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Regulatory hurdles are a major reason for the slow spread of biotechnologies in 
healthcare.  They are the main reason drug development is so expensive and takes so 
many years.  These regulatory hurdles also now apply to small molecule drugs, but the 
hurdles weren’t so large in the earlier years of the pharmaceutical industry.  The huge 
development costs caused by regulation must then be recouped in the product cost when 
it goes to market, which may mean biotech drugs are only taken up by patients and 
national health systems that can afford them.  There are many small molecule drugs that 
are perfectly suitable in the clinical indications they are used in, and small molecule 
drugs are still being developed, so it’s unlikely that the small molecule technological 
regime will be completely replaced with the biotech-drug technological regime... at least 
for many many years and not until biotechnology has developed to a point at which the 
gulf between the therapeutic benefits of biotech drugs over small molecule drugs has 
widened so that small molecule drugs appear ineffective in comparison. This is likely to 
occur in selected disease states rather than in totality - biotech drugs are already proving 
superior in oncology, but perhaps not in hypertension for example. 
 
This transformation from one technological regime to another may be consistent with 
what Schumpeter meant by creative destruction.  In the case of the drug development 
sector long product development and regulatory lead times means that the 
transformation of technological regimes is occurring over decades rather than months or 
years. This provides time for large, financially strong companies to evolve rather than 
be supplanted by newer smaller companies with strong capabilities in the new 
technological regime.  
 
The crux of the matter may be what Schumpeter meant by ‘the process of creative 
destruction’. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2002) appear to think creative destruction means the 
overthrow of incumbents in an industry.  This may be too narrow an understanding of 
what Schumpeter meant.  Schumpeter talks about an evolutionary process, a perennial 
gale.  This conjures a picture of constant relentless change, as opposed to a single gale 
that blows hard and knocks over incumbents (Schumpeter, 1950). 
 
Although the incumbents have not been over-thrown, the organizational field of drug 
development has changed dramatically.  The drug development value chain has been 
shattered so that traditional pharmaceutical companies no longer dominate it 
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completely, but remain very powerful because of their control of complementary assets 
such as regulatory know-how, manufacturing (to some extent), financial capital, and 
marketing and distribution capability.  It could be that it was their capabilities in these 
areas that prevented the gale of creative destruction that was expected to accompany the 
new technologies. As predicted by Tushman and Anderson (1986) the competence-
destroying technological discontinuity of biotechnology has lowered the barriers to 
entry of participating in the drug development industry leading to a huge influx of small 
start-up companies. 
The emergence and adolescence of biotech  
 
The dawning of a new era 
Biotechnology is not new.  Humans have been genetically manipulating living things 
for thousands of years - plants and animals have been selectively bred and 
microorganisms have been used to make wine, cheese, beer and bread.  Commercial 
biotechnology, as we recognize it today, began in the mid 1970s after Stanley Cohen at 
Stanford University and Herbert Boyer at the University of California at San Francisco 
demonstrated the ability to splice genes and express foreign proteins in bacteria.  
Around the same time, Kohler and Milstein described a cell line able to produce 
monoclonal antibodies.  Recombinant DNA and monoclonal antibody technologies 
were amongst the first technologies in the modern biotechnology era.  Cohen and 
Boyer’s recombinant DNA techniques led directly to the formation of Genentech, the 
first company specifically founded to commercialise modern biotechnology.  Genentech 
used gene splicing technology to produce recombinant human insulin, which later 
became the first recombinant DNA drug to be approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
 
Whilst the early to late 1970s saw the formation of approximately 20 biotech start-ups 
per year, from 1980 to 1987 that number jumped to around 75 companies per year 
(Beyond Borders, 2006).  This jump-start to the biotech industry was triggered by three 
key developments in 1980.  The first was the landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that allowed for the patenting of genetically 
engineered life forms.  That was followed by the first initial public offering of the 
biotech industry – Genetech’s price rocketed from $35 to $89 before closing at $71 on 
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its first day.  Finally, late in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act was passed in the US. increasing 
universities’s incentives for technology transfer, commercialisation and start-up 
formation. 
 
Despite a phenomenally successful initial public stock offering in 1980, Genentech did 
not have sufficient resources to fully develop and commercialise its first product, so it 
licensed the technology for recombinant human insulin to Eli Lilly in 1982 (Robbins-
Roth, 2000).  However, tapping revenues from insulin, Genentech became the first 
biotechnology company to develop into a biopharmaceutical company capable of 
commercializing its own biotech product when in 1985 it launched human growth 
hormone.  Genentech thus made it to FIPCO status – it had become a fully integrated 
pharmaceutical company.   
 
Critical mass, but failing capital markets 
By the second half of the 1980s the biotech sector was gathering a critical mass and 
counted around 150 publicly traded companies and about 700 privately held firms in the 
US alone (Beyond Borders, 2006). Many early biotech companies sought to become 
fully vertically integrated, covering the value chain from drug discovery and 
development through to production, and marketing.  Companies such as Genentech, 
Chiron, Biogen and Amgen were successful enough to achieve independence.  
However, companies following in their footsteps discovered that there was a limited 
amount of funding that would support high cash-flow burn companies, a situation that 
became increasingly more intense as biotechnology companies proliferated in number.   
 
By the late 1980s (and following the ‘Black Monday’ stock market crash of October 
1987) the capital markets were largely unwilling to support the huge hunger for finance 
to drive biotech firms that had now been recognized as facing significant challenges.  
These are described by Sammut (2005) as follows: 
- the complex path of preclinical research and clinical development 
- the ever expanding and evolving body of scientific knowledge and its related 
global base of intellectual property  
- regulatory goal posts that are continually moving in response to new knowledge 
and understanding created by technological advancement 
- volatility of the capital markets 
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- dependency on large pharmaceutical companies that are facing productivity and 
earnings crises leading to massive industry consolidation 
 
The earlier biotech companies were able to achieve FIPCO status because funding was 
available.  However, with capital markets becoming drier and imposing lower 
valuations, the FIPCO business model became more of a dream than reality.  Clearly, 
new business models were required – companies turned to deals. 
 
The 1990s started with Roche’s acquisition of 60 percent of Genentech – a deal of mega 
proportions that allowed Genentech to continue to pursue its research driven agenda and 
gave Roche access to a strong research engine and pipeline of products to feed its 
marketing machine.  In the US the early 1990s were characterised by unprecedented 
largess in the private and public capital markets, driven in part by the Genentech-Roche 
mega deal as well as by other drivers in the economy.  Investments were made widely 
across various sub-sectors of the biotech sector.  Several promising drugs were in phase 
III clinical trials and company valuations reached levels that were detached from their 
underlying prospects.  When many of the biotechnology block buster drug candidates 
did not survive clinical trials the industry lost favour with the capital markets.  
Valuations for public biotech companies tumbled across the board.  Financial support 
(private and public) for the sector plummeted and the biotech sector languished until 
late in the decade. 
 
The partnering model 
When the FIPCO model became only a dream, the partnering model became essentially 
the only option for most biotechnology companies.  In the mid to late 1990s partnering 
negotiations were being carried out under two constraints:  pharmaceutical companies 
still largely believed they could fill their pipeline with products from their own research 
efforts; and up until the generous capital markets of late 1999 and early 2000 most 
biotech companies were cash poor and were often in need of a deal (Williams, 2005). 
 
The logic of pharma-biotech alliances from the financial perspective of the biotech 
company is obvious.  The typical cost of developing a drug is several hundred million 
dollars with around 70% of the cost occurring during the clinical development and FDA 
approval stages.  Furthermore, established pharmaceutical companies also have vast 
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experience in managing large clinical trials and in dealing with health authorities for 
regulatory approval, and in dealing with reimbursement agencies.  Small, flexible and 
entrepreneurial biotech companies excel at innovative research and have proved more 
productive than the large cumbersome R&D machines of the large pharmaceutical 
companies.  The biotech company offers the pharmaceutical company access to 
promising technology, libraries of candidate compounds or patented targets or treatment 
modalities.  The risk profile of a drug under development improves dramatically as it 
passes the phase II milestone of clinical proof of concept, so this can be a good time for 
a pharmaceutical company to pick up a drug development project.  This is also often the 
time at which clinical developments costs escalate dramatically and can be difficult for 
small biotech firms to fund. From a risk management perspective, alliances allow the 
risks of new drug development to be allocated to the markets most suitable to bear them 
– the high risks of early stage product development are borne by venture capital 
investors, and the lower risks of later stage product development are borne by publicly 
traded pharmaceutical companies whose shareholders are relatively risk adverse 
(Tyebjee and Hardin, 2004). 
 
Through necessity due to the scarcity of capital most companies persevered by 
aggressively entering into license and partnering agreements with big pharma 
companies.  It was a time when neither biotech start-ups nor large pharmaceutical 
companies had much choice other than to collaborate.  The spiralling costs of healthcare 
meant that reimbursement organisations were flatly refusing to endorse any new drug 
unless it was truly an innovative product.  Pharmaceutical companies perceived the risk 
that biotech companies with their innovative pipelines would eventually come up with 
the capital required to provide a serious threat of competition. Some segments of the 
biotech industry were simply devoured early on, for example combinatorial chemistry 
companies (Scarlett, 1999).  Cash-rich pharmaceutical companies had their pick among 
biotech start-ups who often had little negotiating power, and would sell their firstborn – 
their most advanced product - to a pharmaceutical company that would assume the costs 
of clinical development and commercialisation in exchange for an upfront cash payment 
and the promise of milestone payments and royalties.  For the biotech start-up the 
upfront cash kept the company alive and the deal enhanced credibility in the financial 
markets.  The pharmaceutical company bought promising products mainly on the basis 
of deferred success fees that were deeply discounted because of the great risk assumed – 
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the balance of power was clearly in favour of the larger pharmaceutical companies.  As 
Scarlett (1999) says “By the mid to late 1990s, these partnering deals had killed the 
biotechnology industry’s ability to even hope to execute on a FIPCO model – precisely 
what the pharmaceutical companies had feared the most.” 
 
Platform companies and the genomic biotech bubble  
Despite the scarcity of new capital in the mid-1990s the core venture capital firms 
specializing in biotechnology scouted for new opportunities based on new business 
models.  They were attracted to the ‘tool box’ companies – that provided products and 
services around instrumentations and bioinformatic services to the institutions and firms 
working on the sequencing of the human genome.  Some of them forward integrated 
into sequencing and patenting genes and on the whole tool box companies enjoyed 
impressive profits.  This inspired investor confidence that biotech companies could 
make money even if they were not fully integrated and bringing a product all the way to 
market (Sammut, 2005). 
 
The rise of the technology platform companies (mid 1990s to early 2000s) provide an 
interesting exploration of the effect of environmental drivers on biotech business 
models.  Technology platform companies in the fields of genomics and proteomics were 
created during the period surrounding completion of the Human Genome Project (2000-
2001).  Their key challenge was the translation of the basic research and data 
accumulated in the Human Genome Project into commercial products in human health.   
 
The original focus of the genome scientists was the development of the tools, such as 
high-volume nucleotide sequencing, to characterize genomes (of various species).  This 
gave rise to the tool box companies.  The focus subsequently evolved into the 
expression and function of both genes (genomics) and proteins (proteomics).  The 
genomics and proteomics companies that emerged are the ‘technology platform’ 
companies.  To quote Sammut (2005):  
The underlying scientific and investment hypotheses are that each company would 
occupy one or more definable points in the target identification, validation, and drug 
discovery process using the cues provided by the sequences of genes that coded for 
specific proteins and their interaction in defining health and disease (p.197).  
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Thus platform companies would provide not only new targets for drugs, but often drug 
candidates for further testing and development.  Platform companies proliferated based 
upon their initially persuasive commercial prospects. 
 
The platform company Human Genome Services negotiated a partnership with 
SmithKline Beecham (a large pharmaceutical company) that became a model for a large 
number of genomics companies entering into strategic alliances with nearly all the 
major pharmaceutical companies worldwide.  As Sammut (2005) details, the primary 
components of this model assumed: 
- proprietary accumulation of gene sequences and related patents 
- licensing of those rights as a portfolio for specified disease conditions 
- access to data developed by the platform companies when characterizing the role 
of particular genes in drug targeting 
- bilateral participation in the discovery program on an exclusive basis within the 
agreed upon development focus 
- revenues to the platform company in the form of up-front contract and license 
fees, bonus payments on the completion of milestones toward the identification 
and validation of targets, and identification of drug candidates 
- typically shared costs (clinical development, regulatory, marketing) and profits 
from sales in specified geographies, and royalties on sales in other geographies. 
 
This model was expected to create value either through a generous annuity of royalties, 
or ideally through the creation of drugs that the platform companies might bring to 
market directly.  The parties (platform companies and big pharma companies) would 
enter into a licensing deal whereby financial resources were provided to the biotech firm 
in order to take the products to a pre-determined level of completion, whereupon the 
product for technology would be transferred to the pharmaceutical company.  The level 
of royalties would depend on the state of advancement of the product or technology at 
licensing, whether in-licensing of third party IP was required, cost of manufacturing, 
market size and pricing (Sammut, 2005).  A few typical structures characterize the 
range of relationships between them.  These are referred to as therapeutic area alliances, 
data mining alliances, technology development alliances and technology transfer 
alliances (Sammut, 2005). 
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Hot on the heels of the dot.com bubble, a biotech bubble emerged that was of 
unprecedented scale.  Starting in late 1999 biotech stocks soared and record numbers of 
companies went public raising record values of capital (Beyond Borders, 2006).  
Although genomics (platform) companies benefited the most, the bubble also boosted 
the stocks of other biotech companies. 
 
The hype of the Human Genome Project combined with the high-technology boom in 
the financial markets lead to a massive influx of capital to the sector in 2000 (see figures 
2-3 and 2-4).  Capital raised in the biotech sector in the US alone exceeded US$32bn in 
this year – more than any other year before (Williams, 2005) or since.  Many of the 
more mature biotech companies were able to raise funds far in excess of their burn rates, 
significantly reduced their risk of financial failure.   
 
 
Figure 2-3 US financing 1998-2008 
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Figure 2-4 European financing 1999-2008 
 
The platform business model was simple, but unfortunately the science was not.  
Proteins are structurally more complicated than the genes that express them.  As 
Sammut (2005) describes, the uncertainty and issues that derive from this technological 
complexity meant that while licensing deals were made on the assumption that drug 
targets would be identified and validated, various biological, intellectual property and 
operational issues confounded the relationships:  
1. The identification of a gene sequence did not necessarily reveal the function of a 
corresponding protein 
2. Insufficient data exists to understand the effects of genetic deviations 
3. The function or absence of a protein does not necessarily characterize the related 
disease or point to a means of treatment 
4. Complexity is added through aberrations in protein folding 
5. Many diseases are multi-factorial and may involve several genes 
6. Often a wider range of technical capability and greater capital was required than 
anticipated at the outset 
7. Patent protection of genes, their utility or presumed drug targets turned out to be 
a lot more difficult than anticipated. 
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With all these technological complexities the revenues and profits that biotech firms 
gained from their pharmaceutical company alliances failed to meet investor 
expectations.  Sammut (2005) says:  
It was the fragmentation of capability, the disappointing pace of discovery, and the 
short term inability of the companies to create an annuity from alliances or from 
products directly marketed that led to a loss of faith by the investment community 
….. the anticipated cash streams from the sale of drugs based on genomic/proteomic 
discoveries will take a decade or two longer than expected (p.207).   
Investors pulled out of the sector in droves and the IPO window slammed shut, leading 
to a dearth of IPOs for several quarters. 
 
It is now widely understood that platform companies can earn fair returns, but not the 
margins of product companies. This is recognised by their market capitalization values. 
The effect of all of this has been a major shift in business model for many platform 
companies, moving further down the drug development value chain with the goal of 
out-licensing a more valuable product, or co-marketing and moving toward full 
integration.   
 
After the genomic biotech bubble burst 
Many new companies were started in 2000 with venture capital funds, but the 
subsequent 2001/2002 fall in the markets following the dot.com bust meant many 
struggled to find follow-on funding.  Companies looking to raise money in the IPO 
market found the window firmly shut (Beyond Borders, 2008). While many companies 
were fragile, there were a significant number (perhaps 300-500) that had the funds to 
progress their projects further and get well into phase II or further before looking for a 
deal with big pharma.  At the same time it became apparent that the pipelines of the 
large pharmaceutical companies were going to be insufficient to drive growth just at a 
time when many block-buster drugs were coming off patent.  Now (2000-2003), there 
were biotech companies coming from a position of strength in their partnering 
negotiations with big pharma (Williams, 2005).   
The recent years 
Until the global financial crisis of 2008 the recent years (2004-2007) have seen the 
financial markets being relatively kind to biotech firms.  Whilst not as heady as the days 
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of the genomics bubble, the IPO market has provided consistent access to capital for 
quality firms and has generally supported follow-on funding.  Venture capital 
investment in the sector has steadily increased, reaching a peak in 2007.  It seems that 
biotech may have been coming of age, as aggregate industry losses in the US (amongst 
publicly listed companies) has fallen to 0.5% of revenues in 2007 after starting the 
decade at around 18% and peaking at 31% in 2002 (Beyond Borders, 2008). 
 
The years 2006 and 2007 saw a substantial upswing in the total value of pharma-biotech 
alliances, as well as significant increases in biotech-biotech alliances (Beyond Borders, 
2008).  This likely reflected the increased pressure big pharma was feeling as major 
patent-off dates loom for blockbuster drugs and the fact that the capital markets for 
IPOs and follow-on funding, as well as venture capital, have been relatively favourable.  
Another factor may be the realisation that IPO returns to investors have been shrinking 
and that M&A (merger and acquisition) deals provide a better return to investors than 
IPO two thirds of the time (Beyond Borders, 2008). 
 
As with most other industries 2008 has been a cataclysmic year for the biotech industry.  
The US biotech sector lost US$48 billion in market cap in 2008, with many companies 
trading at below the value of their cash in the bank.  Furthermore, there were over 100 
listed companies with less than one year of cash (Beyond Borders, 2008).  Industry 
observers predict it will be the second half of 2009 or later before public market appetite 
is revived. 
 
What are the implications of this ‘pharmageddon’?  The first is an anticipated 
‘Darwinism’ of biotech companies.  Restructurings and bankruptcies will rise.  Many 
companies will go into hibernation, conserving cash by deferring expensive clinical 
trials.  Collaborations with large pharmaceutical companies are likely to see lower up-
front cash payments, and acquisitions may be more common given that many stocks are 
highly undervalued by the capital markets.  In the mid part of this decade biotech firms 
were starting to gain some strength in their negotiations with big pharma, but the 
pendulum will now swing back to those with the cash and motivation to spend it 
(Beyond Borders, 2008; Behnke and Hultenschmidt, 2007).  It is widely believed that 
the next few years will be a difficult time for biotech companies.  Access to capital will 
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be constrained and big pharma will have the upper hand in many negotiations, meaning 
a decrease in the value that accrues to the biotech firm in any pharma-biotech deal.   
 
2.5 Summary 
 
It seems that the ultimate goal for many biotech companies is still to pursue a traditional 
FIPCO structure controlling the value chain for their product offering.  This seems to 
have become very difficult to do, both for the traditional pharmaceutical companies and 
for entrepreneurial biotech firms, due to the significant costs involved in bringing a 
product through the entire drug development and marketing chain.  Therefore, the basic 
options seem to be to either find a niche in the value chain or control a relatively narrow 
slice of the market.  
 
This chapter has reviewed the historical development of the biotech sector, bringing us 
to the contemporary context in which biotech firms commercialise new drugs.  The key 
strategic issues that start-up firms face are the need for credibility and capital, access to 
specialised complementary assets and imposing regulatory hurdles.  Biotech firms need 
to develop strategies and business models that give them the best chance of success 
within this context.  But how do they do this?  Which biotech business models work 
best?  There are no easy answers or good data to demonstrate which models work best 
in a given set of circumstances.  The knowledge and data is simply not available 
because the biotechnology sector is too early in its life cycle to observe stable patterns 
of performance (Pisano, 2006a).  Even amongst the early successful biotech firms there 
are significant differences in strategies – Amgen commercialised a few blockbuster 
drugs, Genentech focused on smaller markets (e.g. specific cancer therapeutics) and 
Genzyme focused on drugs for very rare diseases (Pisano, 2006a).   
 
This chapter has examined strategic issues at the industry level and how they have 
driven commercialisation strategies and business models over time.  The critical 
commercialisation decisions revealed by this industry level analysis are ‘when and 
‘how’ to plug into the value chain.  In order to best understand commercialisation 
strategy at the firm level it is necessary to undertake research within individual 
biotechnology companies.  This chapter has provided an in-depth understanding of the 
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drug development value chain and wider industry and provides a useful backdrop 
against which to understand the case study analyses reported and discussed in later 
chapters. 
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3 Literature Review   
 
Much of the research in this thesis has been exploratory and has led to continuous 
cycling between field work and the literature in an attempt to understand the data being 
collected and to guide the direction for further data collection.  The iterative process 
between literature review and findings have made the traditional literature review 
difficult to write, as many of the links are dependent on findings described in the results 
chapters.  For this reason, a somewhat brief literature review is presented up-front, but 
two lengthy discussion chapters revisit arguments introduced in the literature review in 
more detail.  The following quote by Pettigrew (1990) summarises the problem nicely: 
Researchers experienced in comparative case study research (e.g. Glaser and 
Strauss 1967, Strauss 1987 and Van de Ven, Angle and Pooole, 1989) all 
emphasise the iterative and at times untidy character of the research process.  The 
research may begin with only a broad definition of the research problem which is 
sharpened by a complex and evolving mixture of literature analysis, data 
collection, internal discussion and memo writing amongst the research team; the 
uncovering of themes, patterns and propositions; followed by more data collection 
and more polished and structure thematic writing as cross case analysis occurs 
(p.279). 
 
The domain of this research project is commercialisation strategy in the biotechnology 
sector.  This literature review proceeds in the following way.  First, the unique context 
of the biotech sector is discussed and reasons for the sector’s poor performance are 
considered.  Next, the term commercialisation strategy is examined - academic and 
practitioner uses of the term are discussed.  The literature review then turns to the more 
specific problem of understanding strategy in biotech start-ups and how strategy relates 
to the context in which they operate.  Contributions to the literature are examined that 
bear directly on commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector, or on the domain of 
science businesses (Gans and Stern, 2003a; Pisano, 2006a, 2006b; Kasch and Dowling, 
2008 and Deeds, 1996, 1997, 1999, Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).  The sector’s unique 
institutional context is found to create an environment of high-risk and high-uncertainty 
for its entrepreneurial participants.  The wider strategic management literature turns up 
two areas of theory that are particularly useful in doing strategy in this type of 
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environment.  These are real options reasoning (ROR) and dynamic capabilities.  Their 
applicability to commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector is discussed.  However, 
strategic management theory fails to provide an actionable explanation of strategy for 
the biotech firm.  This observation leads into a discussion about ‘the great divide’ 
between academic research and practice (Rynes, 2001).  This issue is salient to my 
research design which endeavours to address the gap as it relates to commercialisation 
strategy in the biotech sector.  The literature review concludes with a summary of the 
short-falls in the strategic management literature with regard to biotech 
commercialisation strategy, which generates my research questions and thus my 
research approach.   
 
3.1 The biotech sector – a unique context 
 
The biotech sector of the pharmaceutical industry operates in a new kind of business 
environment with several peculiar attributes.  Biotech start-ups occupy a position 
between university-based basic research and the large well-established pharmaceutical 
companies that have dominated the drug-development industry to date (Powell, 1998).   
Although biotech start-ups may have promising products in development, they rarely 
have a direct connection to the consumers of their products and do not have a full set of 
complementary assets (e.g. clinical trial know-how, manufacturing capability, or 
marketing and distribution arms) that help provide a ready path to market.  The highly 
collaborative nature of the sector raises issues if intellectual property rights are not 
strong, and provides challenges in collective learning (Pisano, 2006a). Only the most 
successful early entrants into the biotechnology sector (e.g. Amgen and Genentech) 
have developed into fully-integrated pharmaceutical companies that rival the traditional 
pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Merck, Eli Lilly, or Pfizer).  Rather, a pattern of 
strategic alliances between small biotechnology firms and large pharmaceutical 
companies has become the norm (Saviotti, 1998; Gans and Stern, 2003a; Burns, 2005), 
with start-up and established firms each undertaking one or a number of the activities in 
the value chain required to take an innovation from discovery to market.   
 
Because they have not yet established a secure revenue stream to support their drug 
development efforts (and a secure future earnings stream to attract investors), and 
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because of the extremely high costs and long timelines inherent in pre-clinical and 
clinical development, capital raising becomes an extremely important activity. A start-
up biotech firm is often a decade or more away from generating revenues – this greatly 
highlights the importance of financial strategy as a part of commercialisation. 
 
All firms in the pharmaceutical industry face a daunting amount of regulatory overhead 
that may significantly differ from nation to nation.  However, small firms with little in-
house regulatory know-how or experience are often particularly hard-pressed to keep up 
with the complexity of the regulatory climates that they will face in the later stages of 
drug development.   
 
The complex nature of biological systems together with our limited understanding of 
them means that biotech firms operate in an environment with high levels of technical 
uncertainty (Pisano, 2006a). 
 
These attributes – the highly collaborative nature of the sector, lack of complementary 
assets including capital, high regulatory burden and high levels of scientific uncertainty 
– describe the institutional context in which biotech firms operate.  In addition to the 
unique business environment biotech companies face, they may also have an unusual 
corporate development trait in that they may remain in the entrepreneurial start up phase 
for one to two decades.  The commercialisation of biotech products in the field of 
healthcare is a long, expensive and high-risk journey.   
 
Poor financial returns have been achieved by the aggregate biotech industry to date 
(Hamilton, 2004) and the failure rate for individual companies is very high (Vanderbyl 
and Kobelak, 2008).  There are four obvious potential causes of the cumulative losses.  
One, there may be flaws in the underlying science i.e. the science is not good enough.  
Two, there are flaws in the execution of the organization and implementation of the 
business elements in the industry i.e. biotech firms really do have good ideas and 
science, but they are not getting into the value chain.  Three, the costs of getting biotech 
products to market overwhelm the financial returns from them i.e. biotech science is not 
financially viable.  And four, the institutional environment is not aligned in a way that is 
conducive to the commercialisation of biotech products (Pisano, 2006a).  
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Of course these four reasons are gross generalizations hypothesized at the aggregated 
industry level, when clearly individual firms vary widely in terms of their science, 
business strategies and costs required to reach the market.  Firms may also operate in 
differing institutional environments depending on their product/technology, location and 
source of capital.  Substantive data does not exist to support or deny any of these 
hypothetical causes of poor performance, and the question of which (if any) is correct is 
fundamentally impossible to answer since we can never know the potential of the 
science that doesn’t make it to market through lack of investment or for other reasons.  
It is likely that elements of the first and third reasons exist in the industry (not in every 
firm, but at the aggregated industry level).  However, it is the role of the second element 
– business strategy and organization to evaluate and manage the risks in both the 
robustness of the science, and the viability of the investment required to reach the value 
chain and earn a return.  It is also the role of business strategy and organization to take 
into account, or deal with, the existing institutional climate in which they operate.  
 
Thus, this thesis explicitly assumes that better organization and commercialisation 
strategy will improve overall returns in the biotech sector. This assumption seems 
worthy of exploration given the youth of the sector, and the fact that many biotech firms 
are started and managed by scientists who may (as a generalisation) lack the business 
acumen necessary to profitably commercialise this new kind of science.  Returns to a 
better understanding of commercialisation strategy will be felt by all stakeholders in the 
sector, not just investors, as society reaps the substantial improvements in morbidity and 
mortality promised by biotechnology. 
 
3.2 The term ‘commercialisation strategy’ 
 
The term commercialisation strategy is commonly used and implicitly understood by 
practitioners, but has found only limited use in the strategic management literature.    
This is somewhat surprising given that the strategic management literature concerns 
itself with the study of strategy in its many forms, examining the development, 
implementation and content of strategy.  The reason for this is not clear.  It could be that 
strategy tends to be viewed from an organizational or business level whereas the 
concept of commercialisation is more often viewed from the product level and is 
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covered to some degree by the new product development literature.  However, in high 
technology start-up firms such as those found in the biotech, clean-tech and ICT 
industries the firm level and product level perspectives may be the same – 
commercialisation of a high tech innovation is very often the company’s sole reason for 
being. 
 
Gans and Stern (2002) define commercialisation strategy very briefly as the process by 
which an innovation is brought to the market place.  This may be better phrased as the 
process by which an innovation is established in the market place, resulting in the 
creation of wealth.  It is important to note that whilst commercialisation results in a 
steady revenue stream, it does not necessarily mean that a satisfactory return on 
investment has been made – as is often seen in the biotech industry. Mitchell and Singh 
(1996) describe commercialisation as “the process of acquiring ideas, supplementing 
them with complementary knowledge, developing and manufacturing saleable goods, 
and selling the goods in a market” (p.170).   This description brings in the notion of the 
value chain (Porter, 1985) recognizing that there are stages in the commercialisation 
process.  In fact, firms may ‘plug into’ the value chain at any of a number of stages in 
the process of taking an innovation to the product market.  They need not commercialise 
an innovation at the end point where a physical product is sold to a customer, but can 
plug into the chain at earlier points. Thus establishing an innovation in the market place 
is akin to plugging into the value chain and can occur when the innovation is still in an 
intellectual property form (an idea) rather than a fully fledged physical product or 
service.  The value chain provides a reasonably stable connection between a firm and 
the final consumer of its innovation. The concept of value chain was explained more 
fully in the previous chapter. 
 
Commercialisation strategy in the biotech start-up involves the decisions a biotech firm 
makes about how to interact with its value chain – particularly ‘when’ it chooses to plug 
in, and ‘how’ it plugs into the value chain.  These decisions are embodied in the firm’s 
business model.  Zott and Amit (2007) define business model as depicting “the content, 
structure and governance of transactions designed so as to create value through the 
exploitation of business opportunities” and describe how a business model elucidates 
how an organisation is linked to external stakeholders, and how it engages with them to 
create value for all exchange partners.   
 40 
 
Commercialisation strategy is about finding solutions to issues that are critical to the 
firm earning a return on investment at both the firm and project level.  The options 
available to a firm for ‘how’ and ‘when’ to plug into the value chain are often 
contingent upon decisions made, and lines of action taken, historically.  A firm’s 
previous investments and learning opportunities will constrain its future behaviour – 
this is the essence of path dependency (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  Path 
dependencies are important in the biotech sector because product development is a very 
long and very expensive journey – sunk costs (and time) are a strong dis-incentive to 
major changes in strategic direction.  A firm’s capabilities today are a function of its 
previous experiences (Pisano, 2006b).  Technological catch-up can be very difficult. 
 
Commercialisation strategy is a term that is meaningful to biotech entrepreneurs and 
that they relate to through experience.  However, it is difficult to translate directly into 
academic frameworks.  While many strategy theories capture some important elements 
of commercialisation strategy, none capture the full range of meaning understood by 
practitioners.  Strauss (1987) refers to ‘in vivo’ and ‘sociological’ codes to describe 
categories of qualitative data.  In vivo codes refer to the terms found in the field – they 
may be local, occupational and/or contextual.  Sociological codes are those defined by 
the academic researcher – they may be anthropological, psychological or economic – 
depending on the field of research.  Commercialisation strategy is an in vivo code that 
does not have a well developed academic/economic equivalent.  The lack of direct 
translation between academic-speak and practitioner-speak adds to the academy/practice 
divide that is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
3.3 Strategy in the biotech context 
 
Only a small number of researchers have specifically focused on strategy in the biotech 
sector.  These include Gans and Stern (2003a) who explain the drivers of cooperative 
strategies in the biotech sector, Kasch and Dowling (2008) who significantly extended 
Gans and Stern’s work by looking for different types of cooperative strategies and at 
different parts of the value chain, Pisano (2006a) who examines the institutional 
framework that governs interaction within the sector, and Deeds and his various 
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collaborators (1996, 1997, 1999, 2004) who have examined several aspects of new 
product development in the sector.   
 
The strategic management literature has largely overlooked the biotech sector because it 
is pre-occupied with strategy in large established organizations – mapping out how they 
can profitably deploy their existing capabilities.  At most, this involves incremental 
innovation and change and an assumption that the organizational environment is 
relatively stable and predictable.  Entrepreneurship, on the other hand, has traditionally 
been focused on small, newly founded firms and the particular problems that they face 
with gaining access to resources and developing the capabilities they need to execute 
entrepreneurial ideas.  As  researchers have begun to focus on the importance of 
developing innovation capabilities as a way to build a sustainable competitive 
advantage in hypercompetitive environments, strategic management has begun to more 
actively incorporate issues that were more directly tied to entrepreneurship.  Similarly, 
because entrepreneurship clearly involves large firms (attempting to adapt) as well as 
small firms, entrepreneurship research has begun to move into areas that are more 
traditionally the domain of strategic management. 
 
Joshua Gans and Scott Stern are principally economists.  Several of their articles have 
generated interest amongst economic and technology management audiences with 30-
750 citations each.  David Deeds’ academic background is in technology innovation and 
entrepreneurship.  His articles co-authored with De Carolis, Hill or Rothaermel are all 
well cited (average 750 citations each).  These citations are heavily biased toward 
technology innovation journals with a sprinkling of citations in management and 
strategy journals.  Silja Kasch is a management consultant and his co-author Michael 
Dowling is Professor of Innovation and Technology Management at the University of 
Regensburg in Germany.  Gary Pisano is very much at home in the strategic 
management domain.  The paper he co-authored with Teece and Shuen on dynamic 
capabilities in 1997 has been cited nearly 1,800 times.  By contrast, his 2006 paper 
questioning the viability of science based businesses has so far only been cited nine 
times.  The contributions of these authors as they relate to commercialisation strategy in 
the biotech sector are examined in turn below. 
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Gans and Stern  
Gans and Stern’s (2003a) central premise is that returns on innovation may be earned 
either through the product market or through the ‘market for ideas’ and that making a 
decision between the two is a key element in commercialisation strategy.  That is to say, 
the innovator may try and take a product to market themselves (probably involving 
manufacture, marketing and distribution) or they may ‘sell the idea’ to another firm that 
already has the appropriate infrastructure to launch the innovation into the product 
market.  Thus there are alternative markets in which to commercialise innovation -  not 
a single undifferentiated market.  In the first instance, the innovator will utilize or 
pioneer its own value chain, meaning the firm integrates internally or contracts for the 
value-added activities in the value chain.  In the second instance, the innovator will 
utilize an already existent value chain.  The majority of biotech firms commercialise 
their innovations in the market for ideas which is also known as the ‘technology market’ 
(Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2002). 
 
Building on the seminal work of Teece (1986) (who is associated with transaction cost 
economics), Gans and Stern (2003a, 2003b) have developed a framework identifying 
the drivers of start-up commercialisation strategy.  It links strategy to the 
commercialisation environment (see figure 3-1).  Their objective is to show the 
circumstances in which an innovator will develop their own value chain versus plugging 
into an existing value chain by examining the appropriability of the innovation versus 
ownership or control of specialized complementary assets needed to take it to the end-
user.   
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Commercialisation Strategy Environments
No Yes
No
The Attacker's 
Advantage
Reputation-Based 
Ideas Trading
Yes
Greenfield 
Competition
Ideas Factories
Do incumbent's complementary assets 
contribute to the value proposition 
from the new technology?
Can innovation by the 
start-up preclude 
effective 
development by the 
incumbent?
 
Figure 3-1 Gans and Stern’s model of commercialisation strategy  
(Gans and Stern, 2003a, Table 2) 
 
In the biotechnology sector, the availability of formal intellectual property protection, 
combined with a concentration of regulatory and distribution capabilties in the hands of 
the incumbent pharmaceutical companies, makes transacting in the market for ideas an 
effective commercialisation strategy for most innovations (Gans and Stern, 2003a).  The 
framework also highlights the role played by reputation and institutions for ideas trading 
in mixed environments – when the appropriability environment and complementary 
asset environment place competing pressures on the start-up in terms of strategy choice.  
Knowledge of reputation may be facilitated by the use of intermediaries such as venture 
capitalists. 
 
Gans and Stern’s industry level focus is typical of IO theory and economists, who tend 
to stand on the outside of an industry looking at the dynamics of the firms that compete 
directly against each other, without a special affinity for any one of them.  Whilst they 
have mapped out competitive versus co-operative structures, they have not examined 
competitive or co-operative processes.  They have not examined the complexity of what 
practitioners actually do during the commercialisation process and hence do not provide 
a particularly actionable agenda.  
 
Biotech commercialisation projects may differ quite fundamentally regarding levels of 
competition or latency of market, appropriability of IP, investment required or the 
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requirement for specialised complementary assets.  The attractiveness of Gans and 
Stern’s four quandrant model is that it is easy to follow – it has only two variables.  
However, in reality there are more than two variables driving strategic choices in the 
commercialisation process. 
 
Once a startup has made the decision to commercialise an innovation in the market for 
ideas, decisions must be made regarding the actual mechanism.  The choice between 
licensing, acquisition, joint venture or alliance (the ‘how’ of plugging in) depends on an 
analysis of the incentives to maintain control over the technology for future 
development versus the benefits of ownership for the firm with direct control over 
commercializing the innovation (Gans and Stern, 2003b).  An extensive literature exists 
in the fields of economics and management describing these various modes of 
cooperation (e.g. Hagedoorn and Narula, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; Aggarwal and Hsu, 
2009; Van de Vrande, Lemmens and Vanhaverbeke, 2006; King, 2003; Hill, 1992).  
  
According to Gans and Stern it is a matter of weighing up the costs and benefits of 
pioneering a value chain versus contracting to gain access to it.  This assumes that if 
there are long term benefits in building a value chain a firm would be able to access the 
finance it needs to do this.  This assumption is not realistic.  Issues of cash-flow and 
survival have a significant impact on commercialisation strategy and need to be more 
explicitly recognized than they are in Gans and Stern’s model.  They talk about biotech 
start-ups integrating themselves into an existing value chain, eliminating the possibility 
of displacing a firm in a particular product niche. Whilst this may be true, it should 
carry the caveat of ‘in the short term’ as innovation in biotechnology has as much to do 
with the pipeline as it does with a particular product.  Co-operation may be driven by 
survival in the short term, even though a start-up may have longer term ambitions of 
reaching the status of fully integrated pharmaceutical company. 
 
Gans and Stern discuss complementary assets at an abstract level. They do not consider 
that there are many points at which to plug into a value chain and that the decision to 
contract for access to complementary assets is not all or nothing.  They present a purely 
dyadic decision process – to compete, or cooperate.  This is helpful but they do not go 
far enough.  A decision to cooperate precipitates further important strategic choices.  
There are many different levels and types of cooperation which can occur at various 
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points in the value chain.  For example, cooperation may be via research partnerships, 
arms-length licensing agreements or cosy joint ventures amongst other alternatives.  
Further, cooperation can be initiated at many points along the value chain from 
discovery to preclinical testing or clinical testing to marketing.  Gans and Stern’s model 
does not provide guidance in making these important strategic decisions. 
 
Gans and Stern maintain that an effective commercialisation strategy results from 
careful analysis of the commercialisation environment, weighing the benefits and costs 
of alternative strategies for securing profits.  A more process-oriented approach would 
be to ask ‘how does a firm do this careful analysis?’  They also maintain that in most 
cases the cost of developing a new value chain is much higher than the cost of 
integrating the new technology into an already established chain, but do not offer 
empirical support.  Certainly the risk is greater in building a value chain, but the 
potential returns are greater as well.  How does a biotech firm really decide which 
strategy would lead to greater profits down the road?  What processes do they use to 
evaluate these options?  Would finance capital be available for them to build a new 
value chain if analysis showed this to be the most lucrative long term strategy?  
 
Gans and Stern’s model provides a useful first point of reference for a biotech firm 
developing a commercialisation strategy.  Considering the appropriability of the firm’s 
intellectual property and value of complementary assets held by third parties, Gans and 
Stern’s model will guide the firm to decide between a cooperative or competitive 
commercialisation strategy.  However, firms can integrate internal and external 
capabilities and plug into the value chain in a myriad of ways that go beyond Gans and 
Stern’s model.  Clearly there is more to commercialisation strategy than purely a 
decision between commercialising in the product market or the market for ideas. 
Kasch and Dowling 
 
Kasch and Dowling (2008) studied the commercialization strategies of young 
biotechnology companies in the United States.  Extending the work of Gans and Stern 
they assumed that commercialisation could include intermediate forms of co-operation 
such as hierachial or bilateral forms and also recognized that co-operation could occur 
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at different stages along the value chain and that the amount of financial resource a 
company has may impact its commercialisation strategy. 
 
In the study of 101 therapeutic product development projects Kasch and Dowling 
combined determinants from the commercialisation literature (appropriability regime, 
competition and capabilities) and determinants from Transaction Cost Economics (asset 
specificity, uncertainty) and from Property Rights Theory (financial resources) to 
explain the impact on forward integration and choice of cooperation type. 
 
In line with Gans and Stern they found a significant correlation between the 
appropriability regime and the degree of co-operation – a strong appropriability regime 
was more likely to lead to unilateral cooperation (such as a simple out-licensing 
arrangement) whilst companies with a weak appropriability regime tend towards 
hierachial/bilateral cooperation.  They also showed that where companies had internal 
capabilities (such as in production and marketing) they tended to be more integrated but 
that internal capabilities in the area of clinical development had little bearing of whether 
the firms chose to cooperate or integrate.  They suggest that this may be because clinical 
trial capabilities may not be readily transferable from one therapeutic class to another.  
Companies were more likely to exploit technologies internally if they belonged to their 
core competencies and synergies could be obtained. 
 
Kasch and Dowling did not find any support for the influence of asset specificity or 
uncertainty, although they raise the concern that operationalising these variables was 
difficult and further research is needed.  Competition was an important influence on 
commercialisation strategy at the clinical trials and production stages of the value chain 
but no significant effect was found at the marketing stage.  Since there is so much 
diversity with therapeutic classes it is difficult to assess the competitiveness of different 
therapeutic options. 
 
In summary, Kasch and Dowling have shown that appropriability regime, capabilities, 
financial resources and synergies influence technology exploitation and provide 
evidence that the continuum of commercialisation strategies (from unilateral 
cooperation to bilateral cooperation to integration) applies and that different parts of the 
value chain react differently to the influence of each variable.  Kasch and Dowling have 
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confirmed that commercialisation strategy in the biotech start-up is more complex than 
Gans and Stern would lead us to believe.  
Pisano 
 
Pisano (2006a) presents a discussion on biotech commercialisation that is more or less 
consistent with Gans and Stern, but more comprehensive and more focused on 
institutional structures rather than competitive dynamics.  His main objective is to make 
a case that the reason behind the lack of profitability in the sector is that it’s institutional 
structure is not working as well as it could be.  Gans and Stern implicitly assume that 
profitability in the industry is as it should be because of the efficient nature of market 
operations.  Pisano rejects this argument.  He argues that industry profitability 
(performance) might be better if the institutional environment was structured 
differently.  Pisano maintains that the biotech industry’s problems stem from its special 
character as a science-based business, with this ‘special character’ being out of sync 
with the institutional organization or ‘anatomy’ of the sector.  
 
A science based business is one that not only uses existing science but also attempts to 
advance scientific knowledge and capture the value of the knowledge it creates.  Pisano 
describes the special character of the biotech sector as being due to three key features.  
Firstly, biotech firms operate under profound and persistent uncertainty due to our 
limited understanding of complex biological systems – this makes drug R&D very 
risky.  Secondly, the process of drug development cannot be broken into independent 
pieces, meaning that the disciplines and parties involved must work together in an 
integrated fashion.  This requires well defined and well protected intellectual property 
rights, which Pisano suggests is not always the case in the biotech sector.   And thirdly, 
the knowledge spread across various parties and disciplines is intuitive or tacit, meaning 
that collective learning is very difficult.    Thus Pisano identifies the key challenges of 
the sector as risk management due to the profound uncertainty inherent in the science, 
integration across disciplines and functional areas of expertise due to the highly 
complex and the heterogeneous nature of the scientific knowledge base, and 
mechanisms for cumulative learning in order to keep up with rapid scientific progress.   
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According to Pisano, the anatomy of the biotech sector is made up of the direct 
participants (start-ups, established pharmaceutical firms, universities, investors, 
customers etc.), institutional arrangements that connect these participants (capital 
markets, technology markets, product markets, grant systems, angel investment 
networks), and the rules that govern and influence how these institutional arrangements 
work.  He does not examine the management practices of biotech firms regarding their 
relationship to these institutions and rules.  He is more interested in how the anatomy of 
the industry can change to better support biotech firms in their key challenges - 
managing risk, integration and learning (see figure 3-2). 
 
 
Characteristics of the 
scientific landscape
• Profound and 
persistent uncertainty
• Complexity and 
heterogeneity
• Rapid cumulative 
change
Resulting economic and 
organizational 
challenges
• Risk management
• Integration
• Learning
Anatomy of the business
1. Roles and strategies of 
participants: including 
new entrants, established 
firms, universities and 
research institutes, 
investors, regulators, etc.
2. Institutional 
arrangements: including 
private and public equity 
markets, markets for 
know-how, grants 
process, etc.
3. Rules of governance: 
including intellectual 
property, regulations, 
norms, etc.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
 
Figure 3-2 Pisano’s conceptual framework  
(Pisano, 2006a, p.14) 
 
 
Pisano maintains that in the biotech sector parts of the institutional environment work at 
cross purposes rather than working together to help firms meet their challenges.  For 
example, the fragmented nature of the industry, with many organizations filling 
specialized niches along the value chain, is a potentially useful model for managing and 
rewarding risk, but on the other hand, has impeded the integration of critical knowledge 
across these silos of expertise.  Another example is that many early stage biotech firms 
are financed with venture capital.  Venture capitalists may be prepared to take on the 
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high levels of risk in drug development but they typically have a time horizon of three 
to seven years whilst the average drug development project takes 10-15 years. 
 
To deal with profound uncertainty, high risk and the need for collective learning Pisano 
proposes greater vertical integration in the industry, fewer, closer and longer term 
collaborations between biotech firms and big pharma, fewer independent biotech firms 
and rather than public biotech firms he recommends more quasi-public biotechs – where 
the majority interest is owned by a large company with a long term strategic interest in 
the biotech firm.  Pisano also recommends changes in the focus of universities – to 
make their discoveries more widely available through open-licensing, to undertake more 
cross-disciplinary and translational research.  Pisano believes many of these changes to 
the anatomy of the biotech sector will occur as part of a natural evolutionary process as  
the biotech sector develops.  The biotech sector is now more than thirty years old and 
we have yet to see many changes in the direction that Pisano suggests.  Perhaps this 
betrays a belief in the efficiency of markets or perhaps it raises the question as to 
whether Pisano’s recommendations are the best solution for the challenges facing the 
sector.  From another view 30 years may be too short a time for the evolutionary 
process that Pisano alludes to. 
 
Pisano maintains that the business models of biotech firms have worked poorly because 
they were based on the wrong inferences about the underlying sciences.  In his writings 
on the biotech sector Pisano’s central tenet appears to be that something is wrong 
because the sector has accumulated such massive losses in its 30-odd years of existence. 
Glick (2008) provides empirical evidence and a compelling argument that this is not the 
case. Glick posits that the business models used by biotech firms are indeed valid and 
they are based on the correct inferences about science.  The prevalent model being the 
formation of strategic alliances with well established corporate partners within the 
industry.  Glick shows that from 1982 until late 2006 a total of 254 biotechnology-
derived drugs were approved by the FDA.  The approval rate, which arguably may 
parallel the productivity of the sector, has been accelerating dramatically as the sector 
matures, see figure 3-3.  Similarly, the number of biopharma companies with annual 
revenues exceeding $100m for the first time has also been accelerating dramatically. 
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Figure 3-3 New biotechnology drug and vaccine indication approvals from 1982 – 2005  
(drawn from Glick, 2008, p.108) 
 
Glick provides an encouraging comparison between the first 30 years of the 
semiconductor industry and the first 30 years of the biotechnology industry, choosing 
the semiconductor industry for comparison because it too was fuelled by radical 
innovation, becoming commercially successful and impacting positively on other 
industries.  As Glick states:  
Twelve years after their respective seminal events, biotechnology product sales (in 
1984) were 20 per cent lower in constant dollars than semiconductor sales (in 1959), 
but then biotechnology product sales began to grow faster than semiconductor sales, 
eventually surpassing semiconductor sales in constant dollars by 3 per cent, 19 
percent, 29 percent, 51 per cent, 59 per cent and 63 per cent at 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 
22 years respectively……  The fact that just five companies representing 0.35 per 
cent of all 1415 private and public US biotechnology companies in 2005 dominated 
the biotechnology industry by accounting for 36 per cent of total industry revenues of 
$72bn does not invalidate the industry’s business models.  In 1982, 35 years after the 
semiconductor industry’s seminal event, five US semiconductor companies, 
representing only 0.65 per cent of all 766 US semiconductor firms at the time, 
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accounted for 38 per cent of the value of all semiconductors produced by US 
companies (p.116). 
 
Risk management is a key component in commercialisation strategy, and as Pisano 
points out, is achieved in part through the reduction of uncertainty.  Notably Gans and 
Stern, although interested in commercialisation strategy,  make no mention of risk 
management.  Pisano is quite focused on risk management although he is not interested 
in commercialisation per se, but rather, in product development.  Product development 
is the advancement of an innovation along the path from concept to physical product 
whereas commercialisation is focused on earning a financial return on an innovation.   
 
Pisano describes three properties that any system requires to manage risk efficiently.  
The first is an ability to generate a diverse range of options and experiments i.e. 
diversification lowers overall risk.  Second is the ability to generate and utilize 
information to reduce uncertainty.  And finally there needs to be a system for rewarding 
those that take the risks.  The system that Pisano describes is the greater biotech sector.  
He believes that the system or sector does pretty well at handling the first and third 
aspects of risk management but deals less well with information flows.  This thesis is 
more concerned with managing risk and uncertainty at the firm level. 
 
Like Gans and Stern, Pisano recognizes that biotech firms can commercialise innovation 
in the product market or the market for ideas.  Actually, he explicitly describes the 
choice between vertical integration and out-licensing as a continuum, with many 
intermediate forms of governing relationships – the best strategy depending on the 
context and conditions.  One of the determining issues is how well the market for ideas 
works – he describes how this depends on four factors: 
- the degree of information asymmetry  
- the need for investments in specialized assets   
- the tacitness of the know-how 
- and the degree of appropriability of the know-how.   
 
These factors help us understand when the market for ideas will work, making licensing 
viable, and when vertical integration is a better strategy.  Gans and Stern focus only on 
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the investment required in specialized assets, and the degree of appropriability of know-
how in explaining a strategy to co-operate (license) or compete (vertically integrate).   
 
In the field of drug development there is a broad range of technologies and projects that 
span the spectrum of these four factors, suggesting that different business models may 
be appropriate for different kinds of technological innovation.  In Science Business 
(2006a) Pisano provides a useful examination of four broad classes of technological 
innovation and the common business models associated with them:  
1) novel research methods and tools (e.g. high throughput screening, combinatorial 
chemistry, bioinformatics) 
2) identification of novel mechanisms of action or targets (e.g. angiogenesis, 
RNAi) 
3) creation of novel compound types (e.g. rDNA, MAbs) 
4) identification of novel treatment modalities and therapeutic markets (e.g. gene 
therapy, xenotransplants, drugs for rare genetic diseases). 
 
There is broad variation within the technology categories described by Pisano, 
necessitating caution in generalization.  The technology does not necessarily determine 
business model, but rather it influences the business model.  Other factors, such as a 
firm’s ability to access capital also influence the choice and success of business model.  
Common business models across the four technology classes are discussed below, and 
the reasons they are popular.  This discussion draws heavily from Science Business. 
 
Novel research methods and tools 
Several business models are available to these companies including simply licensing the 
use of the technique or tool to other drug companies that would then use them in their 
own discovery process.  A second model would be to sell drug discovery services, 
whilst a third strategy would be to vertically integrate forward into drug R&D and 
develop proprietary molecules. 
 
The market for ideas is found not to work efficiently in the case of the first strategy 
because asymmetric information may make it difficult to convince potential licensees of 
the value of the technology or tool.  Furthermore, the licensee would probably have to 
invest in specialized equipment (complementary assets) raising their risk.  There could 
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also be a tacit knowledge dimension to the technique, making it difficult to transfer to 
licensees.  If the intellectual property protection is not air-tight the innovator could 
expose itself to imitation.  Under the second business model all of these risks and issues 
are removed.  In the late 1990s this service model was followed by many platform 
technology companies.  However, many of them such as Millennium, Celera and 
Human Genome Services abandoned this strategy to vertically integrate into the 
development of proprietary molecules (Sammut, 2005).  According to Sammut, vertical 
integration (the third business model) based on platform technology is likely to be 
overkill and may even be suboptimal if the firm lacks capabilities in downstream 
development activities.  However, as he points out, being a service or tool company 
offers a very different risk-reward profile than drug development.  He suggests that the 
problem that many platform companies faced in the late 1990s was not with their 
business models, but with an environment created by the genomic bubble where 
unrealistic valuations could not be sustained with a service or tool model. 
 
Novel targets or mechanisms 
This class of innovation is concerned with the identification of new disease targets or 
mechanisms of action implicated in specific diseases.  The market for ideas is not fully 
efficient is this situation.  It is unlikely that intellectual property can be completely 
secured on a mechanism or class of targets.  Often a lot of prior art exists and the 
intellectual property is based heavily on tacit knowledge, so it is unlikely that a firm in 
this innovation category can simply license its knowledge.  It is therefore more likely to 
pursue a drug discovery and development strategy.  But how far down the drug 
development value chain should it integrate?  This depends on the characteristics of the 
drug and the market.  If it is a small molecule drug candidate targeting a well 
established therapeutic market (e.g. hypertension, diabetes, depression) the rationale for 
full vertical integration is weak, assuming the innovator is able to secure IP protection 
on the molecule.  A licensee would likely have the necessary complementary assets and 
capabilities required to take the drug candidate down the development pathway to 
market.  Tacit knowledge may be an issue in designing or interpreting clinical trials in 
some instances but can be overcome through close collaboration with the licensee.  A 
long term commitment would have to be made, and would probably be a more efficient 
solution than full vertical integration.  
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Novel compound types / novel treatment modality and novel markets 
These two classes of innovation cover new types of therapeutic molecules (e.g. rDNA, 
stems cells, monoclonal antibodies), new treatment modalities (e.g. xenotransplants, 
vaccines using externally enhanced autologous cells) and the development of 
completely new therapeutic markets (e.g. rare orphan diseases or personalized 
medicine). 
 
These types of innovations can involve potential knowledge asymmetry and tacit 
knowledge.  Also, importantly, they typically require significant investments in 
downstream assets (development, manufacturing, distribution).  Full vertical integration 
may be the logical strategy for these types of innovation.  Collaborations have been seen 
with these opportunities, but the risks are high, disputes common and collaboration may 
be a second-best strategy.  Whilst vertical integration reduces the risks of operating in 
an inefficient market for ideas, it raises other risks.  The level of capital required is 
huge, and may preclude R&D portfolio diversification.  Younger firms pursing a FIPCO 
strategy may have everything resting on the success of a single (first) therapeutic 
candidate.  
 
Pharmacogenomics is the branch of pharmacology behind ‘personalised medicine’ in 
which drugs and combination therapies are optimised for each individual’s unique 
genetic makeup.  Pharmacogenomics looks at the influence of genetic variation on drug 
response in patients by correlating gene expression or mutation with a drug’s efficacy or 
toxicity.  
 
Despite the necessary scientific advances personalised medicine is yet to deliver its 
promise of improved health outcomes for the masses.  Aspinall and Hamermesh (2007) 
describe four barriers that are hindering the transition from trial-and-error medicine to 
personalised medicine in the US.  First is the pharmaceutical industry’s preoccupation 
with the blockbuster model, which focuses on developing and marketing drugs for as 
broad a patient group as possible.  Pharmaceutical companies have been reticent to link 
their drugs to diagnostic tests that introduce another step in the chain between prescriber 
and prescription.  Second is a regulatory environment that focuses too many resources 
on expensive phase III clinical trial and too few on monitoring and assessment of a drug 
post-approval.  Next is a dysfunctional payment system that rewards physicians for 
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prescriptions and procedures rather than diagnosis and prevention.  Fourth is the 
ingrained physician behaviour that is deeply rooted in trial-and-error medicine. 
 
Whilst personalised medicine is slow in making its mark on healthcare, few dispute that 
it will grow to be an important pillar in drug therapy.  The model for personalised 
medicine is evolving.  It is likely to be more than one unique model, varying with the 
underlying technology, involving discovery companies, pharmaceutical company 
collaborators and clinical laboratories and will involve participation in the provider 
realm.   
 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that technology type has an important influence 
on business model by the bearing it has on the need for specialized complementary 
assets and the tacitness of the underlying knowledge involved.  Other factors 
influencing the choice of business model include the appropriability of the intellectual 
property and the firm’s ability to access capital. 
 
Pisano contributes to the discussion on strategy in the biotech sector in two ways.  First, 
he draws attention to the anatomy of the sector, questioning whether the institutional 
structure could be improved and offering some suggestions as to how it could evolve to 
improve the performance of the sector.  His focus is squarely at the industry level and 
he does not provide guidance for individual firms seeking to improve their chances of 
success.  Second, Pisano provides a very interesting examination of the relationship 
between technology type and business model.  This discussion bears directly on 
strategic choice at the firm-level and provides the biotech entrepreneur with a useful 
framework within which to consider commercialisation strategy although it still does 
not explicitly recognise many of the strategic choices that must be made subordinate to 
the choice of business model such as ‘when’ in a product’s development path should a 
return be earned, and ‘what’ transaction mechanism should be employed. 
Deeds and collaborators 
 
Like Pisano, Deeds’ focus is more on product development than commercialisation 
(earning a return on an innovation) per se, although perhaps commercialisation is 
considered implicit in product development.  Deeds and various collaborators have 
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sought to understand product development success by examining its relationship with 
the number of strategic alliances a firm has, the motivation behind alliances, geographic 
location and attributes of the management team.  There is a large body of literature on 
new product development (for example Cooper, 1980; Cozijnsen, Vrakking and 
Ijzerloo, 2000; Montaya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994; Zirger and Maidique, 1990) in the 
marketing literature, but it generally focuses on structures, processes and performance 
in established firms rather than start-ups.  Furthermore, the product development and 
life cycle of biotech products is generally much longer than that of other products, an 
idiosyncrasy that is not well addressed in the new product development literature.  Thus 
this literature is of limited value in understanding the biotech sector. 
 
In most sectors, entrepreneurial start-ups depend on the rapid creation of new products 
to gain cash flow, create legitimacy, gain early market share, and increase their odds of 
survival (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lymman, 1990).  In the biotech sector the high 
costs and complexity of new product development and the need for specialized assets 
force the majority of biotech firms to turn to alliances during the course of product 
development.  Strategic alliances are a way of quickly assembling and integrating a 
number of complementary assets needed for development of a new product.  However, 
such alliances can be a two-edged sword.   Deeds and Hill (1996) provide strong 
evidence to support an inverted U-shaped relationship between the number of strategic 
alliances a firm has and its rate of new product development.  Thus at low levels 
strategic alliances are positively related to new product development, but as the number 
of alliances increases the benefits begin to decrease and at high levels the costs of an 
additional alliance actually outweigh the benefits.  This effect is likely due to the effect 
of diminishing returns whereby the more alliances a firm engages in the more likely it is 
to enter into some alliances whose marginal contributions are relatively minor. 
Additionally, the effectiveness with which a firm can select and manage alliance 
partners is likely to be negatively related to the number of alliances the firm is 
managing.  The inverted U shape of the relationship between number of alliances and 
rate of new product development infers that the majority of biotech companies have too 
few or too many alliances.  Deeds and Hill’s analysis suggests that, on average, negative 
returns become a problem beyond 25 alliances although diminishing returns set in much 
earlier.  Economies of scale and scope of alliances are likely to both be relevant here, 
although empirical evidence would be needed to know for sure.  Whilst scale and scope 
 57
both provide large pharmaceutical companies with significant advantage in drug 
discovery (Henderson and Corkburn, 1996) only economies of scope were found to be 
relevant to improved performance in drug development although the impact of scope on 
performance is still relatively small (Corkburn and Henderson, 2001). 
 
Deeds and Hill point out that while they have identified an inverted U-shape 
relationship between the rate of new product development and strategic alliances, much 
of the firm level variance in the rate of new product development remains unexplained 
by their analysis. 
 
Deeds, together with DeCarolis and Coombs (1999) looked for further explanation of 
new product development success finding that geographic location, the quality of the 
scientific team (measured through citations) and keeping the scientists out of the day to 
day running of the firm are all important factors.  The right geographic location is 
important in gaining access to scientific talent, specialized suppliers and labour pooling 
(Casper and Kettler, 2001; Cooke, 2001; Powell, Koput, Bowie and Smith-Doerr, 2002; 
Zucker, Darby and Brewer, 1998; Porter and Stern, 2001).  Furthermore, by locating 
close to other firms from the same industry benefits from knowledge spillovers may be 
gained.  Deeds et al’s results also indicate that there is a point at which competition for 
resources within a given geographic location interferes with a firm’s ability to develop 
new products.  Again they note that there is still a significant amount of variation in the 
rate of new product development that remains unexplained.  Interestingly, in this study 
Deeds et al did not find a statistical relationship between new product development and 
the number of strategic alliances. 
 
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) have proposed a model for new product development 
based on the exploration-exploitation framework of organizational learning, linking it to 
the motivations behind venture’s alliances.  These motivations are either ‘exploratory’ 
where the purpose of the alliance is to discover something new, or ‘exploitive’ where 
the motivation is to use or develop things already known.  They found empirical support 
for an integrated product development path where a technology venture’s exploration 
alliances predict its products in development, while a venture’s products in development 
predict its exploitation alliances, and where its exploitation alliances in turn lead to 
products on the market.  On average, ventures that use an exploration effort tend to have 
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more products in development and on the market.  However, Rothaermel and Deeds 
also found that this product development path is moderated negatively by firm size.  As 
a firm grows it is in the position to retain its most promising projects for in-house 
exploration and exploitation rather than having to give up significant shares of the 
upside to alliance partners through being in a weak bargaining position.  Rothaermel 
and Deeds thus propose that biotech start-ups will be more successful in product 
development if they engage in exploratory alliances.  Such alliances may be considered 
as options a firm takes on the development of future products. 
 
Deeds et al have made a brave effort to uncover the drivers of success in biotech 
commercialisation.  Whilst they have found factors that are correlated with success such 
as location, the number of strategic alliances and management experience, they admit 
that there is still a significant amount of variation of new product development that 
remains unexplained. 
Summary of contributions on strategy in the biotech sector 
 
The decision to compete in the product market or cooperate in the market for ideas is a 
pivotal decision in biotech commercialisation strategy that is recognised by each of 
Gans and Stern, Kasch and Dowling, Pisano and Deeds.  However, their view of the 
efficiency of the market for ideas varies. 
 
Gans and Stern assume the market for ideas functions efficiently when the degree of 
appropriability is low.  However, appropriability is not the only issue for the smooth 
functioning of the market for ideas.  Tacitness of knowledge (Pisano, 2006a) and the 
challenges in negotiating and enforcing contracts in the face of uncertainty (Williamson, 
1985) also challenge the efficiency of the market for ideas.  Firms tend to vertically 
integrate when the costs of transacting in the market for ideas exceed those of vertical 
integration (Pisano, 1990).  Furthermore, Gans and Stern assume efficiency of the 
capital markets and that small firms will be able to access capital when transaction costs 
would drive them toward integration.  However, this is often not the case.  The works of 
Deeds et al suggest a belief that the market for ideas does not work perfectly but works 
adequately.  Pisano explicitly discusses an inefficiency of the market for ideas and the 
capital markets. 
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There have been few contributions to the strategic management literature focused on 
commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector.  Gans and Stern have mainly 
considered two strategic issues at the firm level (appropriability of IP and access to 
complementary assets).  Kasch and Dowling extended this work at the firm-level by 
also considering financial resources, internal capabilities and synergies and uncertainty, 
whilst Pisano has looked at the strategic issues facing the industry as a whole (risk 
management, integration and learning).  Deeds and his various collaborators have 
developed an implicit understanding of some of the issues facing biotech companies by 
examining firm characteristics that are correlated with the rate of new product 
development (number and type of alliances, past performance of management and 
science team).  Deeds taught us that the choice of where to locate a new biotech venture 
is an important aspect of commercialisation strategy. 
 
Whilst Gans and Stern, Kasch and Dowling, Pisano and Deeds have all made important 
contributions to the understanding of strategic issues in the biotech sector only Kasch 
and Dowling have begun to capture the complexity of commercialisation strategy at the 
firm level, and none have provided a particularly actionable agenda for individual 
biotech entrepreneurs.  The strength of these approaches is that they are relatively 
simple to articulate (less so for Pisano as his industry level review is fairly 
comprehensive) and are somewhat generalisable.  They have tended to concentrate on 
structures and relationships at the industry level, and at the firm level on ‘content’ of 
strategy rather than the ‘process’ of strategy.  A firm grasp of the process will allow the 
bio-entrepreneur to develop strategies in completely unique situations.  The importance 
of strategy process is highlighted in the next section. 
3.4 Strategy process 
 
The strategic management literature, as an extension of traditional industrial 
organization economics (IO economics), tends to concentrate on the characteristics or 
content of strategy (e.g. Gans and Stern, 2003a, 2003b; Kasch and Dowling, 2008; 
Pisano, 2006a) and management (Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs, 1997), and the 
interaction with performance, particularly within a specific industry.  This mainstream 
strategy research, as represented in the Strategic Management Journal for example, is 
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dominated by economic codes and draws less from in-vivo codes.  However, strategy 
theory has evolved from this point, with the development of theory that focuses more on 
the process of strategy than on content or structures.  The strategy process literature 
tends to be more dominated by sociological codes and is more open to qualitative 
research and the sort of in-vivo codes that Strauss (1987) discusses.   
 
Traditionally, the process of strategy has been seen as a linear progression through 
distinct stages such as strategy analysis, strategy formulation, strategy implementation 
and strategy change (Davenport, Leibold and Voelpel, 2006).  The analysis stage 
typically involves a SWOT-analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats), the 
formulation stage involves choosing from generic strategies such as cost leadership, 
focus or differentiation (Porter, 1985). During the implementation stage the strategy is 
translated into activities, and during the change stage the strategy is reviewed and 
adjusted as necessary.  The traditional emphasis is on rationality and analysis with a 
presumption of linearity, and an assumption that comprehensiveness is needed.   
 
The idea of stages is fine in some situations, although each stage is presented as 
oversimplified and discrete and gives the impression of a plan (Mintzberg, 1978).  
Mintzberg termed this view of strategy as intended strategy, and defined strategy in 
general as a pattern in a stream of decisions – this then being realized strategy.  This 
definition allows for a less pre-planned or discrete view of strategy.  By defining 
strategy as a stream of decisions, strategy is seen as a process that can be viewed from 
both ‘before’ and ‘after’ perspectives.  The ‘before’ perspective necessitates strategy to 
be formulated with an intention, although that intention may not necessarily be 
implemented as planned.  The ‘after’ perspective does not require any conscious pre-
formed plan to have been developed – it allows strategy to form gradually and possibly 
unintentionally as decisions are made one by one.   
 
Mintzberg (1978) shows how intended and realized strategies can be combined in three 
ways, recognizing that real-world strategies lie somewhere along a continuum between 
deliberate and emergent strategy (1985) (see Figure 3-4): 
1. Intended strategies that get realized are called deliberate strategies. 
2. Intended strategies that do not get realized are called unrealized strategies. 
3. Realized strategies that were never intended are called emergent strategies. 
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A firm’s ‘intended’ commercialisation strategy is embodied in the business model it 
describes for itself.   
 
Types of Strategies
Intended 
Strategy
Deliberate 
Strategy Realised
Strategy
Unrealised
Strategy
Emergent 
Strategy
 
Figure 3-4 Types of strategies  
(Mintzberg, 1978, p.945) 
 
 
Pettigrew (1992) moves beyond Mintzberg in making strategy process research more 
explicitly dynamic, taking into account historical context and its evolution to present 
context.  Strategy process research does not ignore structures and content – the ‘what’ 
of strategy – in fact it is must be considered inseparable from it – but importantly adds 
the ‘how’ to strategy research (Pettigrew, 1992).   
 
Understanding how to develop strategy in the biotech sector is an important extension to 
the work of Gans and Stern, Kasch and Dowling, Pisano and Deeds.  It requires a 
detailed understanding of the relationship between key elements of the sector’s context 
and how that will drive the essential elements of the firm’s commercialisation strategy, 
as embodied in its business plan.  It is important because a strategy process helps 
practitioners to develop strategy in unfamiliar circumstances – where the strategy 
content literature does not provide a neat prescription. 
 
Contributions to strategic management research in the biotech sector have so far 
concentrated on structures and relationships at the industry level.  Managers of biotech 
start-ups may find these contributions informative, but probably not actionable.  On the 
other hand, strategy process research has not concentrated on ‘science businesses’ and 
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science businesses provide an extreme case that may help illuminate some important 
aspects of strategy processes more generally.   
 
Strategy process research examines how strategies are formed, implemented and 
changed (Chakarvarthy and White, 2002) - it examines the strategy journey - whilst 
strategy content research describes what an effective strategy is, without describing how 
to get there.  The development of strategy can only ever be partly systematized and 
taught (Ohmae, 1982).  The reason for this is that innovation is a necessary 
characteristic of a good strategy.  Innovation has never been institutionalized, and it is 
unlikely that it ever will be (Mintzberg, 1994).  
 
Furthermore, the strategy process literature has traditionally dealt with the internal 
processes of large or established firms, so looking at the strategic processes in start-ups 
may provide an extension to this literature, and certainly merges the boundary between 
the fields of strategic management and entrepreneurship.  Thus an examination of 
strategy processes in the biotech sector should benefit both practitioners and academics. 
 
3.5 Strategy in high risk and highly uncertain environments 
 
Biotech firms operate in an environment that is high-risk (Burns, 2005), highly 
uncertain and complex (Pisano, 2006a).  Pisano has identified the key challenges facing 
biotech firms as being risk management, integration and learning.  This review now 
returns to the wider body of strategic management literature to provide an understanding 
of strategy in this type of environment.  I have identified two areas of theory that may 
be useful for biotech firms – real options reasoning and dynamic capabilities.   
 
Real options reasoning (ROR) resonated strongly with me because startups are 
analogous to options (McGrath, 2002) – they are investments in real assets that preserve 
the right to make a decision at some point in the future.  If conditions turn out to be 
unfavourable, resources can be withdrawn and redeployed and loss would only amount 
to the sunk cost invested in the business to date.  On the other hand, if conditions are 
favourable, further resource can be invested in the expectation that a positive return on 
investment will result. The cost of an option on an asset is small compared to the cost of 
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purchasing the asset, just as the cost of an option to commercialise an innovation is 
small relative to the cost of taking an innovation all the way to product launch.  Thus, 
with limited resources more opportunities can be explored using options. Options 
increase in value when uncertainty increases, because whilst the potential downside loss 
remains constant, the upside performance distribution increases (McGrath and Nerkar, 
2004).  This implies that having options in the biotech sector will carry value, as 
uncertainty is certainly very high throughout the commercialisation process. 
 
The concept of dynamic capabilities appealed to me because entrepreneurism is 
(generally) a serial activity.  An entrepreneur who develops dynamic capabilities to 
do/or support real options reasoning will be able to deploy them over again in 
successive ventures. 
Real Options Reasoning 
 
Because investment in options proceeds sequentially, it can be viewed as a process 
involving stages (McGrath, 2002).  The first is the identification or recognition of an 
opportunity to take out an option – i.e. the investment in a business opportunity.  The 
second stage involves determining whether further investment to exercise the option is 
warranted – this is done through a process that involves the reduction of uncertainty – 
either through the passage of time, by creating additional information or by strategically 
amplifying the value of the entrepreneurial option (McGrath 1997).  McGrath and 
Nerkar (2004) found that decision makers in the pharmaceutical sector implicitly or 
explicitly utilize ROR.  During drug development the reduction of uncertainty occurs 
jointly with amplification of value as well defined milestones are met during the product 
development process e.g. proof of concept, phase I clinical trials (safety), phase II and 
III trials (efficacy) and regulatory approval.  In the third stage of the ROR process the 
option can be exercised if it appears to have sufficient value resulting from the 
uncertainty reduction and value amplification process.  Exercising an option may 
include sale of the opportunity (i.e. selling the option) or making the final investment 
necessary to gain profit streams from it.  Sale of the opportunity means selling it in the 
market for ideas (Gans and Stern, 2003a, 2003b) whereas, making further investments 
implies that revenues will be generated further along the value chain – possibly still in 
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the market for ideas, or otherwise in the product market.  An alternative action in stage 
three of the process is the termination of options that are no longer viable.   
 
Real Options Reasoning
Stage 1
Identifying options
Initial Investment
Stage 2
Reducing uncertainty or 
strategically amplifying 
value
Stage 3
Terminate options no 
longer viable
Stage 3
Plug into the value 
chain with the most 
value enhancing option
Full investment 
commitment or sell 
option in the market for 
ideas
Further Investment
 
Figure 3-5 Real options reasoning as a process  
(drawn from McGrath, 2002, p.300-301) 
 
Real options reasoning (ROR) bridges financial theory and behavioural theory regarding 
innovation investment decisions (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004).  Rather than assuming 
efficient markets and static equilibrium like finance theory, ROR presumes information 
asymmetries, accumulation of path-dependencies, and uncertainty (Miller, 1998). In 
addition to these attributes, biotechnology projects also have relatively high 
commercialisation costs as compared to initial investments, a progressive nature of 
decisions and long time horizons, making them particularly applicable for ROR (Remer, 
Siah and Baden-Fuller, 2001).  Accommodating a behavioural perspective, ROR allows 
for (and values) flexibility and the fact that resource allocations may be made on 
different time horizons (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004) i.e. that there is more than one 
answer to the question of ‘when’ to plug into the value chain.  Strategy development 
under an ROR approach parallels Mintzberg’s (1978) concept of ‘emergent strategy’ 
that develops over time as a pattern of decisions are made. 
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The formal application of the real options method is of limited use due to the 
complexity of calculation and restrictive underlying assumptions.  However, it is 
unnecessary to apply it formally to benefit from real options reasoning (Remer, Siah and 
Baden-Fuller, 2001) – it can be used as a basis for strategic process.  The real options 
perspective helps to systematically identify the key variables that determine an option’s 
value – the present values of future income and expenditure streams, the degree of 
uncertainty in the project, the time to expiration of the option (i.e. the time to a decision 
that can no longer be deferred) and the opportunity costs to preserve an option (See 
Table 3-1).   
 
Variable Real options approach to investment opportunity 
Stock price Present value of the expected cash inflows from project 
Exercise price Present value of the expenditures needed to accomplish project 
Volatility Uncertainty of the expected cash flows from the project 
Risk-free rate Time value of money 
Time to expiry Period over which the investment opportunity is available 
Dividends Cost to preserve option – value that depreciates over time 
Table 3-1 Real options equivalents of Black-Scholes financial option input variables  
(based on Remer et al, 2001, p.99) 
 
 
Drawing in part on Remer et al (2001) I will now expand on each of these variables and 
provide examples of management actions that could increase the value of an option  
Increasing the present value of future cash inflows will increase the value of an option.  
To do this management could extend the indications sought for a drug, increase pricing 
or capture more of the value in a product by plugging in further along the value chain 
(subject to a favourable ratio of added income to added costs to do so).  Decreasing the 
present value of future expenditures also increases the value of an option.  This may be 
done by leveraging economies of learning, scale and scope, or by undertaking 
development work in a lower cost geography (such as India or China). 
 
Increasing the uncertainty of cash flows also builds value in an option.  This may be 
done by conducting research over a wider scope to increase the level of uncertainty and 
hence the chance to make new discoveries.  Another example would be to build 
exploratory aspects into a clinical trial in the hope of making an unexpected (postitive) 
discovery. 
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The longer an option has until it expires, the higher its value.  The duration of an option 
may be expanded by enhancing the period of IP protection through creative patenting a 
defense strategies or delaying a project as long as possible while waiting for new 
information. 
 
The value of an option can be increased by diminishing the costs involved in preserving 
an option.  An example of a management action to achieve this would be to plan 
product development so as to push back significant expenditures to as late as possible in 
the development process.  Another example would be to hold intellectual property as 
trade secrets for longer before committing to patenting costs. 
 
McGrath and Boisot (2005) have a proposed an inspiring extension to traditional real 
options reasoning theory.  Whilst ROR adopts an essentially linear approach to strategy 
they propose the use of multiple interacting options to allow firms to “harness the power 
of complexity thinking to the creation of value and to adapt to a greater range of 
environmental contingencies than is on offer in either the economic or financial 
treatment of options.”  The options complexes approach exploits the opportunities latent 
in high degrees of uncertainty rather than focusing on the reduction of uncertainty.  It 
does this by keeping access open to various components of an opportunity that may be 
creatively combined should certain contingencies emerge.  Whilst the concept is very 
appealing it is not easily evident how such an approach could be prescriptively (and 
cost-effectively) applied in the biotech sector. 
 
The value in real options is not static, value changes with market conditions, competitor 
actions, unexpected research outcomes, and many other internal and external factors and 
subsequent decisions.  Actions taken create path dependencies thus the added value of 
flexibility in real options generally decreases over time.  Gaining the full value of real 
options requires continuous evaluation of alternatives and expectations and an active 
management system for determining the optimal nature and timing of investment 
activities (Remer, Siah and Baden-Fuller, 2001).  New information must be evaluated, 
compared to assumptions and options exercised or terminated in a timely fashion.  
Whilst real options reasoning may appear to be common sense, and may often be 
intuitively applied, a more structured and transparent approach to the use of options in 
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biotech commercialisation may improve decision making and strategy.  One of the key 
outputs of this thesis is an options model for commercialisation strategy which could aid 
biotech practitioners in recognizing options and formalizing strategic processes in 
commercialisation projects. 
 
The ability to apply ROR to commercialisation in the biotech sector is a dynamic 
capability.  The concept of dynamic capabilities is described in the next section. 
Dynamic capabilities 
 
Dynamic capabilities are the antecedent organizational and strategic routines by which 
managers alter their resource base – acquire and shed resources, integrate and 
recombine them (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Dynamic capabilities are the ability to 
sense and act upon new opportunities, and to reconfigure and protect knowledge assets, 
competencies, and complementary assets and technologies to achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage (Teece, 1998).  Teece (2007) discusses the microfoundations of 
dynamic capabilities describing the types of distinct skills, routines, processes, 
organisational structures, decision rules and disciplines that firms may need to adopt to 
sense and seize opportunities and to transform resources to manage new opportunities. 
 
An example of a dynamic capability is the ability to do real options reasoning.  In this 
instance the dynamic capability would consist of the organizational routines required to 
identify and evaluate options, to develop their value and to exercise or terminate 
options.  A dynamic capability to do ROR would involve explicit routines that are used 
repeatedly.  This capability may be re-deployed in more than one company. 
 
The dynamic capabilities approach to understanding the firm builds upon the basic 
assumptions of the resource based view (RBV) of strategy. The core RBV paradigm 
asserts that competitive advantage is the root of value creation, is achieved by the 
employment of assets that are scarce, valuable, inimitable and non-substitutable and 
thus competitive advantage is sustainable (Barney, 1991).  It asserts that competences in 
sensing and acting on opportunities, and reconfiguring resources, contribute to 
sustainable competitive advantage because they must be built over time - soft assets 
such as culture and organizational experience cannot be bought or traded.  The 
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accumulation of capabilities is driven by organizational learning and molded by path 
dependencies (Deeds, DeCarolis and Coombs, 2000; Dierckx and Cool, 1989), 
complementary assets, and unique industry opportunities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997).   
 
Schreyogg and Kliesch-Eberl (2007) discuss an inherent paradox with the concept of 
capabilities – on the one hand, capabilities may be described as complex and reliable 
problem-solving architectures that are built over time and by their nature allow for the 
development of sustainable competitive advantages.  But on the other hand, there must 
be a certain path dependency, commitment and inertia in these architectures as they are 
built and thus an organisation is confronted with the dilemma of becoming locked into 
these capabilities.  The answer would seemingly be to build ‘dynamic’ capabilities - 
however, the more dynamic the capabilities become (i.e. the more experiential and 
improvisational) the higher the risk that the capabilities are actually lost.  Thus the only 
organizational capability left in high velocity markets is the ability to learn quickly and 
to improvise effectively.  This is the essence encapsulated in Brown and Eisenhardt’s 
(1998) Competing on the Edge.  As velocity increases decision making can rely less and 
less on previous experience or capabilities and becomes more and more ad hoc.   
 
Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1998) recommendation for a semicoherent strategic direction 
is appealing for competitive contexts that are in constant flux but are too extreme for the 
biotech sector.  However, Brown and Eisenhardt’s Competing on the Edge recommends 
experimentation, which relies on small, fast and cheap probes to help gain insights to 
guide strategy for the future.  Fast and cheap experiments are not always possible in the 
biotech sector but the concept is still valid and Brown and Eisenhardt have linked these 
probes to options, although they have not extrapolated this fully into a ROR framework.  
The high level of scientific uncertainty, and the fact that the biotech sector is in its 
infancy with best business models still evolving, means the traditional view of strategy 
as something first planned and then implemented does not provide flexibility to respond 
to the great unknown.   
 
Dynamic capabilities are critical if knowledge assets are to support sustainable 
competitive advantage, but they are not sufficient in themselves as a basis for 
competitive advantage (Teece, 1998; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Eisenhardt and 
 69
Martin argue that since the functionality of dynamic capabilities can be duplicated 
across firms, their value lies in the resource configurations that they create, not in the 
capabilities themselves.  Thus looking through a ROR lens the value lies in a firm’s 
options.  The challenge then, is in how to build dynamic capabilities that support ROR 
and the amplification of value in options.    
 
It appears that the concepts of ROR and dynamic capabilities may be profitably applied 
to commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector even though the strategic 
management literature provides little comment on this.  Indeed, as pointed out earlier, 
the strategic management provides few contributions on strategy in the biotech sector 
and the existing contributions that have been described in this chapter do not provide 
particularly actionable advice for practitioners in the sector.  This issue is symptomatic 
of what some academics and practitioners have described as a divide or gap between the 
outputs of academic research and the needs of practitioners. 
 
3.6 Academic research and practice – the gap 
 
“If the duty of the intellectual in society is to make a difference, the management 
research community has a long way to go to realize its potential” said Andrew Pettigrew 
(2001, p.S61).  As an academic discipline the field of management should be a 
practically oriented social science.  It faces the dual hurdles of meeting the demands of 
both theory and practice – knowledge should be developed scientifically while also 
making a useful contribution to practice and policy (Pettigrew, 1997a). 
 
At the beginning of this decade there was a substantial body of evidence suggesting that 
management executives do not turn to academic research findings in developing 
management strategies and practices (e.g. Abrahamson, 1999; Mowday, 1997).  It 
appears that in many circumstances that academic research is behind, rather than ahead 
of management practice (Barley, Meyer and Gash, 1988; Galbrouth, 1980; Offerman 
and Spiros, 2001).  The relevance gap may be due, at least in part, to dissemination 
(Starkey and Madan, 2001).  The problem is that academics, who do most of the 
research, are typically not rewarded for publishing in the practitioner journals (Cooper 
and Locke, 2000).  Furthermore, there are often multiple theories relevant to a given 
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phenomenon – practitioners may require theorists to help them with integration (Cooper 
and Locke, 2000).  Rynes et al (2001) point out:  
It is interesting that so much attention has been focused on the benefits of research 
diffusion to practitioners and their organizations but so little has been focused of the 
potential benefits of practical knowledge for researchers and the advancement of 
science (p.346). 
 
Within the wider management field strategic management is the academic discipline 
that deals with strategy – its development and implementation.  It has traditionally 
focused on structures and content, and has not been particularly actionable, limiting its 
useful contribution to practice.  It has also focused on established firms rather than 
entrepreneurial firms.  These limitations are being reflected in a growing concern about 
the disjunction between academic research and practice (Van de Ven and Johnson, 
2006; Rynes, 2001; Starkey and Madan, 2001).   
 
Gibbons et al (1994) argue that we are seeing a fundamental shift in the ways in which 
knowledge is being produced.  They describe traditional knowledge production (which 
they term ‘Mode 1’) as discipline-based and more concerned with theory than practice.  
The target audience is primarily other academics.  They describe a new mode of 
knowledge production (‘Mode 2’) which is transdisciplinary and focuses on the 
application of knowledge to practice.  Mode 2 research requires close collaboration 
between academics and practitioners.  The climate for such collaboration is driven by 
forces on both sides.  Intensified global market competition and pressure for increased 
organizational performance is driving practitioners in search of new knowledge, whilst 
resource constraints in academia are increasing the reliance on the private sector.  
Additionally, public policy incentives for applied research also favour collaboration 
(Rynes, Bartunek and Daft, 2001).  Triple helix organisations in which private firms and 
publicly funded research groups collaborate are an example of public policy at work 
(Hayes and Fitzgerald, 2009). 
 
Starkey and Madan (2001) have lamented the relevance gap, laying the blame mainly at 
the feet of academia whilst proposing that Gibbons et al’s (1994) Mode 2 method of 
knowledge production is a paradigm within which the issues may be addressed.  The 
reason for knowledge production in academia is either explicitly (Davenport and 
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Prusak, as quoted on p.6 of Starkey and Madan, 2001) or implicitly assumed to be to 
improve decision making.  The view of this camp is that to the extent that academic 
theory falls short of improving practitioner decision making it is to blame for the 
relevance gap. 
 
An alternative view of the relevance gap is that perhaps knowledge production is not 
about decision making, but about sense-making (Weick, 2001) or self-conception 
(March, 2003).  Furthermore, perhaps the problem is not with the producers of 
knowledge (academia) but with the consumers (practitioners) – practitioners are looking 
for quick-fixes to their situational view of the real world, usually not pursuing the 
fundamentals of knowledge that makes it transferable across situations (Weick, 2001).  
Thus in times of rapid change “the big danger as we move to a Mode 2 focus on current 
managerial problems, is that this move will represent adaptation that precludes 
adaptability” says Weick (2001, p.S73).  This view argues that the primary usefulness of 
management research is to shape management thinking through an understanding of the 
fundamentals rather than providing solutions for immediate managerial problems 
(March, 2000). 
 
At the same time that these concerns are being raised, a debate is ensuing as to the pros 
and cons of a closer relationship between academia and practice (Walsh, Tushman, 
Kimberly, Starbuck and Ashford, 2007; Benbasat and Zmud; Davenport and Markus, 
1999).  Central issues in this debate include rigor vs relevance, the balance between 
pure research and applied research, and role confusion.  Whilst acknowledging the cons 
of a close relationship with practice in academic research, the research objectives of this 
thesis are unashamedly of significant relevance to practitioners and applied in terms of 
the objective to provide actionable guidance for biotech entrepreneurs.  However, rigor 
and relevance are not mutually exclusive, and in fact may leverage each other in a 
powerful way for both academic and practical outcomes (Huff, 2000).  The rigor-
relevance debate really picked up steam in the late 1990s and shows no signs of abating 
(for example, Kieser and Leiner, 2009; Hodgkinson and Rousseau, 2009; Birnik and 
Bilsberry, 2008).  Academic rigor in this thesis is ensured through the methodology 
employed, as described in chapter four.   
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Nonaka and Takeuchi (1996) describe new knowledge as being created most rapidly 
when there is a continual cycling between explicit and tacit forms of knowledge.  
Explicit, or codified knowledge is formal and systemic in nature, while tacit knowledge 
is personal, context specific and difficult to communicate.  Tacit knowledge includes 
cognitive patterning, technical knowledge and subjective insights.  Most of the 
knowledge disseminated in practitioner-oriented journals is explicit knowledge from 
predominantly academic sources.  This knowledge is not a synthesis of academic and 
practitioner knowledge but more of a simple translation of academic findings to 
presumed practitioner language and format (Rynes, Bartunek and Daft, 2001).  Rynes et 
al suggest that a failure to truly integrate practitioner and academic perspectives is what 
causes this form of knowledge transfer to be mainly ineffective. 
 
3.7 Summary - framing my empirical contribution 
 
This literature review started by examining why the biotech sector is a unique context 
for examining strategy and by describing a perceived problem with the biotech sector as 
viewed by its accumulated losses, and examining the potential causes.  The strategic 
management literature bearing directly on commercialisation strategy in the biotech 
sector was examined and was found wanting in terms of actionable advice for 
practitioners.  Shortfalls in the literature were framed within the greater debate about the 
gap between academic theory and management practice.   
 
Traditional strategic management research approaches would impede an examination of 
commercialisation strategies in biotech start-ups for three key reasons.  Firstly, strategic 
management theory has tended to focus on large, established firms rather than start-ups, 
which are predominantly the domain of the entrepreneurship field.  Biotech firms are 
relatively unique in that the product development cycle for drugs is roughly 15 years, 
and many firms remain in the ‘start-up’ phase for up to two decades or even longer.  
Research and development, and commercialisation, are the strategic focuses of these 
firms throughout this time.  Secondly, strategic management research often focuses on 
strategy at the industry level rather than at the firm level.  Thirdly, the biotech sector is a 
unique setting for commercialisation strategy – the participants face high levels of 
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scientific uncertainty and regulatory burden and often lack the complementary assets 
they require for commercialisation resulting in high levels of collaboration. 
 
Strategy process research offers the opportunity to view commercialisation strategy as a 
stream of decisions that are made over time.  How strategy is devised and revised is as 
important as a strategy’s content.  It is impossible to derive a complete understanding of 
biotech commercialisation strategy in a way that can be prescriptive in every situation.  
A subset of strategy process research looks at ‘decision aids’.  In contrast to those 
researchers with a rational, systematic approach to strategy formulation (typical of IO 
economics), researchers in this area view strategy formulation as problematic and 
believe decision aids are useful in structuring decision processes to analyse strategic 
alternatives.  According to Huff (1987) the work on decision aids recognizes that 
coming up with new strategic ideas and a framework within which to understand them 
is not easy.  A ‘commercialisation options strategy model’ specific to biotech start-ups 
will provide a framework within which to consider strategic ideas and choices, and will 
suggest processes that may support the development and selection of options (to 
exercise or terminate) during the long commercialisation process.   
 
There is a need for improvement in the commercialisation strategies of biotech firms as 
evidenced by the massive losses in the industry to date.  A review of the strategic 
management theory has uncovered only a little useful theory on commercialisation 
strategy (e.g. competition vs cooperation, institutional factors). By and large there 
seems to be a chasm between academic theory and the needs of practitioners in the 
biotech sector.  The reason for this is that most strategy theory is abstracted so as to be 
generalisable across industries or circumstances.  During the process of abstraction the 
relationships between strategies and elements of context may become blurred or lost.  I 
argue that in order for theory about commercialisation to be useful to practitioners it 
needs to be highly contextual – it needs to address their specific strategic issues in a way 
that they will find actionable.  Useful existing theoretical frameworks (ROR, dynamic 
capabilities) were described in this literature review but they require translation into 
substantive theory specific to biotech commercialisation.  The methodology employed 
in doing this is described in the next chapter.  
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4 Methodology      
 
“There are neither good or bad methods but only methods that are more or less effective under 
particular circumstances in reaching objectives on the way to a distant goal.”  George Homans 
(1949, p330 as quoted by Pettigrew 1998 pg 285). 
 
The objective of this chapter is to describe and justify the epistemological approach and 
research design used in answering this thesis’ central research question -  how do 
biotech firms do commercialisation strategy, and how can they do it better?  
 
Two key outcomes are sought.  Firstly, to further empirical knowledge in management 
studies through an analysis of the relationship between the strategic issues faced by 
biotech companies and their choice of business model.  Secondly, to propose a 
processual model of biotech commercialisation strategy that will be useful to biotech 
practitioners and to management academics and that will take a step toward addressing 
the disjuncture between academy and practice that has been discussed earlier in this 
thesis.   
 
One of the ways to ensure that theory is applicable to practice is to build the theory 
inductively, by gathering facts pertinent to the research question through observations of 
the real world (Cooper and Locke, 2000).  This is in contrast to the more popular 
method of theory building that begins with inventing a theory, making deductions 
(hypothesis) from it, and then testing it.  The use of an inductive research approach in 
this project is discussed in section 4.2 under the sub-title of case data analysis and 
theory development. 
 
As Pettigrew says (1990, p 285) “… the choice of methodology is contingent on the 
problems and questions under study and the state of development of any body of 
knowledge.”  The methodological approach described below is appropriate considering 
the scant body of academic knowledge targeted at commercialisation strategy and a goal 
of synthesizing both academic and practitioner knowledge regarding commercialisation 
strategy within the biotech sector. 
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The first section of this chapter outlines my epistemological perspective in this thesis, 
and overviews several key theoretical approaches that have shaped the research design.  
The research design is then described, including the methodology employed in case 
study and analysis and theory development and refinement.  This chapter concludes 
with commentary on the inherent ethical issues and a summary of the overall research 
design. 
4.1 Epistemological perspective 
 
Management research involves a rich interplay between the researcher, the subject and 
the methodologies engaged (Checkland and Scholes, 1991).  The nature of the subject 
guides the choice of methodology, which in turn determines what information is 
revealed on the subject.  The constitution of the nature of the subject, the methodology 
employed, and the interpretation of this information then depends on the 
epistemological perspective taken by the researcher.  Epistemology is the branch of 
philosophy that is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge – what knowledge 
is, how it is acquired and what claims can be made about knowledge.  Below I explain 
the epistemological perspective I have taken in this research. 
 
Two radically opposed epistemologies are positivism and constructivism.  They 
legitimate very different methods for assessing knowledge (Reed, 1999).  Positivists 
hold that there is a ‘real world’ out there an objective and extrinsic truth that we can 
discover.  Knowledge claims must pass a rigorous ‘trial by method’ (Reed, 1999).  
Constructivists hold that there is no reality for all practical purposes and all that we can 
do is deal with the world we live in which is constructed by the way people interact with 
each other.  Knowledge claims are subject to more liberal evaluation.  The underlying 
premise of positivism is that the task of researchers is to find reality rather than to create 
or interpret it and the focus is on description rather than prescription (Wicks and 
Freeman, 1998).  The underlying premise of constructivism is that reality is created 
through choices the researcher makes about what gets construed as a research problem, 
the investigative methods used and what constitutes observations and evidence (Mir and 
Watson, 2000).  Constructivists challenge the notion that research is conducted by 
impartial, detached, value-neutral subjects, who seek to uncover clearly discernible 
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objects or phenomena.  Rather, they view researchers as craftsmen, as toolmakers who 
are part of a network that creates knowledge and ultimately guides practice.  
 
Mir and Watson (2000) have identified six important assumptions that are shared by all 
constructivists.  First, knowledge is theory driven whereas positivists conceive of the 
research process as excavation to reveal naturally occurring insights.  On the other hand,  
constructivists view the research process more as sculpting where the imagination or 
theory base of the researcher interacts with the phenomena to create a model of reality 
which we call knowledge.  Second, the separation of the researcher and the phenomena 
under investigation is not feasible.  Third, the separation between theory and practice is 
equally unfeasible.  According to constructivists, practice exists both before and after 
theory.  Fourth, researchers are never objective or value-neutral.  Fifth, research occurs 
within a community of scholarship where upon researchers are influenced by each other 
in their normal discourse.  And lastly, constructivism constitutes a methodology rather 
than a method.  A method is a tool or technique that is used in a process of inquiry 
whereas a methodology may be regarded as an “intricate set of ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that a researcher brings to his or her work.” (Prasad, 1997 
as quoted in Mir and Watson, 2000, p.944). 
 
An alternative epistemology is interpretivism.  It is not diametrically opposed to 
positivism or constructivism, rather it is based on an alternative belief about the nature 
of reality.  Interpretivists hold that there are multiple realities out there that are taken 
from different descriptions – they are interpretations.  There are multiple interpretations 
that don’t deny each other, they sit side by side.  Interpretivist approaches depend less 
on experimentation and theory testing and much more on observation, comparisons and 
the construction of plausible theory.  Interpretivist research draws on the notions of 
credibility to establish validity rather than upon generalisability as positivist research 
does (Lin, 1998). 
 
Interpretivists emphasize rather than avoid a priori understanding (Alvesson, 2003).  
Indeed, many researchers believe that it is impossible to come to field research without 
any a priori assumptions or biases (Kaghan, Strauss, Barley, Brannen and Thomas, 
1999).  “The personal world of the researcher is a very rich resource for insight.  Yet it 
is one often overlooked by science.” (Locke, Golden-Biddle and Feldman, 2004, 
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p.RM:B2).  When I began working on this thesis, more than seven years ago I had very 
little personal experience in the biotech sector.  I learned about the biotech 
commercialisation process and strategy vicariously through the trials and triumphs of 
the CEOs and executives that I interviewed.  However, as the years went by I found 
myself drawn deeper into the sector so that at completion of this thesis I have had first-
hand experience in biotech commercialisation in a half dozen ventures.  This experience 
has undoubtedly enriched my imaginative theorising capabilities.  Whilst many of the 
elements of the Commercialisation Options Model prescribed in chapters six and eight 
have come from the case study analyses or the strategic management literature others 
have come from my experience founding and working in a variety of biotech start-up 
ventures.  These personal experiences, which all occurred concomitant with this 
research, could be considered participant observation.  Participant observation is a key 
element in who I have become as a researcher although it wasn’t part of my original 
methodology or plan.  Since the objective of this thesis is an interpretivist/constructivist 
synthesis of academic and practitioner knowledge on the topic of commercialisation 
strategy a priori assumptions or biases are not considered to be an issue, but rather a 
source of enrichment of the synthesized knowledge. 
 
 Each epistemological approach differs in its slant as to the true meaning and value of 
data collected in qualitative research.  The lines between epistemologies have become 
blurred with many perspectives overlapping (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
Understanding the theoretical perspective taken in this thesis will help in understanding 
how I have construed the social world in my interpretation of my research, thus aiding a 
critical evaluation of my findings and conclusions.   
 
Using industry related experiences I have provided interpretations of observations of 
content, structures and relationships in the data collected from the field.  I have sought 
to understand commercialisation strategy in the biotech community from a biotech-
practitioner’s perspective, adopting a research design that allowed the refinement and 
validation of my initial interpretations.  A positivist approach has been rejected because 
it tends to reinforce the disjuncture between theory and practice by emphasizing testing 
at the expense of the creation of theory (Weick, 1989).  Positivist epistemology begins 
with the hypothesis as given, saying nothing about the process of discovery (Marsden 
and Townley, 1999) – it does not support theory building around problems that are 
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recognized where the answer is not yet anticipated.  I began this research with no idea 
as to how commercialisation strategy could be improved in biotech firms.  An inductive 
interpretive / constructive research methodology has allowed the simultaneous 
exploration of the strategic issues facing biotech firms and theorising as to how these 
issues could be better dealt with.  It has facilitated the synthesis of academic and 
practitioner knowledge into a useful tool to guide biotech practitioners in the 
development and implementation of commercialisation strategy. 
4.2 Research design 
 
This research design incorporates two phases.  Phase I of the research was strongly 
discovery oriented with the goal of elucidating the key strategic issues facing start up 
biotech firms and identifying any patterns between strategic issues and business models.  
This phase of research was broken down into two parts.  One involved a review of the 
secondary literature on the emergence and development of the biotech sector.  The other 
involved exploratory research and data immersion in the three case studies.  The outputs 
from this phase of research are found in chapter two which discusses the development 
of the biotech sector and how the strategic context has affected popular choices of 
business model over time, and in chapter five which presents the cross-case analysis of 
strategic issues and business models.  These two chapters describe how biotech firms do 
strategy.   
 
Following the first phase of research a model was developed proposing how biotech 
firms could do strategy (ostensibly do strategy better).  This is a normative model based 
on findings from the case study comparison, the sector review and literature review.  
The model is also supplemented with imaginative theorising, drawing on my own 
experience to fill in some of the gaps. This prototype model is presented in chapter six. 
 
In the second phase of research the prototype model was tested with seasoned biotech 
practitioners such as CEOs and venture capitalists.  The key objectives of this phase of 
research were to validate the model and to refine and extend it in order to be able to 
generalize beyond my original cases and imaginative theorising.  The findings from this 
phase of research are presented in chapter seven and the final Commercialisation 
Options Model is presented in chapter eight. 
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Theory development as part of methodology design is essential regardless of whether 
the purpose is to develop or test theory (Yin, 2009).  A complete research design 
embodies a theory of what is being studied, providing guidance on what data to collect 
and how to analyse it.  Whilst research in this thesis is largely inductive in nature, the 
research design still incorporated a conceptual framework to guide the data collection 
and analysis in both phases of data collection (Miles and Huberman, 1994).   This 
conceptual framework provides a map of the territory being investigated.  From the 
beginning this project incorporated a clear objective to merge academic and practitioner 
knowledge to provide a better understanding of commercialisation strategy in the 
biotech sector.  With this in mind, the diagram below provides a conceptual overview of 
the research design.  
We need a better understanding of 
biotech commercialisation strategy
What does the academic literature 
have to say about strategy in high‐
tech environments?
How is (and has) strategy been 
done in biotech firms? Issues? 
Processes?
Bring knowledge together to propose 
how commercialisation strategy might 
be done better
Seek further advice / input from 
practitioners
Present final commercialisation
strategy model which is a synthesis of 
academic and practitioner knowledge
 
Figure 4-1 Conceptual overview of my research design 
 
 
It is important to understand that there was an iterative process during the collection of 
both academic and practitioner knowledge. Early data and knowledge collection in each 
environment was highly influential on how the case studies proceeded and on what 
 81
areas of the strategic management literature were found to be helpful in meeting the key 
objectives of this research (e.g. real options reasoning and dynamic capabilities).  This 
iterative approach has resulted in a true synthesis of academic and practitioner 
knowledge.  
 
Phase I research methodology 
Case study method 
 
Case study is only one of several potential research strategies that could be used to 
study commercialisation strategies in biotech firms.  Other alternatives include 
experiments, surveys, histories, and archival analyses (such as economic and 
epidemiologic research).  Each method has advantages and disadvantages depending on 
the research question, the control the researcher has over actual behavioural events and 
the focus on current versus historical phenomena (Yin, 2009).  These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive.   
 
Experiments depend on the researcher being able to control behavioural elements of the 
subject matter, making this method quite unsuitable to my research objectives.  With the 
use of surveys, the ability to evaluate the impact of context on strategy development is 
quite limited.  It is constrained by the researcher’s own prior understanding of the 
potential subset of contextual factors.  Furthermore, surveys are usually more focused 
on contemporary events and may be less useful for a longitudinal analysis of 
commercialisation strategy.   On the other hand, historical analyses are (obviously) 
more focused on historical than contemporary events.  Review of archival 
documentation exclusively may provide some evidence of the context for strategic 
choices but may not uncover the rationale for the choice of one strategy over another, or 
the processes used in making choices. 
 
The key research questions in this thesis are ‘what are the perceived strategic issues 
facing biotech firms?’ and ‘how do biotech firms do strategy, and how could they do 
strategy better?”  These questions are exploratory and explanatory and best suited to a 
case study methodology rather than a historical or archival analysis since they require a 
contemporary focus.  Case study method is most appropriate when a ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
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question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator 
has little or no control (Yin, 2009) – as is the case with my research question.   
 
A cross-case analysis has been chosen as the central method for this project as it allows 
the collection and analysis of a full variety of evidence from documents such as 
business plans and grant applications, websites and interviews with a variety of 
participants and because it allows for the development of a fuller understanding of the 
context in which commercialisation strategy is formulated and implemented, how 
context changes over time, and the processes that are used in developing 
commercialization strategy, than other methods allow.   I would add that my research 
methodology did add a historical analysis component by reviewing the development of 
the biotech sector in terms of the strategic issues perceived by the sector and the 
relationship of those issues to prevalent business models over time. 
 
Yin’s (2009) definition of case study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.  Yin further 
defines a case study as coping with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, 
and as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis.  Stablein (1999) describes three main types of case 
studies – the ethnography which purports to represent a native participant’s reality, the 
case study that is oriented to generalising theoretical propositions, and the exemplar 
case study which provides a template to be duplicated in other organisations.  It is the 
second type of case study that is the aim of the methodology in this research. 
 
Contextual conditions are a key element in the development of commercialisation 
strategies.  In the case study research I have construed context to describe both the 
internal and external elements of a firm’s circumstances that affect its strategy.  A 
firm’s internal context includes its organizational structure, politics, strengths and 
weaknesses.  External context describes industry level factors and includes threats and 
opportunities.  An understanding of context cannot be adequately addressed a priori. 
Nor can the relationship between context and strategy be fully anticipated.  Only case 
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study methodology offers the opportunity to collect very rich data and to analyse both 
the explicit and implicit components of each case’s commercialisation strategy and the 
drivers behind those strategies. 
 
Case study methodology does have its limitations.  It is often criticised for lack of rigour 
and / or bias.  These limitations may also be found with other methodologies such as 
historical research or survey and can be overcome by diligent application of case study 
technique by the researcher.  A common concern about case studies is that they provide 
little basis for scientific generalisation – particularly if there is only one case study.  
Equally, experiments may not be generalised from a single experiment.  However, 
experiments and case studies may be replicated to allow generalisation to theoretical 
propositions rather than populations or universes (Yin, 2009).  A further concern is that 
case studies take too long and result in copious out-put.  Again, this limitation can be 
managed by the researcher. 
 
Case study research may be built on a single (detailed) case study or upon two or more 
(multiple) cases.  In this project multiple case studies are required to examine the 
relationship between strategic issues and business models.  Three case studies have been 
undertaken.  They are described below under the heading of case selection.   
 
Two theoretical themes have particularly shaped the nature of the case study research in 
this project – processual analysis and contextualism.  Processual analysis focuses 
research enquiry on processes that are going on within the case to explain the ‘what’, 
‘why’ and ‘how’ of a sequence of actions within a specific context and is particularly 
mindful to account for evolution over time (Pettigrew, 1997b).  Context is important in 
explaining patterns found in processes.  How companies integrate context in their 
decision making brings context to the process level.  Context is integrally embedded in 
processual analysis which is now reviewed and related to the overall research design as 
well as case study design. 
Processual analysis  
 
The goal of processual analysis is to search for patterns in processes and to compare 
patterns both within and between case studies.  One of the biggest challenges is to find 
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underlying mechanisms that create, maintain or destroy (i.e. shape) these patterns 
(Pettigrew, 1997b). A further objective of processual analysis is to link processes to 
outcomes, but this relies heavily on the element of time.  Due to the long 
commercialisation times in drug development this project must settle for studying the 
relationship between ‘what’, and the firm’s intended ‘when’ and ‘how’ rather than their 
actual outcome.    
 
Pettigrew (1992) describes five guiding assumptions in strategy process research: 
1. embeddedness, studying processes across a number of levels of analysis; 
2. temporal interconnectedness, studying processes in past, present and future time; 
3. a role in explanation for context and action; 
4. a search for holistic rather than linear explanation of process; and, 
5. a need to link process analysis to the location and explanation of outcomes. 
 
These guiding assumptions have influenced the research design in this thesis.  I respond 
to the notion of embeddedness by presenting a full chapter on the historical 
development of the biotech sector at the industry level.  This provides background to 
understanding my firm level comparative case study analysis of commercialisation 
strategy in the sector.   The industry level review covers approximately thirty years 
whilst the case studies are also of a longitudinal nature with data collected for up to 18 
months.  Pettigrew places importance on context in strategy process research.  In this 
research context has been addressed by exploring the relationship between aspects of 
enabling and constraining environmental factors on strategic choices made within the 
firms.  Case study methodology has been used to generate fertile data to aid in the 
search for holistic explanations of the relationship between context and business model.  
Lastly, in addressing Pettigrew’s guiding assumptions I will present a processual model 
that links the drivers of commercialisation strategy with optimal business models and 
then guides the biotech practitioner in their execution and continual re-evaluation of 
their strategies.  Table 4-1 summarises the ways in which my research design addresses 
Pettigrew’s five guiding assumptions. 
 
 
Pettigrew’s Guiding Assumptions 
 
My Research Design 
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Embeddedness, studying processes 
across a number of levels of analysis 
A macro-level review of the development of 
the biotech industry provides a broad context 
in which the case study comparison is 
interpreted.  The three in-depth case studies 
provide a meso-level analysis of the evolution 
of commercialisation strategies in New 
Zealand biotech firms, whilst at the micro-
level the focus is on the development of 
options within specific projects in the 
pipeline. 
Temporal interconnectedness, 
studying processes in past, present 
and future time 
The industry level review covers thirty years 
from the inception of the industry until 
present day, it also makes some predictions 
for the future.  The case studies covered a 
period of up to 18 months. 
A role in explanation for context 
and action 
A heavy emphasis has been placed on 
understanding the internal and external 
environments of the case study firms and 
understanding the external environment of the 
industry during the historical review. 
A search for holistic rather than 
linear explanation of process 
Case study method has been chosen to 
generate rich data that will aid in the search 
for holistic explanations of process in the 
development of commercialisation strategies. 
A need to link process analysis to 
the location and explanation of 
outcomes 
The final output of this research is a 
processual model that guides biotech 
practitioners to specific outcomes (the 
exercise or termination of options). 
Table 4-1 Mapping my research design to Pettigrew’s guiding assumptions 
 
Contextualism is a theory of method that fits snugly with processual research, ensuring 
a substantial focus on both the process and context of, in this research, the strategies 
under study.  Contextualist analysis draws on phenomena at vertical and horizontal 
 86 
levels of analsyis (Pettigrew, 1990).  Vertical levels of analysis consider the micro vs 
macro scope of the context e.g. project level, firm-level, sector/industry level, economy 
level etc.  Horizontal levels of analysis consider the temporal aspects of past, present 
and future.  This research project is contextualist in nature because it considers both 
multi-level (vertical) analysis by looking at firm and sector contexts, and processual or 
horizontal analysis because it considers the effects of past and present contexts on 
commercialisation strategy.  The commercialisation strategies under study are 
embedded in these two dimensions of context.   
 
One of the key implementation issues in adhering to Pettigrew’s guiding assumptions is 
dealing with the issue of time.  In a processual analysis historical data is collected which 
allows the present to be explored in relation to the past and the emerging future 
(Pettigrew, 1990).  One way to do this is to collect the data ‘real-time’ over a sufficient 
period that would be dictated by the research topic.  In the case of biotech 
commercialisation the typical life-cycle from discovery to market launch is around 10-
15 years, making real-time data collection impractical for a doctoral research project.  
Instead, real-time data was collected over 12-18 months in each of the cases, with 
retrospective recall and archival data being used to fill in the gap from inception of the 
start-up to the commencement of real-time data collection.  The other aspect of time 
constraint in this project is that it has not been possible to observe performance as an 
outcome of commercialisation strategy.  Ideally an explanation of differential firm 
performance would have been achieved before proceeding to the second part of the 
research question – ‘how should firms do strategy?’  A further consideration regarding 
the impact of time on longitudinal  research is that literal time may have different 
temporal meanings at different levels of analysis (Lerner and Kuffman, 1985).   Thus it 
may be difficult to detect the influences of changes in the industry-level context on the 
case study firms (especially during the short real-time data collection period); and 
almost certainly impossible to pick up the reverse – influences of the individual case 
study companies on the sector – although this may in fact happen over time. 
 
By now it should be apparent that the view of strategy development and implementation 
taken here is holistic and that strategy is complex.  Strategy is driven by context – 
internal and external and by past decisions and occurrences, present realities and 
 87
expectations about the future.  The process of strategy is every bit as important as the 
content. 
Case selection 
 
The unit of analysis in this study design is the firm.  A biotech firm typically has a 
pipeline of R&D projects, often each project is at a different stage in the development 
process.  Individual projects may have their own value chains and their own 
commercialisation strategies.  However, strategic processes supporting 
commercialisation are performed at the firm level including the processes a firm uses to 
build viable options for plugging into the value chain at the project level.   
 
Ideally, research of the nature proposed would employ theoretical sampling.  
Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for theory generation whereby the 
researcher simultaneously collects, codes and analyses the data, deciding what data to 
collect next in order to develop the theory as it emerges.  Thus data collection is 
controlled by the emerging theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  Cases are chosen to fill 
theoretical categories and provide both similar and dissimilar types (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967; Eisenhardt, 1989), maximizing variance and including evidence from outliers if 
possible.  The objective of theoretical sampling is the selection of cases that are likely to 
replicate or extend theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) and the number of cases chosen is 
determined by reaching a point close to theoretical saturation, where the incremental 
learning is minimal because the phenomena observed is the same as in previous cases 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
In this doctoral research project, time and resource are significant impediments to 
theoretical sampling with the goal of saturation.  Instead, the key objectives of 
theoretical sampling were kept in mind as biotech case studies were chosen which 
introduced as much variation as practical.  For reasons of access the sample frame was 
limited to New Zealand biotech companies.  The companies needed to be in start-up 
phase and be commercialising technology in the human life science sectors 
(therapeutics and/or diagnostics).  Access to top management and confidential 
documentation was needed – this access was a significant determinant of case selection 
such that there was a degree of ‘planned opportunism’ (Pettigrew, 1990). 
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Three in-depth case studies have been undertaken in generating this thesis.  The 
companies studied were Kiwi Ingenuity Ltd (now known as Kode Biotech Ltd), Neuren 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Living Cell Technologies Ltd. 
 
Kiwi Ingenuity (KIWI) was the first and most detailed case study undertaken.  KIWI is 
a platform technology company commercializing its first products as diagnostic tools 
but also researching potential therapeutic applications.  The primary reason for selection 
was Professor Steven Henry’s generous offer to provide extensive no holds barred 
access to documents, staff and most importantly to himself.  By the time research into 
KIWI has been completed 20 documents had been gathered 13 in-depth interviews 
conducted.  
 
Neuren Pharma (Neuren) was the second case study initiated.  Neuren was a typical 
early stage biotech drug development company, with a portfolio of therapeutic 
candidates at various stages of pre-clinical and clinical development.  It provided a 
complete contrast to KIWI’s platform and largely diagnostic approach to 
commercialisation. 
 
Living Cell Technologies (LCT) was the final case study undertaken.  LCT was chosen 
as an atypical example of a biotech firm commercializing a therapeutic application.  The 
company is now in clinical trials with a cell therapy for type I diabetes that utilizes 
neonatal porcine xenotransplant cells to produce insulin in the human recipient. 
Whilst the case studies were not intentionally selected according to Pisano’s framework 
of technological innovation (see chapter three) I was sampling for diversity.  As it turns 
out, the variation in case studies fits Pisano’s technological framework nicely.  KIWI is 
an example of Pisano’s third category – a novel compound type.  Neuren fits the second 
category – a noval mechanism of action or target.  LCT is an example of the fourth 
category of technological innovation – a novel treatment modality.  Pisano’s first 
innovation class – novel research methods and tools – was not covered by case 
selection. 
 
Of the firms studied, no single case is representative of all biotech start-ups. They each 
operate in varying contexts – internal and external. Historically, they have developed in 
different ways, shaping the paths and options available to them now.  By comparing and 
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contrasting individual case studies (cross-case analysis) a better understanding of the 
relationship between context and strategy has been gained.  Further research in terms of 
replicative studies on biotech firms in other settings, or with differing core attributes, 
would be required to extend the generalisability of the results.  
Data Collection 
 
Data collection in the case studies was based on semi-structured interviews and the 
review of hard-copy data such as business plans, prospectuses and grant applications.   
Interviews began with a common set of semi-structured questions aimed at eliciting 
both explicit and implicit elements of commercialisation strategies, as well as the 
drivers of those strategies.  After exhausting the semi-structured questions, areas of 
interest generated from earlier interviews were followed up on and the firm’s strategies 
were followed as they developed.  Most interviews were recorded (with the written 
permission of the interviewee) and transcripts prepared by a contract typist. 
 
The approach in each new case study changed with regard to the degree of focus placed 
on data collection from interviews versus data collection from documents and websites.  
In the first case study, KIWI, much of the initial focus was on the interviews.  A broad 
set of exploratory questions (see Appendix B) was used – I was not very clear what 
information I was looking for.  I knew that biotech industry practitioners and strategic 
management theorists needed a better understanding of commercialisation strategy but I 
had no idea what elements would turn out to be important.  By the time the third case 
study was initiated, LCT, I had a much better understanding of the biotech start-up 
environment and was able to elicit the data required more succinctly during interviews.  
Key elements of commercialisation strategy could then be more easily distilled from 
business plans, websites and other documents.  An inventory of the data collected 
(interviews and documents) during the case study can be found at appendix F. 
 
The data collected by interview has largely been accepted as fact after triangulating the 
data against documentary records and in some instances from other interview sources in 
the same company.  The informants were believed to be credible and accurately and 
intelligently conveying their understandings and experiences.  A conscious and 
consistent effort was made to view subject matter from different angles avoiding strong 
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a priori or naïve understandings of the material.  Reflexive pragmatism was exercised in 
interpreting case study observations (Alvesson, 2003). 
 
The data collected during phase II research consisted of feedback on the prototype 
Commercialisation Options Model that was obtained through interviews with industry 
practitioners.  Each practitioner was provided a briefing document (see appendix D) two 
or three weeks ahead of being interviewed.  During the interview the practitioners were 
shown a powerpoint presentation overviewing the prototype Commercialisation Options 
Model (see appendix E) and their feedback was recorded and judiciously transcribed.  
Each practitioner has substantial experience of commercialisation in the biotech sector.  
A brief curriculum vitae for each practitioner can be found at appendix C and their high-
level details are summarised in table 4-5 below. 
 
Biotech practitioners participating in phase II research 
Name Present role Nationality Current 
country of 
residence 
Years of 
sector 
experience 
Dr John Holaday 
Entrepreneur/CEO, 
specialty 
pharmaceutical 
company 
USA USA >30 
Dr Jesus Soriano Vice President, 
Business 
Development 
Spain USA >10 
Dr Mike Hirshorn Venture capitalist Australia Australia >25 
Dr Robert Teoh Entrepreneur, CRO 
industry 
China Singapore >20 
Mr Katsumi 
Maruyama 
Principal, 
Consultancy-Life 
sciences 
Japan Australia >10 
Table 4-2 Biotech practitioners participating in phase II research 
 
 
Case data analysis and theory development 
 
An inductive approach has been taken to analysing the qualitative data gathered during 
the case studies.  Inductive reasoning begins with particulars (data, observations) and 
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derives concepts and generalisations through the interpretations of the researcher 
(Thomas, 2006; Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010).  An alternative form of reasoning is 
deduction.   Deduction is a method of reasoning that starts with a logical analytical 
process to derive a conclusion.  A deductive conclusion does not contain any new 
knowledge and is merely a restatement of the premises whereas an inductive conclusion 
amplifies knowledge (Ketokivi and Mantere, 2010).  
 
An inductive analysis of data employs systematic readings of raw data to derive 
concepts, themes or a model through interpretations of the data made by the researcher.  
Research findings are allowed to emerge from the dominant themes in the data without 
the restraints imposed by structured methodologies (Thomas, 2006). 
 
Inductive reasoning relies heavily on the interpretation of raw data by the researcher, 
and hence is consistent with the interpretivist/constructivist epistemology described 
earlier in this chapter.  The imagination of the researcher also has a role to play in 
analytic interpretation on theory construction (Locke, Golden-Biddle and Feldman, 
2004).  Weick (1989, p.516) states “Theorizing consists of disciplined imagination that 
unfolds in a manner analogous to artificial selection”.  There appears to be no doubt that 
theory is constructed and relies heavily on the interpretations and judgements of the 
researcher.  
 
The methodology applied in the first phase of research closely parallels that used by 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1997) in their inductive study of continuous change in the 
computer industry.  Brown and Eisenhardt also used a multiple case comparison to draw 
insights to extend existing theory.  Whereas their focus was on extending theory in the 
areas of complexity theory mine has been to extend real options reasoning to make it 
more applicable to the biotech sector.  Like Brown and Eisenhardt I have collected data 
through interviews, observations and secondary sources, and have incorporated into the 
analysis the impact of company- and industry-level forces. 
 
After several false starts (attempts to analyse the data using various coding paradigms) I 
under took a systematic analysis of each case using a SWOT analysis (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, threats) to elucidate strategic issues.  For each case every 
piece of data was examined to see whether a strength, a weakness, an opportunity or a 
 92 
threat could be detected, listing each into the left hand column of a spreadsheet.  In 
parallel the data was examined for all elements of the firm’s business model – these 
were the salient points about how each firm intended to interact with its value chain.  
These were listed into the right hand column of the spreadsheet.  The SWOT analysis 
detailed the firm’s individual context.  I came to think of the firm’s strengths and 
opportunities as its enabling factors, and the firm’s weaknesses and threats as its 
constraining factors.  The challenge then became to understand the relationship between 
each firm’s enabling and constraining factors and its respective business model.  This 
process of theorising involved interpreting observations and proposing relationships and 
recognizing patterns.  Table 4-6 summarises the process employed in this stage of data 
analysis. 
 
Context Theorising Business Model 
These are strategic 
elements that come from a 
SWOT analysis 
Interpreting observations, 
proposing relationships and 
recognizing patterns 
These are salient points 
about how the firm intends 
to plug into the value chain 
Examples: 
• No existing 
distribution channel 
for live cell 
transplants 
• Lack of regulatory 
and clinical trial 
experience 
Examples: 
• New treatment 
modalities are likely 
to require FIPCO 
business model 
because 
complementary 
assets do not exist 
in the sector 
• Lack of internal 
complementary 
asset (clinical & 
regulatory 
expertise) is a 
constraining factor 
which will drive the 
firm to plug into the 
Examples: 
• Company intends to 
set up a chain of 
surgeries to deliver 
product to patient 
• Out-license IP at 
pre-clinical stage 
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value chain sooner. 
Table 4-3 Content analysis of case data 
 
Theory generation and the cross-case analysis developed in parallel and necessitated 
frequent revisits to the strategic management literature.  During analysis of the case 
study data it became obvious that the firms had choices amongst the strategic directions 
that they could take.  There was some evidence of analysis of those options but there 
was also evidence of a fairly ad hoc approach to decision making and of path 
dependencies created that closed down future possible strategic directions.  The data 
also demonstrated that a firm’s circumstances could change over time opening up new 
strategic opportunities and sometimes changing the value of existing alternatives. 
 
A goal of this thesis is to propose how companies can better approach 
commercialisation strategy and so I reviewed the strategic management literature for 
ways in which companies could pursue strategy making in a situation where they have 
multiple choices as to ways in which they can interact with their value chain but where 
the best choices may only be evident in hindsight at a point of interaction that may be 
several years down the track from the original decision making. 
 
Real options reasoning is a theoretical framework that supports strategy development 
where multiple choices (options) exist and where a strategy needs to evolve over a 
sometimes long period of time in response to changes in a firm’s internal or external 
environment.  Companies generally have choices to make (options to invest in) 
regarding ‘what’ drugs to develop, at which stage they plug into the value chain 
(‘when’) and what kind of transaction they use for commercialisation (‘how’).  The 
myriad combinations of these choices multiply the options available to companies in 
their commercialisation strategy.  It may be argued that understanding and evaluating 
these options is an important aspect of commercialisation strategy. 
 
Drug development is a staged process from discovery and lead development to pre-
clinical characterisation followed typically by three to four stages of clinical 
development.  Typically progression through each stage is accompanied by a reduction 
in uncertainty and an increase in value as is the focus of the second stage of ROR.  ROR 
was chosen as the underlying scaffold for the Commercialisation Options Model – the 
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fit of the framework to commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector should be 
apparent. 
 
Whilst other theoretical frameworks exist to support strategic decision-making none are 
as good a fit as ROR.  For example, in Competing on the Edge (1998) Eisenhardt and 
Brown present a framework for the development of strategy incrementally that at first 
glance may appear not unlike a real options reasoning approach.  They advocate that 
managers should “play a broader range of strategic options” which is appealing, but also 
recommend that managers “expect to shift strategy over time from, for example, driving 
differentiated brands, to pushing the technology envelope, to emphasizing cost 
leadership.”  Managers are encouraged to continually re-invent the business and re-
shape the firm’s competitive advantage.  However, in the biotech sector a firm’s 
competitive advantage very often stems from a proprietary technology or intellectual 
property rights.  During the commercialisation process the biotech firm is not looking to 
re-invent its competitive advantage, but rather to make decisions about when and how to 
interact with its value in chain in order to maximize the creation of value for its 
stakeholders.  Eisenhardt and Brown’s approach is too unstructured for the small 
biotech company with limited resources, it may be more applicable to larger businesses 
operating in more competitive and more dynamic industries. 
 
An even less appropriate fit is Porter’s (1980) very well known Five Force’s framework 
in which a good strategy involves somehow picking an attractive industry and 
positioning oneself so as to be shielded from the competition after analyzing the forces 
of potential market entrants, suppliers, buyers, substitutes and rivalry amongst 
competitors.  The Five Forces framework takes a rather static view of an industry and 
ignores many aspects of the competitive environment including the role of 
complementarities, path dependencies, technological opportunities, appropriability 
conditions, learning, regulation and supporting institutions (Teece, 2007).   
 
In the dynamic capabilities tradition the essence of strategic decision making involves 
selecting and developing technologies and business models that build competitive 
advantage through assembling and organizing difficult-to-replicate assets, and thus 
shaping competition.   
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Real options reasoning and dynamic capabilities are closely intertwined.  Being able to 
apply ROR as a process to commercialisation strategy is in itself a dynamic capability.  
On the other hand, there are many organizational routines that may be classified as 
dynamic capabilities that can support an ROR framework in terms of identifying 
(sensing) options, making investments in options (seizing opportunities) and amplifying 
value (managing threats and reconfiguring resources). 
 
With the decision made to use the ROR framework for the Commercialisation Options 
Model it was necessary to comb through the case study data once again, this time 
looking for instances in which the case study firms had invested in options and then 
exercised or terminated those options.  Surprisingly few examples were identified. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985, as cited in Thomas 2006) discussed the trustworthiness of 
qualitative research from the perspectives of credibility, transferability, dependability 
and confirmability.  They described peer debriefings and stakeholder checks for 
establishing credibility.  This was essentially the approach taken in the phase II research 
where industry practitioners were asked to critique key research findings. 
Phase II research data analysis and theory extension 
 
The data collected in the second phase of research consisted of the transcripts of five 
interviews of between one and two hours each.  Content analysis involved a thorough 
review of each transcript looking for comments that supported, questioned or extended 
the prototype Commercialisation Options Model.  By far the greatest amount of 
feedback represented extensions to my proposed model.  This second phase of research 
allows generalization of the research beyond the experience of the three case firms. 
4.3 Ethical issues 
 
Confidentiality was the biggest ethical issue facing this research project as participants 
were requested to provide commercially sensitive information.  A research co-operation 
agreement containing confidentiality clauses was signed with each company (see 
appendix A).  Participants were given the right to review the parts of this thesis 
describing their company and any related manuscript prior to publication. All 
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participants in this project were provided with an Information Sheet and asked to sign a 
Consent Form as per appendix A.   
 
After review of the project in light of the Massey University code of ethics, and peer 
review by my primary supervisor, an ethics review application was submitted to the 
university’s  Ethics Committee prior to the initiation of each case study.  A formal 
review was not undertaken by the committee as the research met the criteria of a low 
risk application. 
4.4 Summary 
 
The methodology employed in this research supports a holistic and multi-faceted view 
of commercialisation strategy.  The epistemological perspective employed is a 
combination of interpretivist and constructivist. I believe that as an industry-insider my 
personal experience enriches the theory generated and is in keeping with the objective 
to create a synthesis of both academic and practitioner knowledge on the topic of 
commercializing strategy in biotech firms.  This synthesis is achieved through a highly 
iterative process of field research, literature review and theory generation.  A two stage 
research design maximizes the validity of my findings within the time and cost 
constraints of a doctoral research project.  The final output of this thesis is the 
Commercialisation Options Model which I believe will aid biotech practitioners in 
doing strategy better at the same time as enriching the understanding of 
commercialisation strategy by management academics by providing a deeply grounded 
explanation.  
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5 Strategic issues and commercialisation at the firm 
level – first results chapter  
5.1 Introduction to the case studies 
 
This chapter contains an analysis of the three in-depth case studies that form the 
backbone of this research.  These cases represent three very different types of biotech 
companies.  The first, Kiwi Ingenuity Ltd, is a technology platform company with 
intellectual property that may be commercialised across a wide range of diagnostic and 
therapeutic fields.  Because KIWI’s technology represents a novel compound type that 
may be used as a research tool or a drug candidate it spans the first and third of Pisano’s 
innovation classes (as described in chapter two) and has a wide range of plausible 
business models to choose from. The second case study, Neuren Pharmaceuticals Ltd, 
represents a typical drug development company with a number of drug candidates being 
put through pre-clinical and clinical development.  It fits into Pisano’s second 
innovation class – a novel mechanism of action or target. The last case study, Living 
Cell Technologies Ltd, is developing a therapeutic based on the transplantation of 
animal cells into humans. It faces unique challenges being at the cutting edge of a new 
modality of treatment – Pisano’s fourth innovation class. 
 
Each case has been written up as an individual story following a similar format.   
First, an overview is provided of the company, technology, product concepts and the 
value chain specific to their product development and commercialisation.  The 
company’s business model is then concisely explained – either in their own words, or as 
a synthesis of the elements that have come from analysis of the case data.  Particular 
emphasis is given to what, how and when the firm intends to plug into the value chain. 
Factors that the firm perceives will enable or constrain the commercialisation of their 
technology or product are then described and these factors are related back to the firm’s 
business model to uncover the key drivers behind the firm’s commercialisation strategy.  
The case study analyses focus only on the strategic issues that the firms perceive.  The 
same objective environment may appear differently to different organisations, but each 
firm responds only to what it perceives; those things that are not noticed do not affect its 
decisions and actions (Miles, Snow and Pfeffer, 1974) and thus do not drive its 
commercialisation strategy. 
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Lastly each case story looks at the options the company had available to it as possible 
alternatives for commercializing their product or technology.  The concept of options as 
a significant element in commercialisation strategy is one that resonated with me during 
my review of the strategic management literature.  Specifically, real options reasoning 
(ROR) struck me as a useful approach to commercialisation strategy in high risk and 
highly uncertain environments.  Close examination of the strategies and actions of the 
case study companies revealed some examples of options, and some processes that 
would support ROR, but little evidence that the development of options was an explicit 
aspect of commercialisation strategy.  ROR presents an opportunity to add a new 
dimension of strategic thinking to the development of commercialisation strategy.  This 
concept is discussed in the next chapter where ROR is positioned as a central process in 
my Commercialisation Options Model for start-up biotechnology companies. 
 
The field research presented in this chapter was carried out between 2003 and 2006.  All 
three case study companies are still in existence.  However, a lot has happened over the 
past few years.  The companies have had their successes and failures in product 
development, their environments have evolved and the firms have no doubt adapted 
their strategies accordingly.  I would like to note that the companies I have described in 
this chapter are the companies I observed several years ago.  To any readers who know 
these companies today my observations may seem substantially out of date.  I would 
urge readers to consider that the currency of the case studies is not germane to the 
objectives of this thesis in understanding how biotech firms do strategy and how they 
may do it better.  This thesis has not sought to measure firm performance against 
strategies – a much larger sample size and longer study period would be required for 
this.  Rather, I have sought to understand the drivers behind strategies and business 
models so that this knowledge may be applied in new or unique contexts. 
 
The results in this chapter are discussed at the level of the company, with one exception.  
One interview is reported in detail.  This is because Dr. Doug Wilson of Neuren 
Pharmaceuticals, a particularly reflexive practitioner (Schon, 1995) has, purposefully or 
otherwise, distilled many of the important choices in commercialisation strategy with 
regard to drug development.  During our interview he drew on the experience gained 
through a long career in drug development.   
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A cross-case analysis is presented in the later part of this chapter.  The goal there is to 
present broad themes, linking the theoretical and empirical findings across the cases to 
the wider bodies of literature on strategic management and biotech commercialisation.   
The next chapter will then extrapolate from the observations described here, as well as 
drawing on concepts from the literature to propose a model of how biotech firms could 
do strategy. 
5.2 Kiwi Ingenuity case profile 
 
Kiwi ingenuity refers to the ‘number eight wire’ philosophy which is at the heart of 
New Zealand’s ‘can do’ mentality.  Any problem can be fixed with a piece of number 
eight fencing wire.  Knowing Professor Steve Henry and his can do attitude its no 
surprise he named his company Kiwi Ingenuity Limited.  KIWI, as the firm was 
affectionately known, was formed in 1996 with the objective of commercializing 
research findings on the ability of glycolipids (sugars attached to lipids) to insert into 
red blood cell membranes.  The company was later re-branded as KODE Biotech Ltd 
(following the brand name it had always used for its technology) after data collection 
for this thesis had been collected.  However for the purposes of this thesis the company 
is still referred to as KIWI.   
 
The original KODE research platform was based on the natural phenomenon that 
glycolipids (sugars attached to lipids) will insert into red cell membranes. Early work 
utilised natural glycolipid molecules. Since then those molecules have been replaced 
with biocompatible ‘smart’ synthetic molecules which have a bi-lipid tail, a 
solubilisation linker and a designable bioreactive terminal structure. These molecules 
insert harmlessly and are retained in cell membranes.  The term KODE now represents a 
technology platform based on a range of synthetic molecules that have the potential to 
attach a large variety of bioactive molecules to cells. These molecules can modify 
functional activity and/or membrane characteristics of living cells in vitro and in vivo. 
Due to their synthetic nature KODE molecules can be specifically designed to 
incorporate novel features and are potentially applicable to a large range of diagnostic 
and therapeutic applications, including: diagnostic controls, immune modulation, 
antigen enhancement/masking, diagnostic analytic systems, cell labelling and imaging, 
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vaccine and drug delivery, cell culture improvement, immune therapy and fertility 
enhancement.  The KODE technology platform is under-pinned by a strong strategic 
intellectual property portfolio. 
 
KIWI’s first commercial target was the inclusion of  KODE technology in to CSL Ltd’s 
Securacell product – a niche market product for quality control cells used in pre-
transfusion testing of donated blood.  The estimated market value is a modest 
(confidential) number, as is the royalty stream that KIWI expects to earn.  KIWI 
envisages product line extensions and the possibility of the company becoming self-
sustaining (cash flow positive) as a result of this income stream. 
 
In parallel with the development and launch of its first product, KIWI has been working 
on the development of KODE FEM.  FEM stands for Fertility Enhancement Molecules.  
This project uses the core KODE technology to improve the implantation of embryos as 
part of an assisted reproductive technology (ART) technique.  This project is still pre-
clinical, meaning that the product is being tested in mice, but not in humans.  The 
market size is around 1.5 million ART cycles per year.  KIWI estimates that if the 
KODE FEM product could lift the current implantation rate by 20% then the product 
would be viable and could earn KIWI royalties ranging from tens of millions of dollars 
for a low market penetration rate to hundreds of millions of dollars for a high market 
penetration rate.  KODE FEM also has potential applications in the veterinary arena. 
 
Key stakeholders in KIWI are its founder and CEO, Professor Henry, staff of 
approximately 20 persons, shareholders, key collaborators and the Auckland University 
of Technology (AUT).  KIWI is a privately owned company, funded by angel 
investment and government research grants.  Many of the company’s early investors 
were strategically chosen to provide credibility and access to networks including other 
potential investors and potential R&D collaboration partners.  Some of the shareholders 
have relevant industry expertise which they contribute as required.  “The effort to raise 
the first $150,000 to $275,000 was more work than raising the millions.  But that’s the 
key.  Get those front-end decisions right from the beginning, and the rest will flow” said 
Professor Henry. 
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Professor Henry describes the company’s relationship with AUT as being critical to its 
success.  Since its inception KIWI has been based, in part, on the AUT campus.  KIWI 
maintains total legal independence yet is operationally integrated within AUT which 
provides access to various resources, services and networks including subsidised 
accommodation.  AUT has seconded to KIWI several staff members in exchange for 
research outputs.  KIWI has a contractual relationship with AUT, where in exchange for 
AUT support KIWI undertakes to pay to the university 10% of its profit generated from 
collaborative research. “We run at about a quarter of the expenditure of equivalent 
companies out in the real world” said Professor Henry. 
 
KIWI’s second most important alliance is with Lectinity Holding, Inc. based in the 
Shemyakin Ovchinnikov Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry, Russian Academy of 
Sciences in Moscow.  KIWI owns all intellectual property developed by Lectinity and in 
consideration Lectinity has rights to the Russian Federation license to use the developed 
KODE technologies at no cost.  Lectinity employs two full time Russian chemists on 
behalf of KIWI who develop the prototype molecules conceptualised in New Zealand.  
They cost a fraction of what it would cost to employ similar scientists in NZ.  Lectinity 
also manufactures the KODE molecules for the first product which is already on the 
market.  Other significant relationships are with CSL Limited, and Immunocor Inc 
which are the licensees of the KODE CAE technology and Medicult AB which has 
licensed the KODE FEM technology for use in the field of assisted reproduction 
techniques (ART).  
Value chain for a diagnostic product 
 
A typical value chain for a diagnostic product is presented below.  Some countries do 
not require the registration of diagnostic products, or have a fairly limited registration 
process (e.g. New Zealand and Australia), whilst others require a comprehensive 
evaluation before marketing approval is given (e.g. the US).  
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Figure 5-1 Typical value chain of a diagnostic product 
 
Business model 
A firm’s business model is about how and when it plugs into the value chain. The 
business model may be different for each R&D project.  Although KIWI now keeps an 
open mind to the different options available for plugging in (e.g. licensing, manufacture 
and distribution, sale of IP etc.), so far licensing is the only mechanism that has been 
used. 
 
A review of six versions of KIWI’s business plans and grant applications spanning the 
years 2002-2006 has shown a remarkable consistency in the articulated business model 
of the firm.  From the June 2003 Technology for Business Growth grant application – 
“The actual products of KIWI are intellectual property which can be licensed.  KIWI's 
commercial strategy is to develop, protect and license technology, it does not 
manufacture, distribute or market product.  Instead KIWI's strategy is to maximize its 
intellectual property position and then license the technology to appropriate industry 
partners who will manufacture the product, then distribute and market it through their 
own established systems and brands.” “There is a planned mix of KODE technology 
development to ensure early positive cash flows from some products to help fund the 
longer-term, but high return developments.” Additionally, the earlier business plans did 
mention consultancy as a method of income generation, although noting that this would 
be minor, as indeed it was. 
 
One element of KIWI’s business model that was not made explicit in their documents, 
but was apparent from interviews with both Professor Henry, and KIWI’s chairman, 
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was KIWI’s aspirations to spin out new opportunities into new companies.  The central 
idea behind this type of structure was the ability to raise new funds into the spin-out 
companies without diluting shareholders in the parent company.   
 
Exit opportunities for investors have always been at the fore-front of the Kiwi business 
model.  The first business plan used the term ‘harvest’ to describe the ultimate goal of 
extracting optimum value out of the business by taking the company public on a stock 
exchange or selling out to a large international corporation.  Later plans used the term 
‘exit strategy’.  Professor Henry consistently talked about complete flexibility in the 
options available to the company in providing exit opportunities for its shareholders  
“We have options rather than strategies.  Options.  Because everything is negotiable, 
everything is for sale.  The mix and match depends on what they want.”  Professor 
Henry described the various options as including IPO, trade sale of parts of the 
company or technology, and joint ventures with license fees coming back to KIWI.  
“Anything can go, at the right price.  So that is part of the strategy, to have a powerful 
research engine with many spin-off products, and if one goes then the next one is 
stepped up because there's so much technological cross-over.” “But we are not 
prepared to commit to any particular exit strategy, we’ve left it open.” 
  
Whilst the business model itself has mainly remained consistent over the five year 
period, the business plan has changed to accommodate changing research focuses of the 
company and most importantly – the slippage of time.  For example, the April 2002 
business plan projected that investors injecting capital in 2002 would have their funds 
repaid by 2005, and that a shareholder exit would be available in the 2007/2008 
financial year either through selling the technology as a trade sale to a large 
international corporation, or through public share flotation (IPO).  It also projected that 
income from licensing would begin in 2002.  The 2005 business plan no longer talked 
of repayment of invested funds, instead it talked about becoming self-sustainable by 
2008 (the 2006 plan indicated self-sustainability by 2008 or 2009) i.e. the profit from 
commercialisation of the short term opportunities would be sufficient to fully support 
the on-going research and development into the longer term opportunities without the 
need to return to investors for further funding.  Exit strategies including a trade sale or 
IPO were still envisaged for the 2007/2008 financial year. 
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My active research into KIWI drew to a close in mid-2005 when I was approached to 
join the company’s board of directors.  Over several years of observation as a researcher 
I had developed opinions about how KIWI could have approached commercialisation 
strategy differently, but had kept these to myself to avoid biasing the data I was 
collecting (in keeping with my choice of methodology).  Thus the Sept 2005 and March 
2006 business plans are tainted with my input and consider for the first time production 
of particular niche products for sale as a way of capturing higher value by plugging in 
further along the value chain.  In addition, a greater focus was put on ensuring a balance 
between short-term opportunities to ensure cash flow and sustainability, and long term 
opportunities that would provide substantial revenues to investors but which would 
require a longer timeframe for R&D and regulatory hurdles.  “In order to maximize 
revenues, KIWI is looking to keep as much of the value chain, for the short term 
opportunities, in house as possible.  So rather than a simple licensing of intellectual 
property for royalties, KIWI will have the diagnostic kits contract manufactured where 
this makes commercial sense, and will then distribute them globally through one or 
more companies prominent in the appropriate specialty area.” 
 
In summary, the ‘what’ that Kiwi plans to plug into the value chain is, for the most part, 
intellectual property.  This intellectual property covers the KODE construct – a novel 
structure that can be used to paint a variety of bio-active molecules onto the outside of 
cells.  Kiwi’s ‘when’ is at a fairly early stage in the development path for either a 
diagnostic or a therapeutic and ‘how’ is primarily through a licensing mechanism. 
 
Perceived enabling and constraining factors 
 
The strong IP protection around KODE technology is one of the core strengths, or 
enabling factors, of the firm.  Professor Henry talked extensively about ring-fencing 
intellectual property to prevent competitors bringing similar products to market.  
“Where possible competitive technology is also indentified, researched and covered by 
strategic filings such as public disclosure.” 
 
KIWI also saw its relationships with AUT and Lectinity as significant enabling factors.  
Both offered KIWI the opportunity to lower costs, and in addition Lectinity provided 
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vital chemistry skills that KIWI did not have in-house.  Whilst KIWI’s relationship with 
Lectinity was on one-hand a significant strength, enabling KIWI to develop new KODE 
molecule constructs (and cost effectively too), KIWI’s dependency on Lectinity 
provided a serious threat to KIWI’s R&D programs.  The turn-around time for research 
materials coming from Lectinity was often poor, and as an external contractor KIWI had 
limited ability to influence the serious impact on its R&D timelines.  Furthermore, there 
was always an underlying discomfort with a key supplier being based in a developing 
country on the far side of the world – i.e. Russia.  However, the R&D skill sets and 
manufacturing capabilities provided by Lectinity could not be duplicated without 
significant investment and so this threat remained unaddressed in the KIWI business 
model. 
 
There is no doubt that lack of capital has been one of KIWI’s biggest constraints.  “We 
don’t have the money or the manpower to run five or six significant projects on the core 
technology…. each would be potentially worth a fortune, but we can’t manage it.”  “If 
we had a lot more money we could be a lot further on down the process.”  The 
availability of good staff was also seen as a significant constraint – this is tied to capital 
constraint to the extent that the best people are very expensive, explained Professor 
Henry.  However, “finding (good) staff is a bigger limitation than finance.” 
 
Unlike many biotech companies KIWI has actually launched a product to market and is 
earning revenues from its license of KODE CAE to CSL Ltd for use as a blood 
grouping control.  KIWI perceived this as a strength in terms of providing credibility for 
the technology platform and the company even though the royalty stream had not yet hit 
six figures per annum.  During my research it was not possible to observe the actual 
effect this achievement had on the company’s ability to do further licensing deals. 
 
The fact that KIWI’s platform technology had multiple applications across several fields 
including diagnostics therapeutics and veterinary medicine was perceived as a strength.  
However, in some ways this hindered the company in reality.  Several of the product 
opportunities the company was working on had totally different value chains from each 
other.  There was no leveraging when it came to researching and understanding the 
paths to market for each potential market opportunity.  Doing this for even a single 
product opportunity is no small feat.  It involves understanding how the product can be 
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developed, manufactured, meet regulatory requirements, be reimbursed or paid for, and 
be marketed.  KIWI suffered from a lack of human resource in the business 
development area (driven by capital constraints) with Professor Henry wearing the hats 
of both CEO and CSO with part time support from his uncle.  Whilst his uncle is an 
experienced businessman, with a long career within the management structures of large 
corporations, he had little experience in the healthcare sector or biotech start-ups.  
Certainly there was only a modest focus on business development during the case study 
years as Professor Henry’s focus was committed to making sure the intellectual property 
was protected before talking to potential partners.  Intellectual property protection is 
crucial to commercialisation strategy, but I believe KIWI’s commercialisation strategy 
and business model would have been better served by a more in-depth understanding of 
the value chain, inclusive of regulatory requirements, for each R&D project and the 
options that KIWI had for plugging into those value chains.   
 
KIWI has been funded by angel investors and government grants.  KIWI’s current 
shareholder base presents it with a unique challenge, not faced by the other two case 
study companies.  It consists of a group of older shareholders who are retired or close to 
retirement age, and a group of younger mid-career shareholders.  The two groups have 
differing outlooks with regard to timeline.  While the younger group are happy to wait 
for larger returns further down the track, the older group tend to want more immediate 
returns so that they may enjoy the benefits of KIWI’s success for a longer period of 
time.  This is not an issue that KIWI was able to resolve at the time, but it is one that the 
board was acutely aware of, and it is an issue worth consideration by entrepreneurs 
establishing start-ups with angel investment. 
 
When asked if being located in New Zealand enabled or constrained KIWI’s activities 
Steve described the location as doing both.  “Supply is difficult – it takes a long time for 
reagents to arrive, and the people we want to meet with are a long way away.  A further 
constraint is that the New Zealand dollar is weak.  On the upside, the cost of labour is 
very low, so you need a lot less cash.  But on the other side it’s very hard to raise 
funds…. so maybe the differential of low labour cost is artificial because you have to 
pay for it with NZ raised cash.” 
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Relationship of enabling and constraining factors to the business 
model 
 
Due to lack of capital and small scale, KIWI saw itself as vulnerable to having its IP 
infringed by competitors and being unable to do anything to defend itself.  Its July 2004 
Growth Services Fund application stated “It should be noted that the commercial 
strategy of KIWI is to minimise competitive risks by forming alliances with large 
international and well established companies.  The risks of competitors are therefore 
mitigated by these major alliances (although these companies will still have their own 
competitors).  Additionally, as the IP products of KIWI are valuable they will be 
litigated by competitors - thus alliances with large partners are essential to reduce this 
risk." 
 
Alliances with bigger partners who would provide a path to market have always been 
part of KIWI’s business model.  When asked why KIWI had chosen certain stages of 
the value chain over other for plugging in, Professor Henry replied “Cost.  We are not 
trying to take on the world.  If you look at an R&D cost structure it starts off pretty low 
and flat, it’s still pretty substantial but it’s pretty low and flat.  When you have to get 
into trials, animal trials, human trials, phase one, phase two, it just goes up through the 
roof.  We have no interest in going into those high cost areas.   Too high risk, too high 
investment and too many other things in the research engine to resort to - so let it go. 
Come back to the core, add value, because you get a lot… you don’t get as much money 
as the big bucks at the other end, but if you really look at it the amount of money 
invested, the return in the investment is actually much higher on the front end than it is 
actually on the back end, the amount percentage-wise.  The return in dollars is much 
higher at the other end but they also have put in a huge amount, you know so the 
percentage return is probably a lot less.  The risk, and we can mitigate risk reasonably 
well in our research engine here, we know what we are capable of doing so we can 
manage that risk quite well.” 
  
Coming back to kiwi ingenuity and the number 8 wire philosophy, the reason KIWI has 
been able to do so much with so little resources is a very carefully planned leveraging 
strategy whereby R&D projects are structured to have significant technological cross-
over between them.  Likewise IP protection is leveraged through the reinforcement of a 
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patent taken out for one market application providing protection for other applications.  
This concept is best observed diagrammatically as in figure 5-2. 
 
This figure illustrates the significant overlap in the three main areas of 
technology currently being researched by KIWI. Central to all projects is IP 
protection of the KODE constructs, with the IP of each area overlapping into the 
arenas of other projects. These overlaps provide for additional IP coverage, while 
also allowing each projects research to leverage off the other. FEM = fertility 
enhancement molecules; CAE = controlled antigen expression; CAEenz = CAE via 
enzyme technology, PA = protein antigens and SYN = synthetic KODE constructs.
SYN
PA
FEM
CAE
CAE
enz
 
Figure 5-2 KIWI’s IP leverage strategy 
 
Professor Henry describes this “…. but all the technology is designed to leverage off 
each other, so the advances we make on this one feed into that one, if we want to feed 
into that one, how can it be designed in such a way that it will leverage up the other 
technologies?  So we use technological leverage, where each feeds into the other and 
each drives each other, so nothing has a single value, everything is one plus one equals 
five.  So we have a product pipeline which is KODE, and then every technology feeds off 
each other.  And yet they’re totally different areas.  One’s a blood-grouping serology 
marker, and the other one’s fertility enhancement molecules.  Yet they’re all related.  So 
what you do in one, gives value in the other areas.”  Professor Henry also sees leverage 
as reducing risk.  “So nothing is really started from cold.  Everything has a head start.  
We know what our core can do, and we have a good feeling of what it can potentially 
do.” 
 
KIWI is undoubtedly a platform company even though it does not operate in the typical 
platform technology fields such as genomics, proteomics, combinatorial chemistry or 
high-through put screening.  KIWI’s technology is a unique innovation and part of the 
challenge it faces is making potential licensees aware of the technology and its 
capabilities.  Because KODE technology has not been conceptualised (or even dreamed 
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about) by the international scientific community KIWI does not have the business 
model option of ‘fee for service’ available to it, as do many technology platform 
companies.  It also has to develop product ideas to a certain proof of concept stage 
before going out to find partners to form alliances with.  As detailed in chapter two, it is 
now widely understood that platform companies can earn fair returns.  However the 
returns are generally not as attractive as they are for product companies.  KIWI, like 
many platform companies, has recently reviewed its commercialisation options and is 
considering moving further down the product development value chain with the goal of 
out-licensing a more valuable product. 
 
The key drivers behind KIWI’s business model are constrained financial resources, a 
shortage of business development and regulatory experience and the applicability of 
KODE technology across a wide range of fields.  These drivers have KIWI’s focus on 
commercialising IP rather than physical products, plugging into the value chain early in 
the product development path and this has resulted in a preference for licensing as the 
transaction mechanism for plugging in.  In addition, the make-up of KIWI’s shareholder 
base (with many older shareholders) has compelled it to look for nearer term exit (plug-
in) opportunities.  Strong IP protection allows KIWI to access complementary assets in 
the market for ideas without concern for appropriation of its technology. 
Options 
 
KIWI explicitly sought options as part of its commercialisation strategy.  The focus was 
mainly about ‘what’ and ‘how’ options – “everything is negotiable and everything is for 
sale”.  KIWI did not extensively consider its ‘when’ options, remaining committed to 
the idea of early-stage deals.  KIWI’s central paradigm was that it was an R&D 
boutique – with greater focus on the ‘R’ than the ‘D’ – and that it did not participate in 
down-stream activities such as manufacturing, clinical trials or marketing and 
distribution.  The conviction of this paradigm was so strong, that it prevented KIWI 
from exploring and evaluating alternatives for plugging into the value chain other than 
early stage licensing.  KIWI commercialised its first product KODE CAE by licensing 
the intellectual property to third parties for a royalty stream so that they could 
manufacture the control cells.  KIWI did not consider the alternative approach of 
manufacturing the control cells in-house itself and selling this value-added product to 
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the marketing partners and thus retaining a far larger portion of the value for itself.  
Without a doubt there would have been hurdles to overcome in this approach – a full 
evaluation would have determined the costs versus benefits.  However, it is possible that 
if such an evaluation had been undertaken, and the alternative approach found viable, 
that the greater income stream may have prevented the need for several further rounds 
of capital-raising. 
 
Whilst Professor Henry emphasised the company’s flexible strategy and the desire to 
maintain options around plugging into the value chain, the company did not have 
structured processes in place to support real options reasoning as an approach to 
strategy.  The company did however pursue several tactics that had an ROR flavour to 
them.  These were the way that KIWI tested the market for KODE CAE control cells, 
the process it described for evaluating new R&D projects and the way in which KIWI 
was prepared to extend KODE FEM technology into the animal market.   
 
With CSL’s assistance KIWI was able to secretly field test KODE CAE control cells in 
the field.  This experiment (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998) was done by posing the 
control cells as a patient sample in a laboratory quality assurance survey that saw the 
control cells tested in hundreds of laboratories around Australia.  (Medical laboratories 
routinely participate in external testing programs whereby they are provided with mock 
samples to analyse and make sure they get the correct results). Uncertainty around the 
product was reduced by secretly testing prior to launch – both CSL and KIWI gained 
valuable knowledge about how the product would perform in the market.  Later, when 
the duplicity was unveiled, the latent market for control cells began to develop true 
market demand as the laboratory community realised that some of their members had 
failed the survey due to inadequate reagents or procedures.  The value of this scouting 
and positioning option (McGrath and MacMillan, 2000) was also amplified through the 
credibility gained with the licensee (CSL) who then went on to launch the product 
proper. 
 
As a platform company KIWI was never short of R&D opportunities.  Whilst the 
earliest projects – KODE CAE and KODE FEM were built around the academic 
interests and skills of Professor Henry and Dr. Blake, later project concepts went 
through a thorough evaluation process before new R&D projects were selected.  If each 
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R&D project is thought of as an option on a future out-licensing opportunity and 
revenue stream, then the evaluation process used by KIWI is a means of validating each 
option and also reducing uncertainty by understanding what choices the company would 
have when it came to plugging into the value chain.  Professor Henry described how 
KIWI analyses the market for potential licensees – identifying who they are, what 
they’d pay, their marketing and distribution channels and the size of the end market.  
“Up front we identify prospective buyers of our technology.  We work up the margins 
and examine the competition.”  I believe KIWI could further enhance this process by 
ensuring a complete understanding of the full product development path of the products 
that potential licensees would develop from specific KODE technologies.  For example, 
a detailed understanding of the clinical trials and regulatory process that Medicult will 
have to undertake to get a product based on KODE FEM technology to market would 
help KIWI more accurately predict and forecast revenues in relation to its license. 
 
KIWI followed a very structured process in finding and evaluating potential licensees 
for the human application of its first two KODE technologies – KODE CAE and KODE 
FEM.  Professor Henry told how, on an opportunistic basis, KIWI was prepared to give 
a license for KODE FEM for animal applications in exchange for a $1 per year royalty – 
for the NZ market only and KIWI would take a major stake in new intellectual property.  
“It’s a way of trying to push our technology out and get money off it without actually 
doing anything – since we don’t have the resources to develop all the market 
opportunities.”  This license opportunity was not executed in the end, but it provides a 
good illustration of one type of option that KIWI was willing to take. 
 
The Kiwi Ingenuity case study provided a valuable opportunity to study 
commercialisation strategy in a start-up platform technology company and to observe a 
rudimentary application of the concept of options to strategy.  Professor Henry was 
exceedingly generous with his time and with access to company records.  As my first 
case study KIWI has significantly influenced my theories around commercialisation 
strategy. 
 
5.3 Neuren Pharma case profile 
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Following injury, the death of nerve cells occurs over a prolonged period of many hours 
or days, providing a window for therapeutic intervention to limit the degree of damage.  
Furthermore, when the brain is under insult it produces compounds to protect itself by 
delaying neuronal cell death or reducing its impact.  Scientists at Neuren 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd were among the first to discover these principles and to use them 
as the basis for drug design.  Neuren is a biopharmaceutical company listed on the 
Australian stock exchange (ASX) with a unique product pipeline targeting the large and 
rapidly growing therapeutic markets of neuroprotection and metabolism and is backed 
by a strong patent estate (greater than 70 patents).   
 
Neuren’s neuroprotective portfolio comprises native molecules and their analogues that 
have application not only to acute brain injuries associated with stroke, 
cardiopulmonary bypass surgery (CPB) and traumatic brain injury but also in chronic 
neurological conditions such as Alzheimer's Disease, Parkinson's Disease and Multiple 
Sclerosis.  Metabolic syndrome is characterised by hyperlipidemia, hypertension and 
obesity.  While most large pharmaceutical companies have focussed on treating the 
individual consequences of this syndrome rather than its causes, Neuren is directly 
targeting the underlying processes that result in the multifactorial clinical phenomena, 
with a focus on growth hormone.   
 
Neuren’s lead compound is Glypromate, a naturally occurring neuroprotective molecule 
that was in a phase II clinical trial at the time of data collection. Glypromate is being 
trialled for protection of brain injury resulting from cardiac-pulmonary bypass, 
specifically, Coronary Artersy Bypass Graft Surgery (CABG).  CABG involves 
stopping a patient's heart and using a heart-lung machine to oxygenate the blood and 
pump it through the body.  There are in excess of 800,000 CABG procedures performed 
annually with 40 to 70% of patients showing some impairment of brain function at the 
time of discharge.  The pathophysiology of bypass associated neurodegeneration is 
essentially the same as stroke, although more limited.  CABG was selected as Neuren’s 
clinical entry point as these trials have a much shorter lead in time frame than the 
chronic disease trials and are much simpler than stroke.  A patient’s cognitive condition 
can be tested before and after surgery, allowing each patient to act as his/her own 
control thereby reducing the number of patients needed in the trial and therefore the 
cost.  There is an enhanced chance of success due to the tightly controlled nature of this 
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type of trial.  Neuren is positioning to be first to launch in a market worth approximately 
US$1 billion per year.  Neuren’s second lead compound, NNZ-2566 also targets 
traumatic brain injury and will also be tested clinically in CABG patients.  These 
indications together with stroke represent a potential world market of more than US$68 
billion per annum.  Neuren is also developing additional classes of compounds for 
neuro-protection and neuro-regeneration.  
 
Neuren was formed by the merger of NeuronZ and EndocrinZ in January 2004.  These 
companies were established as spin-offs from the University of Auckland to 
commercialise intellectual property created by the university (including the Liggins 
Institute, a world-renowned centre for research in neuroscience and endocrinology).  
Neuren has continuing rights to new intellectual property developed by the Liggins 
Institute.  Other key stakeholders include its staff, shareholders including Pfizer Inc and 
collaboration partners which included the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research / 
Neurosciences program and Metabolic Pharmaceuticals Ltd (Australia) at the time of 
data collection (Metabolic no longer exists). 
 
Neuren has established operations in Auckland, New Zealand, where the majority of its 
17 employees and consultants are based. It also has an office in Australia and an office 
in Bethesda, Maryland, near Washington DC, to support its partnerships, regulatory and 
business development activities in the USA. 
Value chain 
The value chain for Neuren’s lead candidates are well represented by the ‘generic’ drug 
development value chain described in chapter two.  
 
Figure 5-3 The generic drug development value chain 
Source: Medicon Valley Drug and Device Development Guide. 
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Business model 
An April 2004 document entitled Executive Summary describes the company’s business 
strategy:  "The Company's strategy is to aggressively pursue clinical development of its 
compounds through phase two then to establish profitable relationships with larger 
biopharmaceutical companies for manufacturing, phase III studies, regulatory approval 
and marketing.  This business model will significantly reduce the capitalization 
requirements and risks of late-stage development while maximising milestone revenue 
and royalty streams.  The depth and breadth of Neuren's pipeline, the large number of 
target indications in highly attractive markets and the capability to deliver products 
cost-effectively will allow the company to follow multiple exit strategies and paths to 
value recognition." 
 
This message was consistent with interviews with the company’s CEO and one of its 
Directors.  CEO, Mr. David Clarke said "Our business model is very straight forward, 
three parts to it.  Get it into man, get into humans very quick.  Get into acute first, prove 
the family of compounds and then go into chronic.  Don't go past phase two.  Forget 
phase three, its too expensive.  Secondly, build partners.  You're gonna have to license 
some day.  We're a small pharmaceutical company at the bottom of the world, we need 
partners, we need friends, you need credibility.  Get it quick - we've got some very good 
partners.  Don't be a single product company, don't back your company on one product.  
Have a range of options.  This is biotech and things fail, things don't go right, they take 
longer - so make sure you've got a very good strategy."   
   
Product development strategy was also defined in the same document: "Neuren has 
defined a product development strategy designed to maximize the value of the 
compounds and associated intellectual property in strong, underserved markets while 
utilizing available resources in a highly efficient manner.  The strategy targets clinical 
development primarily for acute indications where those indications have significant 
value and where success will lead to partnering opportunities for chronic indications 
with similar pathophysiology in potentially more lucrative markets.  The Company 
believes that this approach will maximise the return for investors in a reasonable 
timeframe while controlling expenditures and limiting the need for ever greater 
capitalization.  Additionally, Neuren's development strategy involves carefully 
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considered assessment of alternative indications for characterized compounds as a 
means of reducing the risk of failure for any one indication and expanding the value of 
the compounds to potential partners." 
 
In their Prospectus dated November 2004 Neuren describes an "effective and efficient 
clinical development strategy - conducting trials in conditions that provide readily 
available patients, maximum control, minimum timeframes and outcomes that are 
indicative of efficacy in additional and larger indications."  "Unlike traumatic brain 
injury and stroke, CABG is a controlled elective surgical procedure, therefore the 
measurement of cognitive function before and after the procedure is possible.  It is 
envisaged that success in this first indication should lead to partnering opportunities for 
stroke and other indications for which clinical trials are more complex but where there 
is a substantial unmet need with little competition.  Neuren believes that its strategy of 
first undertaking the generally shorter and typically less expensive clinical trials for 
acute conditions and then pursuing the chronic conditions represents the most cost-
effective means of increasing shareholder value while controlling risk.  This same 
rationale drives the Company's commitment to seek partnerships with larger companies 
that have the resources and experience to manage large-scale phase three clinical 
trials, product approval and commercialisation.  Further, Neuren's strategy should 
enable the Company to pursue more studies for more indications, potentially increasing 
the probability of early clinical success and partnering." 
 
Neuren’s clinical trial strategy is worth spending time to understand in detail as it is a 
clever leveraging strategy designed to create as much value as possible for as little 
investment as possible, and at the same time decreasing risk by picking off the low 
hanging fruit.  The following table lists the broad range of potential indications for the 
company’s neuroprotective compound families.   
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Figure 5-4 Potential indications for Neuren’s neuroprotective IP 
 
 
The key focus is to rapidly obtain clinical safety, tolerability and efficacy data using the 
CABG model.  This data will then be used to under-write an out-licensing approach for 
the chronic disease program.  Due to Neuren’s extensive pipeline (and ongoing 
requirement for fresh funds) they are also seeking out-licensing opportunities for 
various other drug candidates. 
 
During the early stages of the case study research it was Neuren’s objective to out-
license Glypromate (and subsequent candidates) to a larger pharmaceutical company 
after completion of the phase two trial.  It would then have been the licensee’s role to 
complete the remaining phase three trial(s) and launch Glypromate to market.  
However, in later interviews I learned that Neuren had decided to complete the clinical 
development of Glypromate in-house and planned to market Glypromate directly to 
doctors in the US, while out-licensing sales and distribution in the rest of the world.  
This was a major change in strategy for the company.  The strategy revision came about 
when the FDA (US Food and Drug Administration) advised Neuren that they did not 
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have to do a phase IIb trial together with the realisation that a phase III trial could be 
carried out in NZ, Australia and the US at a substantially lower cost than originally 
anticipated.  I asked what the drivers were that made this phase III trial affordable 
compared to trials for other products.  Mr. Clarke explained that firstly there are no 
therapeutics in the market for the prevention of cognition loss in CABG, so Glypromate 
only has to work fractionally. It doesn’t have to compare to any other product – so the 
size of the trial required in order to prove efficacy is not large.  The main focus is on 
safety.  Also, CABG operations are common in New Zealand and Australia, meaning 
recruitment is easier.  These factors all keep costs down. 
 
The ‘what’ of Neuren’s business model is Glypromate – a product chosen for its 
perceived low risk in clinical trials and its ability to be leveraged into more lucrative 
markets such as stroke. ‘When’ was initially following completion of phase two trials 
with plugging in to occur through a licensing transaction (‘how’).  However, a revision 
in strategy saw the plugging in point move beyond the conclusion of phase three trials 
and the intended transaction mechanism became a hybrid between out-licensing and 
sale of physical product. 
 
Mr. Clarke talked about Neuren operating in three types of markets – the capital 
markets, the partnering market and the product market.  Each had its own competitive 
context. The capital markets are the sources of finance for a biotech start-up and include 
angel investments, venture capital funds and the public capital markets that are 
mediated by stock exchanges.  Mr. Clarke perceived Neuren as having to compete 
against other companies trying to raise funds in this same environment. Neuren’s 
investment opportunity was likely to be considered in comparison with that on offer by 
other biotech and non-biotech companies.  The partnering market was also seen as an 
area for competition with literally thousands of start-up biotech firms clamouring for the 
attention of a relatively small number of large pharmaceutical companies, each biotech 
firm seeking some form of collaboration such as a co-development project, or an 
investment.  The product market is the end market where a biotech firm’s innovation 
will eventually be sold to end-users.  In this market competition is between alternative 
therapies or tools that may be substituted for one another.  This view of competition, 
from three perspectives highlights the complexity in commercialisation strategies, 
which need to deal with the underlying issues in these arenas, as well as others. 
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Perceived enabling and constraining factors 
 
"We've got a range of scientific capabilities which is hard to match in the world in our 
fields.  We have a portfolio which is well protected, which is deep - that has compounds 
which have unique capability.  And I think at the end of the day, it's a scientific 
credibility and a wide portfolio that has got the ability to move into trials and get proof 
of concept and investors’ ultimate approval.... credible science, good products, and a 
good path of how to get to a certain point." (Mr. David Clarke, CEO).  Mr. Clarke sees 
one of Neuren’s strengths as its access to the 100-odd scientists of the Liggins Institute 
with the flexibility to contract or draw on them as needed. 
 
Neuren’s compounds have the potential to treat multiple diseases – “And that’s why it’s 
a highly leveraged portfolio – because if you prove it here, there’s a very big case that it 
can actually go elsewhere in other markets.  It gives (the opportunity of) off-label uses.” 
The term ‘off-label’ refers to the medical practice of using a drug for a therapeutic 
application other that for which it was approved for by the regulators.  It is a common 
practice and in some instances drug development companies may pursue a regulatory 
approval for an indication with a smaller market size (because it may have lower risk or 
development cost) in the hope that they may access larger markets through off-label use.   
 
Neuren saw its relationship with Pfizer as an enabling factor, as stated in the Company’s 
April 2004 overview document: “Pfizer’s relationship with the company has been an 
especially important element of Neuren’s development in terms of financial support, due 
diligence and validation of our scientific and technical capabilities.”  
 
Experienced management and board were also seen as an enabling factor – they have 
skills covering biopharmaceutical product development from basic research and 
discovery, through preclinical and clinical development, to market approval and 
commercialisation.  The regulatory expertise that Neuren required access to was only 
available in the US, so to prevent this becoming a constraint, and because Pfizer “only 
likes dealing with U.S. companies”, Neuren established a US subsidiary. 
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Mr. Clarke described being located in New Zealand as a “huge negative”.  “The 
regulators are in the US and Europe and there is no capital market or venture capital 
money in New Zealand.  It’s too difficult to raise US venture capital money for a New 
Zealand company.”  “The one thing I should’ve done is move as much as we could 
across to California. We could have moved up there but we decided not to.  That may 
have been a decision which might not have been the best one.”  Neuren could not list on 
the New Zealand stock exchange because there was little investor appetite in New 
Zealand for biotech companies, thus it had to pursue its initial public offering in 
Australia. 
 
Being located in New Zealand did hold one upside for Neuren.  Being situated amidst 
the country’s largest university, with the Liggins Institute literally below and the largest 
hospital just down the road meant that intellectual property could be sought and gained 
cheaply.   
Relationship of enabling and constraining factors to the business 
model 
 
The value chain for Neuren Pharma’s drug development projects are well represented 
by the generic value chain presented in chapter two.  Furthermore, its business model is 
fairly typical of small biotech drug development companies – take each project as far 
down the development process as possible and then out-license or partner in some way 
with a large pharmaceutical company.  Neuren’s initial commercialisation strategy 
closely followed predictions from Gans and Stern’s model that they would 
commercialise in the market for ideas by plugging into the value chain at a point prior to 
physical product production i.e. by out-licensing at the end of a phase II clinical trial.  
However, when the company realised they didn’t require as much financial resource for 
a phase III trial as originally estimated, their strategy changed.  They decided to 
progress their lead product, Glypromate, further down the value chain by doing a phase 
three trial and launching the product themselves into the US market. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Neuren’s commercialisation strategy is not so 
much the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of how they decided to plug into the value chain, but ‘what’ 
they decided to plug in.  The way in which they have chosen their product development 
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projects was ruthlessly driven by a realistic understanding of the company’s capital 
constraints.  Neuren chose product opportunities for acute disease, with short duration 
clinical trials and easily measured end points. Capital constraint, risk management and 
leverage are the key drivers behind Neuren’s business model.  Partnering with larger 
companies was perceived as a way to cost effectively develop drugs while minimising 
risk.  Getting products quickly and inexpensively would allow the company to leverage 
revenues in more lucrative markets through out-licensing. Neuren’s comprehensive and 
robustly protected intellectual property portfolio supported its ability to transact in the 
market for ideas. 
Options 
 
As mentioned in the KIWI case story, each R&D or product development project can be 
considered an option on future revenue streams.  With this in mind, I observed that 
Neuren had very strong processes for identifying options and deciding which ones to 
invest in.  Neuren had six candidates/groups of closely related candidates.  In order to 
choose which one to lead with (i.e. put the major investment behind) it evaluated the 
following: the candidate had to be able to be manufactured and stable, it had to be able 
to pass toxicology and efficacy models, and the company needed to understand the 
clinical development path and how to get through clinical trials as quickly as possible.  
Intellectual property needed to be strong and the candidate needed to be in an area 
where the company had strong capabilities. The competitive market and potential 
partners (for in-licensing) were then evaluated.  Glypromate met all the requirements 
and was identified as the primary option. 
 
Although Neuren did not consciously follow a real options reasoning approach to 
strategy it did employ a constant focus and good processes for reducing uncertainty in 
its options.  It did this by choosing an acute indication for its drug candidate, one with 
simpler clinical trials that could be carried out in hospitals where it is easy to recruit 
patients and monitor results.  It also reduced uncertainty by choosing a market where 
there is little competition (compared to markets like stroke, Alzheimer’s disease or 
Multiple Sclerosis for instance). 
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Partnering parts of its portfolio to keep more options open and reduce cash burn was 
also part of Neuren’s strategy.  In the case of the metabolic program a partnership with 
Metabolic Pharmaceuticals meant that co-development reduced the amount of 
investment required to take a drug candidate forward but left Neuren with “half the 
rights to a billion dollar market!”  Although this partnership did not work out in the 
long run, the underlying concept still reinforces Neuren’s consistent doctrine of 
reducing uncertainty.  Another example is the company’s co-development deal with 
Walter Reed Army Hospital that saw Walter Reed employing its world class facilities 
and clinical models plus paying 50% of the clinical trial costs for NNZ-2566 in 
exchange for the military rights which account for only 2% of the global market. 
 
Neuren had a tight focus on risk.  Mr. Clarke explained “We’ve got this constant plan B 
now.  The upside always manages itself, but the downside never does.  And this is 
biology.  So one of my jobs it to isolate the big risks and get a culture of de-risking.”  
Neuren held de-risking meetings where they looked at what could go wrong and what 
they could do about it.  They were happy to spend a little extra money to ensure an 
outcome.  They tried to make sure they had multiple shots at a target.  At the company 
level that was about having multiple product candidates – they described this as de-
risking at the strategic level.  They also looked to de-risk at the technical and 
operational levels where they could.  By way of example, Neuren employed three 
consultants in the US – one each for regulatory, clinical trials and CMC (chemistry 
manufacturing and control), and then twinned these consultants with internal employees 
who lived and breathed every step that the consultants in the US, took on Neuren’s 
behalf.  Another example is found in the company’s April 2004 overview document: 
“Neuren’s development strategy involves carefully considered assessment of alternative 
indications for characterised compounds as a means of reducing the risk of failure for 
any one indication and expanding the value of the compounds to potential partners.” 
Pearls of wisdom 
 
An interview with Dr. Doug Wilson (Neuren’s Chief Medical Officer) provided many 
pearls of wisdom that have had a significant influence on the commercialisation options 
model proposed in the next chapter.  Some of these were obviously captured within 
Neuren’s commercialisation strategy, but others reflected Dr. Wilson’s many years of 
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experience in drug development as Head of Worldwide Medicine at Boehringer 
Ingelheim.  Dr. Wilson proved to be a highly reflective practitioner who had distilled 
many important aspects of commercialisation strategy over his years in the industry.  
Although the collection of quotes may seem eclectic they bear heavily on the objective 
of this thesis which is to learn how biotech firms can do strategy better. 
 
“It’s ideal if proof of concept can emerge in either phase one or phase two.  Lower 
numbers are needed, shorter timeframe, cheaper and then much easier to 
commercialise.  So that’s why people often seek orphan indications where patient 
numbers are low, you’ll get a faster track, but may be you’ll get a clinical signal for 
something very meaningful.”  An orphan drug is one that is for a rare disease.  In the 
U.S. this means a prevalence of less than 1 in 1,500 people, although definitions vary by 
country. 
 
“If you do a trial that’s measuring a direct physiological response it’s much easier – 
e.g. an asthma drug where you measure the opening of the airways.  However, if it’s an 
inhaled steroid drug for asthma it’s a bit harder as you have to measure the patient 
base line over time, and then the outcome over time.  If you are measuring a drop in 
blood pressure it’s easy, but if you’re measuring an outcome such as reduced coronary 
results it’s much harder.  You need a lot of patients to show a material benefit.” 
 
Dr. Wilson provided a check list of things to consider:  
- Being able to manufacture your product in a way that's meaningful, it has to be 
stable; being able to formulate and deliver your product in a way that's 
meaningful - this can be more complicated that you think.   
- Not all patients are able to absorb and metabolise drugs in the same way.   
- Another issue about delivery is the acceptability of different frequency and 
methods of administration which depends on the severity of disease, alternative 
therapeutic options and whether the medical problem is acute or chronic. 
- Your product needs a good safety profile. 
- Achieve clinical proof of concept as quickly and cheaply as possible. 
- Do you have an indication (market opportunity) that is big enough to warrant the 
development cost and effort?  Pharmaceutical companies love chronic 
treatments! 
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- Look for an unsatisfied market, or where you can get into the market, 
reimbursement is an important issue.  If there are already products on the market 
you need to have a material benefit.   
- Very big studies (thousands of patients) and $100 million can be required to 
establish the benefit over an existing therapy that justifies a premium.  This can 
be a very difficult model for a biotech company.  "A lot of biotech firms end up 
in cancer because some of these hurdles are lower, and the margin of success is 
less, but this also means once something better comes out you're surpassed." 
- Identify the drug development path all the way through. 
- Match your progress through that drug development path by ticking off all the 
boxes that a potential purchaser would want so they don't have to go back and do 
it again. 
 
His other pieces of sage advice included: 
 
"The industry team has to come in early so as to avoid wasting money.  The maturing of 
scientific creativity will benefit right from the beginning by an interface with industry 
experienced people.  Because there will be different choices on the way through, and 
those choices can be honed by the reality of drug development and druggability and 
even simple things like how will you deliver this? How will you get it to the site where 
you need it, minimizing its effect somewhere else?" 
 
"At the preclinical stage you need to avoid being too perfect.  You come a certain 
distance down the line with the animal models… you could add another model and 
another year, but you won't make any additional decisions about the drug on the basis 
of that extra model.  Because in fact the ultimate model is man." 
 
"I'm in favour of a model that the analysts in the Australian market tell me they don't 
like.  Which is if you have the opportunity, have part of the company which is an income 
generation stream.  It’s one that pharmaceutical companies have used all these years."  
 
Of the three case studies Neuren comes closest to the concept of a ‘typical’ biotech 
start-up.  They have adopted a business model which is well recognised in the sector. 
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5.4 Living Cell Technologies case profile 
   
In a remote rural location in New Zealand Living Cell Technologies (LCT) herds swine.  
Not just any swine, but a rare breed of genetically pure and disease-free pigs from the 
isolated sub-Antarctic Auckland Islands.  Why?  LCT was established in 1987 by 
Professor Bob Elliot with the support of local entrepreneur Mr. David Collinson to 
develop an alternative treatment for the management of type 1 diabetes – a dreadful 
disease that Mr. Collinson’s son had suffered from since the age of two.  It is a 
treatment that is based on the injection of insulin producing porcine cells into the 
abdomen of a diabetic patient to better regulate blood glucose levels and reduce his/her 
dependence on insulin injections. 
 
LCT manufactures injectable living cells coated with a protective gel that can be 
transplanted to treat patients suffering from a range of diseases caused by lost or 
damaged cellular function.  Harnessing living cells for controlled, long-term delivery of 
therapeutic proteins, LCT’s initial products are aimed at major therapeutically under-
served markets such as diabetes, neurodegenerative diseases (e.g. Huntington’s disease) 
and bleeding disorders (e.g. haemophilia or factor VIII deficiency). 
 
LCT’s products are based on living cells that are neither synthetically produced nor 
manufactured by genetic manipulation.  They come from the harvested organs of 
neonatal pigs. For example, islet cells from the pancreas or choroid plexus cells from 
the brain.  The living cells are covered in a proprietary seaweed-derived coating 
(alginate encapsulation) to form biocapsules which isolate the transplanted cells from 
the patient’s immune system but allow the free passage of small nutrient molecules, 
oxygen and cell products.  LCT's ability to control the effective pore size dictates the 
capsules permselectivity (which molecules are allowed to pass through the wall). The 
final product is comprised of cells encapsulated in transparent microspheres, that are the 
size of small grains of sand (around 500 microns) loaded into disease specific 
packaging. The cell capsules are transplanted into the patient for the release of 
beneficial proteins such as hormones or clotting factors and eliminate the need for toxic 
immunosuppressant drugs.  They can be used to treat a wide range of life-threatening 
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diseases such as diabetes, Huntington’s Disease and haemophilia.  The product 
candidate names are DIABECELL, NTCELL and FAC8CELL respectively. 
 
LCT aims to treat type 1 diabetes with DIABECELL.  Diabetes is a chronic disease 
characterised by high blood glucose levels resulting from the body not producing insulin 
or using it properly. Insulin is a hormone needed for glucose to enter the cells and be 
converted to energy.  Type 1 diabetes occurs when the pancreas no longer produces the 
insulin needed.  It is usually diagnosed in childhood or early adulthood.  Type 2 
diabetes is most common form of the disease and is due to insufficient insulin 
production or the subject’s cells not responding properly to insulin.  The build up of 
glucose in the blood deprives the cells of energy and over time impacts eye, kidney, 
nerve or heart functioning.  To prevent these long term complications, as well as serious 
short term complications, people living with type 1 diabetes must monitor their blood 
glucose levels and inject insulin up to six times per day.  There are currently around 25 
million sufferers of type 1 diabetes worldwide and this is expected to grow to about 38 
million by 2025. Currently the main treatment is insulin by injection or pump.  A very 
small number of patients receive a human islet cell transplant but this approach has the 
serious drawback of requiring immune-suppression.  
 
Neutrophincell, or NTCELL, consists of encapsulated choroid plexus cells that are 
microencapsulated in an alginate-based gel coating and will be in planted in the brain of 
patients with Huntington’s disease to produce beneficial hormones and neurotrophic 
factors that help protect and repair damage resulting from the disease.  Huntington’s 
disease is an inherited, degenerative disease that is caused by a defective gene and 
usually strikes between the ages of 30 and 45.  There is a gradual physical, emotional 
and cognitive deterioration over 10 to 25 years, eventuating in total incapacitation and 
death.  There is currently no known cure or effective treatment.  Approximately 30,000 
Americans have Huntington’s disease and over 200,000 more are at risk of developing it 
(every child of a HD parent has a 50% risk of inheriting the disease). 
Huntington’s disease is an orphan drug target.  In the US this means any drug developed 
under the Orphan Drug Act of January 1983, a federal law concerning rare diseases that 
affect fewer than 200,000 people in the US.   The granting of orphan drug status is 
designed to encourage the development of drugs which are necessary but would be 
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prohibitively expensive or un-profitable to develop under normal circumstances.  This is 
done by rewarding the drug developer with tax reductions and marketing exclusivity (a 
monopoly) on that drug for an extended time (seven years post-approval). A similar 
status exists in the European Union.  Orphan drugs generally follow the same regulatory 
development path as any other pharmaceutical treatment.  Testing focuses on the 
characterization of the molecule, stability, safety, and efficacy.  However, clinical trial 
numbers are usually smaller (and less expensive) and some statistical burdens are 
reduced (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orphan_drug).  Whilst NTCELL is being 
developed for Huntington’s disease it may also have applicability in the very large 
markets of Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease.  Achieving regulatory approval 
for Huntington’s disease will then simplify regulatory access into other (larger) markets. 
 
FAC8CELL comprises porcine cells that produce Factor VIII, the protein that is 
defective or missing in people who suffer from the bleeding disorder called 
Haemophilia A.  Regular treatment is given by injecting the missing clotting factor into 
veins – either to treat a bleeding event or for prophylaxis. It is a very expensive disease 
to treat, with current treatments costing in excess of $100,000 per year.  The incidence 
of Haemophilia A is one in 10,000 live male births.  About 17,000 Americans have 
Haemophilia A. 
The value chain 
There is no complete pre-existing value chain for LCT’s products – the company 
has/and will have to develop many parts of their value chain as they progress toward 
market launch including specialised manufacturing facilities and delivery clinics. 
 
Figure 5-5 LCT’s value chain for xenotransplant products 
 
Business model 
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Although not specifically articulated in any of the case study materials, the key features 
of LCT’s business model are: 
- The use of live cell xenotransplants to meet the needs of therapeutically 
underserved disease groups (‘what’) 
- A vertically integrated corporate structure, whereby LCT owns swine herds and 
a manufacturing facility, and has plans to establish cell therapy centres for the 
distribution of product (‘when’) 
- LCT also envisages becoming a franchisor or licensor to facilitate the 
establishment of further cell therapy centres for wider distribution (‘how’) 
- LCT will license out non-core products to generate revenue to support further 
development of other products 
- The company offers GMP certified alginate as a way of generating income to 
support research operations.   
 
The last two activities do not appear to be part of the core business model, but rather it 
appeared that they were tacked on as financial constraints tightened and thus are part of 
a survival strategy. 
 
Developing a fully integrated business in the face of capital constraint is a significant 
challenge.  For DIABECELL LCT’s solution to this challenge will be to work closely 
with centres of excellence around the world that command large shares of the market for 
type 1 diabetes  and then to work with marketing partners once an indication for type 2 
diabetes is approved.  For NTCELL LCT’s approach is to target an orphan drug market 
– Huntington’s disease – where there are a limited number of medical specialists doing 
the treating.  These specialists can be serviced by a small sales team.  As revenues build 
they may create the opportunity for LCT to target other markets for which NTCELL 
may be approved. 
 
Perceived enabling and constraining factors 
 
Patents and trade secrets protect LCT’s technical and intellectual property, which are its 
core enabling factors.  It would be difficult for competitors to commercially use 
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neonatal porcine islet cells without infringing their patents, and they have purposefully 
kept aspects of cell preparation as carefully guarded trade secrets to prevent other 
research groups gaining access to their advanced knowledge and mimicking it.  Further, 
LCT hopes that by keeping process detail a trade secret that they may keep their 
intellectual property exclusive for longer than the life of a patent. 
 
The company’s expertise and reputation in cell recovery and xenotransplantation has 
attracted collaboration opportunities which are important in maintaining the 
international leadership position of the company, capitalising on the expertise it is 
gaining in its diabetes program. 
 
LCT sees its best in class manufacturing and testing capabilities as a competitive 
advantage – it leads the field of xenotransplantation and has the first such 
manufacturing facility worldwide to be externally accredited by International 
Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ).  This accreditation will ensure that LCT’s 
laboratory test reports are accepted in 49 countries, including the US, Canada, UK, 
Australia and New Zealand.  These manufacturing capabilities include proprietary 
technologies and have actually been borne out of an earlier constraint – no contract 
manufacturers existed that could perform the cell coating procedures that LCT has 
developed.  LCT had no choice but to develop manufacturing capability in-house, and 
in doing so has turned a constraint into a competitive advantage.   
 
LCT also owns a herd of rare disease-free pigs, which it gained during the acquisition of 
PanCell Ltd, preventing competitors from gaining access to this inimitable strategic 
asset.  From these pigs LCT produces biocertified high-health status porcine cells and 
tissues that are free from any microbiological agent.  The herd has been reviewed and 
benchmarked from an international regulatory perspective.  From the completion of 
clinical trials demand for porcine cells is predicted to outstrip capacity.   CEO, Dr. Paul 
Tan noted that it will be a challenge to upscale at the right time.  The company is in the 
process of building a new breeding facility. 
 
Turning constraints and threats into competitive advantages and developing a fully 
integrated business is an expensive process.  As in most biotech businesses, capital is a 
significant constraint on the company’s activities and strategies.  Shortage of capital 
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meant that the FAC8CELL project had to be put on hold, as LCT only has the resources 
to concentrate on two product candidates at this time – DIABECELL  for diabetes and 
NTCELL for Huntington’s disease.  In addition to equity funding which comes from 
both private investment and the public capital markets LCT also seeks grants from the 
Diabetes and Huntington’s disease foundations in the US.   
 
The regulatory environment also acts as a significant constraint on LCT’s activities.  
One example is the inefficiency of the New Zealand regulatory system and political 
considerations which according to Dr. Paul Tan have set the company back years.  This, 
together with the lack of clinical trial expertise in New Zealand has meant that LCT has 
to do its clinical studies overseas.   
 
The lack of US regulatory experience in New Zealand means that LCT has had to 
engage a team of regulatory experts based in the US.  Initially regulatory capability was 
a constraint on LCT’s product development, but now, with the right team in place, 
regulatory capability is perceived as an enabling factor. 
 
Relationship of enabling and constraining factors to the business 
model 
 
LCT has been forced to adopt a vertically integrated development, manufacturing and 
marketing strategy simply because there is no existing value chain for their product.  
They are amongst the front-runners at the cutting edge of a brand new field – 
xenotransplantation for markets of significant size.  No manufacturing facilities exist 
that can provide contract services for the manipulation of freshly harvested cells, and 
there is no established distribution channel for a product that must be prepared in a 
dedicated facility and then air-freighted under special conditions to a distant location 
where it will be injected into the patient by a specially trained surgeon.  When LCT 
completes clinical trials and is ready to launch its first product to market  it will need to 
establish ‘Living Cell Treatment Centres’ which will deliver its xenotransplant 
therapy(s) to patients.  “This approach has been employed successfully by life science 
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companies producing products such as hearing implants and other devices where no 
alternative channels were available” reported LCT in its May 2004 prospectus. 
 
Capital constraints have had a significant impact in shaping the company.  The New 
Zealand capital market is under-developed and a difficult place to raise funds.  
Recognising this, LCT had its initial public offering in Australia (like Neuren), and has 
since raised capital privately in the US.  LCT had to take the company public much 
earlier than it would have preferred to, as it was unable to raise venture capital in New 
Zealand’s (then) almost non-existent venture capital market. 
 
Capital constraints together with an extensive IP portfolio have added a 
leveraging/survival strategy aspect to LCT’s business model.  “This extensive 
intellectual property resource allows the company to leverage its funding with product 
and commercialisation licenses.  Discussions with large pharma and mature biotech 
partners are underway.”  The company also contracts research and manufacturing 
opportunities as a way to leverage its unique capabilities and infrastructure to provide 
additional capital. 
 
LCT’s business model allows for it to acquire additional technologies where it has areas 
of technical weakness, in order to maintain a dominant position within the living cell 
therapy area – “LCT has actively evaluated and, where appropriate, moved to acquire 
additional technologies for cell therapy and tissue generation.  This strategy is designed 
to maintain LCT’s position as the dominant company in the field of treating disease 
with living therapy.”  As an example, LCT acquired Theracyte Inc to gain access to 
their technology and patents covering a device that could be filled with cells and placed 
under the skin to deliver therapeutic factors. 
 
In summary, the key drivers of LCT’s fully integrated business model is the absence of 
an existing value chain for its products.  A fully integrated business model allows the 
use of trade secrets as a source of competitive advantage as knowledge does not need to 
be transferred to a third party thus there is no risk of appropriation.  Whilst financial 
constraint has slowed the company down and prevented it from pursuing simultaneous 
product development projects, it has not proved to be a key driver of the company’s 
core business model. 
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Options 
Data collection for the LCT case study involved fewer face to face interviews and relied 
more heavily on the review of business plans and publicly available information than 
the other two case studies.  For this reason there were less opportunities to observe 
options that LCT may have taken, exercised or terminated pursuant to its 
commercialisation strategy.  Like the other two companies, it was apparent that LCT did 
not intentionally apply real options reasoning in its commercialisation strategy or 
processes.  Therefore, I made only two observations of the concept of options with 
regard to ‘what’ and ‘how’ to plug into the value chain. 
 
At one stage LCT was considering early out-licensing of NTCELL in order to generate 
revenue to support the on-going development of DIABECELL.  However, the 
company then decided to continue the development in house.  Dr. Tan explained 
“Licensing in the pharmaceutical model makes sense – you get validation for your 
program and that’s what investors look for, so you get money.  And you get expertise.  
But it doesn’t work well in cell therapies, you don’t get the kudos with collaboration 
because big pharma are not known for their cell therapy products.  And their money is 
expensive because they tend to over control their shares.  Also, we don’t need their 
distribution channels.”  This is an example of an option (to out-license early) that was 
evaluated and then terminated. 
 
Whilst LCT only has capital resources to pursue two applications of its technology at 
present, aggressive patent filing keeps options open for future pipeline opportunities: 
“The company is aggressive in its filing of additional patents covering new and unique 
therapeutic uses of transplanted cells.” In ROR terms, this is an example of identifying 
options and making initial investments.  It’s not clear if LCT is applying any ROR stage 
two processes to reduce uncertainty or amplify value (i.e. engaging in active R&D).  It’s 
possible that these options are merely being parked for the future. 
 
In contrast to Neuren, LCT is very non-typical of biotech start-up firms.  At the cutting 
edge of a new treatment modality LCT has to pioneer many aspects of its value chain 
because it simply does not exist at present.  The LCT case study has provided a valuable 
 132
perspective on commercialisation strategy and how a product’s value chain impacts the 
options available. 
 
5.5 A cross case analysis of strategic issues 
 
As predicted by Gans and Stern (2003) and Pisano (2006) access to complementary 
assets turned out to be a significant driver of commercialisation strategy in all three 
firms.  They each faced value chains that required complementary assets that were not 
found within their own firms.  In the case of KIWI and Neuren, the complementary 
assets they required such as manufacturing and marketing/distribution are found in the 
wider industry.  Thus these companies were able to choose the point in their value 
chains to plug in that was most attractive given their resource levels.  However, for LCT 
the manufacturing and distribution channels required for their unique treatment 
modality do not exist in the wider healthcare industry.  LCT has had no choice other 
than to develop in-house manufacturing capability and they intend to develop at least 
some distribution capability to coincide with regulatory approval of DIABECELL, 
albeit that is still some years away. 
 
Financial constraint was strongly lamented by all three firms causing each of them to 
limit the number of commercialisation projects they pursued.  It was a significant driver 
of KIWI’s business model which was centred around early stage out-licensing to 
generate revenues.  It was also a driver behind Neuren’s business model, heavily 
influencing the firm’s options for plugging into the value chain during or after the 
clinical development program.  Surprisingly (to me anyway) financial constraint was 
not a key driver of LCT’s business model as the lack of an existing value chain was the 
overriding factor. 
 
Regulatory burden was also accurately predicted by Gans and Stern (2003) and Pisano 
(2006) to be an important aspect of commercialisation strategy.  Neuren and LCT were 
both fully cognizant of the regulatory hurdles they had to tackle in order to get their 
products to market.  Both companies recognized that they lacked the skills and 
resources (complementary assets) in-house.  Unable to access the appropriate resources 
in New Zealand both companies established offices in the US and employed or 
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contracted regulatory resources there. The vast majority of Neuren’s and LCT’s 
commercialisation activities were focused on meeting regulatory requirements to gain 
marketing authorization from the regulatory bodies e.g. the FDA. 
 
KIWI had much less of a regulatory focus than the other two companies for two 
reasons.  Firstly, KIWI’s initial product is a diagnostic application, which means the 
regulatory requirements for bringing the product to market are not as complex or 
voluminous.  Furthermore, the regulatory approvals needed by KODE CAE were 
handled by KIWI’s licensees.  Secondly, KIWI’s subsequent product development 
projects are still in the research phase, so regulatory activities are not significant.  
However, regulatory barriers were still an important driver behind commercialisation 
strategy.  KIWI recognized it had few skills in the areas of regulation or manufacturing 
and this was an important factor in KIWI’s choice of the RIPCO business model.  KIWI 
focuses on research (discovery) and will partner with established companies with the 
experience and resources to take care of the later stages of product development which 
are heavily oriented towards meeting regulatory requirements. 
 
KIWI has the added challenge of facing a latent market for its technology.  Ready 
demand does not exist for a technology that can coat living cells with bioactive 
molecules.  Rather, the market for KODE technology and even some of its applications 
(such as blood grouping control cells) is latent.  KIWI, and in some cases its licensees, 
has to build awareness for its technology or applications.   An additional strategic issue 
facing KIWI was insufficient in-house business development, resource and experience.  
This issue was further exacerbated by the fact that KIWI’s platform technology can be 
applied in many different types of applications including diagnostic, medical imaging, 
vaccines, assisted reproductive technology, drug delivery and even as a therapeutic 
(drug) itself.  The very significant challenge here is to understand each of these 
opportunities and their very different value chains.   
 
5.6 Summary 
 
An inductive approach was taken to analysing the case data collected in this first phase 
of research.  Capital constraint, access to complementary assets and regulatory hurdles 
were consistent themes that emerged as key strategic drivers behind the business models 
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of the firms.  These strategic issues had significant bearing on ‘what’, ‘when’, and 
‘how’ the firms intended to interact with the value chains for their innovations.   
 
Not surprisingly none of the companies consciously employed a real options reasoning 
approach to strategy.  However, to varying degrees, they had adopted processes that 
would help support an ROR strategy framework.  Although value enhancement and 
reduction of uncertainty is inherent in the process of drug development, I did not 
observe any strong consistent processes to support this aspect of an ROR framework.  I 
suspect this is due in part to my research design and focus, and in part because such 
processes were not well developed in the firms. 
 
The discussion chapter which follows looks at how biotech firms do strategy with a 
focus on how these observations relate to the literature.  It then goes on to propose a 
model of how biotech firms could do strategy better.
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6 A prototype Commercialisation Options Model – 
first discussion chapter 
 
Business models describe how a firm is going to create value despite the issues it faces.  
The strategic issues faced by the case study companies were similar in that they were all 
substantially constrained by lack of / access to capital, had significant regulatory hurdles 
to mount, and required access to complementary assets that were not to be found within 
their own companies.  However, they ended up with distinctly different business 
models.  Why is that?   
 
This discussion chapter draws on findings at the industry level as found in chapter two 
and the firm level as found in chapter five.  These analyses have shown that three key 
drivers have a significant constraining influence on the commercialisation strategies of 
biotech firms – access to complementary assets, finance and regulatory hurdles.  
Regulatory burden dramatically increases the cost of commercialisation, driving up 
capital requirements.  At the same time financial constraint impairs a firm’s ability to 
build complementary assets, some of which may be needed to deal with regulatory 
burden.  Thus these strategic drivers are closely inter-related and drive 
commercialisation strategy in a complex way.  Together with project specific factors 
such as market opportunity and competition they shape decisions about ‘what’, ‘when’, 
and ‘how’ to plug into the value chain to earn a return on an innovation. 
 
The first part of this chapter examines how biotech firms do strategy within the context 
of the strategic issues that they face and finishes with a comment on the impact of being 
located in New Zealand on commercialisation strategy.  Whilst the case studies have 
provided little evidence of the application of real options reasoning within 
commercialisation strategy and only modest illustrations of dynamic capabilities the 
cases do not disconfirm the utility of an ROR approach and may be interpreted to 
demonstrate the potential of such an approach. Therefore these remain favored concepts 
that provide a good framework within which to structure practitioner knowledge in a 
way that may help biotech companies improve the way they approach 
commercialisation strategy.  ROR and dynamic capabilities are discussed within this 
context. I then propose a commercialisation strategy model as to how biotech firms 
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could do strategy better.  This model is the subject of practitioner validation and 
refinement in the next two chapters. 
 
6.1 Dealing with strategic issues – how biotech firms ‘do’ 
strategy 
 
My research shows that biotech firms need to access assets outside the company, 
finance is a massive constraint and huge regulatory hurdles stand between innovation 
and commercialisation.  Pisano (2006) describes the same drivers of commercialisation 
strategy and also notes the tacitness of know-how as an additional driver of strategy. 
How do biotech firms do commercialisation strategy in this context?   
 
While LCT, Neuren and KIWI all suffer capital constraint, it is most severe in the case 
of KIWI.  KIWI does not have the financial resource to fund its projects further along 
the development path – this is particularly true of its larger projects such as those in 
assisted reproductive technology and vaccine technology.  The other factor specifically 
faced by KIWI is the lack of internal experience in the downstream development areas 
such as manufacturing and clinical trials.  Whilst this lack of experience is real, it leads 
to perceived constraints on KIWI’s options for plugging into the value chain.  By way 
of example, KIWI out-licensed its KODE CAE technology in exchange for a royalty fee 
income stream in keeping with the company’s RIPCO business model.  However, due to 
perceived constraints KIWI did not consider plugging into the value chain at a later 
stage, and thus may have missed out on the ability to earn the greater returns had it 
decided to manufacture a KODE CAE control cell product in house, or have them 
contract-manufactured and supply customers with physical product rather than 
intellectual property.   
 
If all three case studies face the same strategic issues why have they ended up with 
distinctly different business models? 
 
Neuren has chosen to employ a fully integrated drug discovery and development model 
(FIDDO), whilst KIWI has espoused a royalty income pharmaceutical model (RIPCO).  
Despite significant capital constraint LCT had to employ a fully integrated 
pharmaceutical company (FIPCO) business model. 
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For Neuren and KIWI it is the extent of finance available and in-house capabilities that 
have driven their choice of business model.  Whereas with LCT, the lack of an existing 
value chain (thus availability of complementary assets in the wider industry) forced the 
company to adopt a vertically integrated business model despite capital constraints. 
 
In general biotech firms endeavour to progress as far along the value chain as possible – 
capital and capabilities permitting.  This is evidenced by Neuren’s change in strategy 
from intending to plug into the value chain after Glypromate’s phase II trial to deciding 
to plug in after phase III with the objective of selling some product directly in the 
market as well as out-licensing for some territories.  Certainly this is the trend that has 
emerged in the wake of the platform company era.  There is a strong tendency for start-
ups to plug in to the value chain at the point where they either run out of capital or 
require complementary assets that they cannot easily access.  As the case study 
companies indicate there may also be a tendency for biotech firms to pursue therapeutic 
indications where there are lower regulatory barriers, thus lowering risk. 
 
Gans and Stern (2003a, 2003b) view the decision to earn a return on innovation in the 
product market versus market for ideas as being a key element of commercialisation 
strategy.  However, in reality many biotech firms have no choice.  Amongst the case 
study firms KIWI and Neuren have to earn a return in the market for ideas as they lack 
sufficient capital to bring their innovations all the way to market. Whilst Gans and Stern 
don’t explicitly mention capital they may have predicted this outcome by assuming 
capital to be just another complementary asset. LCT has no choice but to commercialise 
in the product market because the market for ideas does not exist in relation to their 
value chain.  This outcome is also predicted by the Gans and Stern model.  
 
At first glance Gans and Stern’s model provides an appealing model to account for 
commercialisation strategy in the case study companies.  However, it does not recognize 
that there are multiple points in a product’s development at which to plug into the value 
chain as well as multiple ways in which to engage in the market for ideas.  The 
decisions around ‘when’ and ‘how’ to plug into the value chain are both part of a 
continuum of related options as portrayed in figure 6-1.  At the left side of the chart are 
the early stages in the development of a product, such as discovery and proof of 
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concept.  Plugging in at this end of the value chain is most often accompanied by co-
operative transaction mechanisms.  Plugging in late in the development process (right 
side of chart) is most often achieved by competitive ‘how’ mechanisms.  The forces that 
push a firm to plug into the value chain early (left) include financial constraint, the need 
for complementary assets that are available outside the company and regulatory burden.  
The forces that push a company to plug into the value chain later (right) include a high 
degree of appropriability of the IP, high level of tacitness of the know-how and the need 
for complementary assets that are not readily available in the industry.  Whilst the 
‘when’ and ‘how’ continuums do not track each other precisely they are correlated.  The 
earlier a firm plugs into the value chain the more likely it is to use a co-operative 
strategy e.g. licensing and the later the firm plugs into the value chain the more likely it 
is to use a competitive strategy through a fully integrated or virtually integrated 
structure. 
 
 
Figure 6-1 Forces that direct the ‘when’ and ‘how’ of plugging into the value chain 
 
The strategic management literature holds theory on ‘how’ and ‘when’ to plug into the 
value chain (Gans and Stern, 2003a, 2003b; Pisano, 2006a), but contains no comment 
on ‘what’ to plug into the value chain.  To my surprise, I found ‘what’ was an integral 
part of the commercialisation decisions made by biotech start-ups.  The choice of ‘what’ 
was closely tied to at least two of the key drivers of commercialisation strategy – 
financial constraint and regulatory hurdles. 
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When asked what factors influenced KIWI’s initial decision of what to innovate the 
response was “That was very very simple.  What to innovate was what to get to the 
market first. You’ve got to generate cash flow.  So that which would generate cash flow 
for us the earliest was the highest priority…. You need the cash flow and you need the 
credibility tick.” Furthermore, KIWI’s earliest ‘what’ choices were in the areas of 
diagnostics and assisted reproductive technology – fields where the regulatory 
requirements are not as onerous as for drug development. 
 
Neuren was very focused on targeting acute indications with easily measurable end 
points – this was the ‘what’ strategy that the firm used to minimise the size of the 
regulatory hurdles it faced and to reduce its capital requirements.  LCT has chosen to 
develop NTCELL for Huntington’s disease rather than the larger markets of 
Alzheimer’s disease or Parkinson’s disease.  This is because a treatment for 
Huntington’s disease would garner orphan drug status with the FDA, meaning the 
burden of proving efficacy would be less – meaning a lower number of clinical trial 
participants and lower costs. 
 
Arguably raising capital is an important part of commercialisation strategy.  Whilst it 
does not usually form part of the business model, it is a vital element in achieving the 
business model. In the absence of sufficient capital to bring their innovations to market 
biotech companies pursue a number of supporting strategies.  They pursue: 
- Leveraging strategies 
- Survival strategies 
- Alliances 
Leveraging strategies 
 
All three companies used leveraging strategies to try and develop as much value as 
possible, with limited resources, by making activities add value to more than one 
(intellectual property) asset or by using an asset in more than one way.  Another form of 
leverage is to gain access to resources outside the company at little or no cost – 
accessing grant funds is a form of leverage that many biotech firms use.  Undertaking 
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research that de-risks more than one product development project is another form of 
leverage. 
 
LCT talked about leveraging a regulatory approval for NTCELL in Huntington’s 
disease by moving into Alzheimer’s disease or Parkinson’s disease.  The pre-clinical 
and phase one clinical work in Huntington’s would pave the way for a lower cost and 
potentially lower risk entry into the more sizeable and lucrative markets of Alzheimer’s 
or Parkinson’s.  Similarly, once LCT had a regulatory approval in place for type I 
diabetes with DIABECELL® it intends to expand the approved indications to include 
insulin dependent type II diabetes.   
 
Neuren’s David Clarke talked about how Neuren’s compounds “… appear to be useful 
across a range of diseases… and that’s why it’s a highly leveraged portfolio – because 
if you prove it here, there’s a very big case that it can actually go elsewhere in other 
markets.  It gives off-labels.”   
 
Whilst LCT and Neuren talked about leverage in the sense of expanding market 
opportunities through the leveraging of clinical trial and regulatory efforts KIWI talked 
about leverage in the context of its R&D programs and IP protection.  For example, 
research undertaken in the KODE PA project feeds into the KODE VDS program and 
patents taken out for one KODE application strengthen the intellectual property 
protection of other applications.  In the face of tight capital constraints all three 
companies sought to leverage investor funds with government grants.  
 
Survival strategies 
 
Survival strategies are often tangential to the company’s key objectives e.g. providing 
contract research (Neuren) or manufacturing alginate for sale (LCT) and are aimed at 
ensuring that the company lives to see the day it will earn a return on its core business 
proposition.   Sacrificing the first born project through an early stage deal with a large 
pharma company provides cash flow that will improve the firm’s chances of survival.  
Sometimes survival strategies are incorporated up-front as part of a business model such 
as Neuren’s contract research program for Pfizer which brought invaluable revenue. 
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Other times survival strategies are developed in response to the pressure of financial 
constraints. For example, LCT had begun to seek ways to leverage off its GMP facility 
through contract research or manufacturing alginate for sale, in order to derive revenue 
to off-set cash burn.  KIWI’s survival strategy was its flexible approach – its willingness 
to do any deal that would generate cash flow to support its key product development 
objective. Although survival strategies are a common theme in the commercialisation 
strategy of biotech start-ups there is little or no recognition of this element of strategy in 
the strategic management literature. 
Alliances 
 
Alliances are a key way in which biotech firms pursue commercialisation in the face of 
capital constraint.  Alliances can provide cash-strapped start-ups with access to 
complementary assets that they cannot afford to develop in house.  Furthermore, 
alliances often provide the third party validation and credibility that biotech firms seek. 
 
Alliances depend on strong intellectual property protection.  Strong IP rights are 
commonly found in the biotech sector.  All three case study companies put very strong 
emphasis on the development and protection of IP.  As Gans and Stern point out, strong 
IP reduces the risk of an innovation being copied and thus facilitates a biotech firm’s 
participation in the market for ideas. 
Credibility 
 
Credibility in the biotech start-up may come from several sources – the reputation of the 
team, the reputation of the science, or the reputation of key investors or alliance 
partners.  Credibility affects the firm’s ability to access capital and complementary 
assets and may enable the options a firm has for ‘how’ it interacts with its value chain.  
 
Neuren and KIWI both expressed the need for credibility with potential collaborators 
and investors.  One approach Neuren took to this issue was to ensure their scientists 
travelled and were visible, building reputation and credibility.  Neuren also viewed 
having Pfizer as a cornerstone investor as providing credibility to their company and 
research programs.  KIWI viewed its credibility as coming from having already licensed 
a product into the market place, whilst LCT believed it gained its credibility from being 
 142
the first xenotransplantation company in the world to gain IANZ accreditation for its 
manufacturing facility.  Unlike Neuren and KIWI, LCT did not see credibility coming 
from relationships with large pharmaceutical companies.  Paul Tan said “Licensing in 
the pharmaceutical model makes sense.  You get validation for your program and that's 
what investors look for, so you get money.  And you get expertise.  But it doesn't work 
well in cell therapies, you don't get the kudos with collaboration because big pharma 
are not known for their cell therapy products.  And their money is very expensive 
because they tend to over control their shares.  Also, we don't need their distribution 
channels.”  
De-risking 
Biotech commercialisation is a risky business, and all three companies endeavoured to 
reduce risk by having multiple products in development – multiple shots at goal.  
Neuren appeared to have the greatest focus on de-risking, holding specific meetings to 
identify risks and look at what could be done about them.  Neuren employed a 
redundancy strategy in dealing with operational risk by assigning employees to under-
study external consultants every step of the way. 
 
Options 
Operating within the context of capital constraint biotech firms need to be somewhat 
flexible in order to seize upon unexpected opportunities that come their way, or to 
pursue alternatives when intended outcomes do not eventuate.  To do this they need to 
keep their options open.  The three case study companies would indicate that biotech 
companies do not typically employ a real options reasoning approach to 
commercialisation strategy.  Of course this is not surprising given that ROR is an 
academic management concept and the majority of biotech CEOs are scientist turned 
entrepreneurs.  They are simply unfamiliar with the concepts and rationale behind ROR.  
Having said that, the case studies did present examples of options being used in 
strategy.  These are discussed under the headings ‘what’ and ‘when’ and ‘how’. 
‘What’ 
 
The first options the companies had to identify and initiate were ‘what’ they were 
ultimately going to plug into the value chain.  All three companies had choices and 
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evaluated them in different ways.  Neuren had six groups of candidates.  In order to 
choose which one to put the major investment behind they evaluated the following: 
- manufacturability and stability 
- likelihood of passing toxicology and efficacy models 
- the clinical path and speed through clinic 
- competition 
- ability to find a partner 
- patentability 
Neuren decided on Glypromate as its lead compound because it could be positioned for 
an acute indication, with simpler clinical trials that could be undertaken in hospitals 
(enabling recruitment and the monitoring of results).  Neuren also chose a market where 
there was little competition and the need for differentiation was small (compared for 
example to the markets for Alzheimer’s disease or Multiple Sclerosis).  Also, as 
Glypromate is a naturally occurring molecule the risk of side effects is reduced.  It 
appears that Neuren had a range of options and employed a rational process in choosing 
to employ its assets and resources to bring Glypromate to market. 
 
KIWI, as a platform company, had many options as to ‘what’ products to 
commercialise.  However, it’s likely that the choice between alternatives was less 
rational.  The first product (KODE CAE) was shaped around Steve’s background in 
transfusion medicine.  As Steve admits, when Debbie who is an embryologist came on 
board, the KODE FEM project was shaped to fit her specialty.  However, since that 
point in the company’s development projects have been shaped around ideas, and then 
the appropriate people sought to work them. 
 
LCT’s leading ‘what’ is DIABECELL® – this product is the very reason for the 
company’s existence.  LCT was formed when founder David Collinson (whose two year 
old son had been diagnosed with type I diabetes) invested money in co-founder 
Professor Bob Elliot’s diabetes research.  A selection process is more evident in 
deciding to pursue an indication for Huntington’s disease for NTCELL. 
‘When’ and ‘How’ 
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In addition to ‘what’ to commercialise the firms also had options of ‘when’ and ‘how’ 
to interface with their value chains. ‘When’ refers to the stage of product development 
between idea/discovery and marketing a physical product to consumers.  ‘When’ is the 
aspect of commercialisation strategy that has the biggest impact on the options around 
‘how’ the company plugs into the value chain.  ‘When’ is the crucial decision point in 
determining the selection of business model amongst the choices of RIPCO, FIDDO, 
NDRO, FIPCO,  FIPNET and others.  ‘How’ a company plugs into the value chain 
defines its revenue model.  It describes whether revenues are earned through royalties, 
product sales, IP sales, sale of the complete company or other mechanisms. 
 
KIWI chose a RIPCO business model, Neuren chose a FIDDO business model and LCT 
a FIPCO model.  The direct translation of these choices is that KIWI will plug in early 
to the value chain – after the research stage but before clinical trials.  Neuren intends to 
plug in further along the value chain – most probably in late stage clinical trials or 
immediately following completion of clinical development, and LCT will plug-in at the 
end of the value chain – by delivering a clinical service/product to the end consumer. 
 
Alternatives as to ‘how’ a firm may plug into the value chain may be constrained by 
their choice of business model.  For example, by choosing a RIPCO or FIDDO business 
model KIWI and Neuren forgo the opportunity to earn revenues through product sales.  
However, they retain options around licensing, sale of IP or sale of the company.  In 
LCT’s case it is predominantly their choice of ‘what’ to plug in that constrains their 
‘how’ options.  Preparation and xeno-transplanation of living cells requires highly 
specialised complementary assets that do not exist outside the firm, which means that 
licensing or sale of IP are unlikely to be viable plugging in mechanisms.  LCT retains 
the options of selling the company and selling a physical product.  
 
There is evidence from the case studies (albeit limited due to the small sample size) that 
biotech firms do not always fully evaluate all their options/alternatives before deciding 
on a commercialisation strategy.  What is required is a more systematic approach to the 
identification, evaluation and exercise/termination of options as a basis of strategy. 
The New Zealand context 
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A comparison of the strategic issues faced by the case study companies with those faced 
by the industry in general (as per chapter two) would suggest that the New Zealand 
context for biotechnologies is not particularly different from that found in the key 
biotech centres.  However, whilst access to capital and complementary assets, and 
regulatory frameworks remain key strategic issues, New Zealand companies have a 
diminished ability to respond to these issues.  An experienced New Zealand venture 
capitalist once stated in an NZ biotech industry seminar that capital was 30 times harder 
to raise in New Zealand than the US.  Certainly New Zealand venture capital and capital 
markets are significantly less developed than those of the global biotech centres such as 
San Francisco, Boston, London, Germany and Seattle. 
 
Complementary assets may be accessed globally and it is mainly the tyranny of distance 
and lack of familiarity that impedes New Zealand companies.  Likewise, it is relatively 
simple for New Zealand biotech companies to contract U.S. based regulatory expertise.  
However, the New Zealand regulatory framework is not so easily overcome.  
Regulatory restrictions such as the moratorium on genetic engineering and elements of 
the HSNO legislation are likely to impede the progress of New Zealand biotech firms 
relative to those in other jurisdictions. 
6.2 How real options reasoning and dynamic capabilities help 
 
The strategic management literature has only a little to say about commercialisation 
strategy and business models in the biotech sector per se (Gans and Stern, 2003a; 
Pisano, 2006a, Sammut, 2005).  Academics theorizing at an industry specific level have 
uncovered important industry and firm level strategic issues and some of the drivers of 
commercialisation strategy but have not brought these findings together in an actionable 
agenda that practitioners can capitalize on.  Practitioners cannot easily seek solutions to 
the problem of poor industry performance from the literature.  However, close 
examination of the literature turned up two areas of theory that may be adapted and 
applied to the biotech setting in an actionable way.  These are real options reasoning 
(ROR) and dynamic capabilities as discussed in the literature review.   
 
Rather than coming up with a completely new theoretical framework for 
commercialisation strategy in the biotech environment I have synthesized and extended 
theory related to ROR and dynamic capabilities utilizing the rich experience of 
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practitioners operating in the sector.  The remainder of this chapter focuses on the 
integration of the academic concepts of ROR and dynamic capabilities with the 
identified drivers of commercialisation strategy (and other observations) to propose an 
actionable model that may assist practitioners in developing commercialisation strategy. 
 
Figure 6-1 captures the key drivers of commercialisation strategy at the firm level but 
does not address several key challenges that Pisano described – risk management (due 
to the profound uncertainty of science), integration across disciplines and functional 
areas and mechanisms for learning to keep up with rapid scientific progress. It also does 
not address the essential element of commercialisation strategy which is to build value.  
Addressing these issues is in the domain of dynamic capabilities – the organizational 
routines that enable a firm to reconfigure resources and act upon new opportunities 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, 1998).   
 
Eisenhardt and Martin say that in stable industries dynamic capabilities are detailed 
analytic processes relying on existing knowledge and exercised and implemented in a 
linear fashion with the outcome being predictable.  In stable industries dynamic 
capabilities resemble the traditional concept of routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  In 
highly dynamic industries such processes are exercised in an iterative, adaptive manner, 
and the outcome is unpredictable. The are simple or experimental processes, relying on 
new, quickly created knowledge (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998).  Most likely the biotech 
sector stands somewhere in between these two extremes. The high level of scientific 
uncertainty, and the fact that the sector is in its infancy, with best business models still 
evolving, means the traditional view of strategy as something first planned and then 
implemented does not provide flexibility to respond to the great unknown.  Brown and 
Eisenhardt’s (1998) recommendation for a semicoherent strategic direction is appealing 
for competitive contexts that are in constant flux but it is too extreme for the biotech 
sector.  However, Brown and Eisenhardt’s Competing on the Edge recommends 
experimentation, which relies on small, fast and cheap probes to help gain insights to 
guide strategy for the future.  Fast and cheap experiments are not always possible in the 
biotech sector but the concept is still valid and Brown and Eisenhardt have linked these 
probes to options, although they have not extrapolated this fully into a ROR framework. 
Dynamic capabilities closely support the concept of real options reasoning (ROR).  
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Under ROR entrepreneurial strategy making may be viewed as the development, 
exercise and possible termination of options over time.  Some options may arise out of 
inspiration, some out of planning and analysis i.e. deliberate or intended strategy 
(Mintzberg, 1978) and others out of extemporized responses to events and serendipity 
i.e. emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1985).  Unexercised options resemble Mintzberg’s 
unrealized strategies.   
 
The real options perspective helps to systematically identify the key variables that 
determine an option’s value – the present values of future income and expenditure 
streams, the degree of uncertainty in the project, the tie to expiration of the option (i.e. 
the time to a decision that can no longer be deferred) and the opportunity costs of 
preserving an option.  In the biotech sector the real options framework has the 
additional benefit of forcing the formulation of process milestones that have the effect 
of establishing decision criteria and the mitigation of financial risk by portioning the 
development process into predefined stages (Burns, 2005).  Figure 6-2 summarises 
ROR into three stages. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Real options reasoning 
 
To help conceptualise ROR I’ll be explaining this model by reference to a gardening 
metaphor, which is portrayed pictorially in figure 6-3 
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Garden Metaphor
Stage One
Plant Seeds Stage Two
Nurture
Stage Three
Harvest
Stage Three
Weed
 
Figure 6-3 Garden metaphor 
 
Stage one of the ROR model involves identifying the strategic options available to the 
firm at each stage of the commercialisation process and investing in selected options.  In 
terms of the gardening metaphor it is about identifying all the possible plants (alias 
strategies) that can be grown in the garden and then planting the seeds of those selected.  
Stage two involves nurturing the ‘seedling’ options – fertilising (with further resources) 
and pruning as needed.  The goal of stage two is to either reduce the risk or strategically 
amplify the value of the options.  It is an ongoing process that may involve many cycles 
(or seasons).  Stage three is where a firm either exercises or terminates options.  
Exercise can be done either by selling the option in the market for ideas (e.g. through 
the sale of intellectual property or through out-licensing) or by making the full 
investment commitment required to bring the product to market.  Either way ‘exercise’ 
is about plugging into the value chain.  In gardening terms this is the harvest.  Stage 
three also involves the termination of options that are no longer viable.  Termination can 
occur at any point in time and is the equivalent of ‘weeding out’ the plants / options no 
longer required, no longer affordable, or judged to have a low probability of future 
exercise. 
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The options available to a firm during commercialisation are very contextual, and path 
dependent, so MANY strategic choices made by biotech firms will affect their options 
for how and when they can plug into the value chain. I view commercialisation strategy 
as widely encompassing and incremental in nature.  At the firm’s inception it includes 
issues such as defining company structure - both operational and ownership, choice of 
location, choice of technologies and products to commercialise (hence specifying 
aspects of R&D and certainly specifying the developing pipeline) and nurturing and 
creating demand for products.  Commercialisation strategy may include seeking and 
ensuring finance to cash-flow operations, hiring and developing key management staff, 
and seeking and negotiating collaborations and alliances.  It involves the development, 
acquisition or contracting of downstream functions such as sales, marketing and 
distribution and integrated support functions such as information technology.  
Commercialisation strategy involves investment decisions such as whether or not to 
patent, and ensuring that the costs of product development and commercialisation do 
not overwhelm revenue generating potential.  And finally, commercialisation strategy 
may include collecting competitive intelligence on trends and developments in the 
environment to create an organizational awareness, particularly in terms of competition, 
technological innovation, and discontinuous change that could upset the firm’s 
strategies. 
 
What is apparent from this long list of activities associated with commercialisation 
strategy is that strategy is not formulated and then implemented.  Rather, it is developed 
and modified over time.  It is incremental as well as encompassing, and it is important 
to recognise that past actions shape future possibilities (Pettigrew, 1979).  This is the 
true nature of commercialisation strategy in practice, as opposed to a more rationalistic 
view of commercialisation strategy as something that is formulated and then 
implemented.  The holy grail is to understand how lines of action related to these 
activities, and the options surrounding each, are knit into coherent strategies for the 
commercialisation of biotech innovations.  This thesis raises the awareness of the 
complexity of commercialisation strategy and offers a ROR/dynamic capabilities 
approach as an actionable way of at least trying to deal with the complexity.   
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Drawing on ROR and dynamic capability theory, and melding this with the findings 
from the preceding chapter a prototype model for biotech commercialisation strategy is 
proposed in the following section. It is then refined and validated through discussion 
with experienced industry practitioners with their feedback and input described in the 
next chapter.  The final model is presented in chapter eight as part of the continued 
discussion on how biotech firms could do strategy better. 
 
6.3 How biotech firms ‘could’ do strategy better – a synthesis 
of academic and practitioner knowledge 
 
I propose that biotech start-up firms be flexible in their commercialisation strategy, be 
aware of all their options, preserve as many as possible and be prepared to revise their 
business models in relation to how various options develop over time.  Biotech firms 
need to develop dynamic capabilities that support this flexibility.  As dynamic 
capabilities were only opportunistically observed during my case studies (rather than 
extensively sought out) I have relied mainly on the literature for advice here. 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model I propose below examines the strategic choices 
and processes involved at each of the three stages of the ROR model, customizing it for 
direct applicability to the start-up drug development sector.  The focus of the model is 
heavily biased toward stage one – identifying and selecting options, and stage two – 
reducing uncertainty or strategically amplifying value around those options.  This bias 
reflects the notion of path dependencies – that is to say that past decisions will shape 
future options – “history matters” (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997).  Although not 
empirically proven, an implicit foundation of the Commercialisation Options Model is 
that by developing, nurturing and keeping open options a firm will have a greater 
chance of success. 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model is a process.  It is necessarily detailed in order to 
make it informative and actionable for practitioners in a wide variety of situations.  
Therefore the Commercialisation Options Model cannot be neatly summed up in a 
single diagram, but instead is expressed in a sequence of tables. 
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Stage one of the model involves identifying a wide range of options available and 
deciding which options to invest in.  Stage two involves nurturing these selected options 
by reducing risk or amplifying their value.  Stage three involves either exercising an 
option by plugging into the value chain and (hopefully) earning a return on investment 
or terminating an option that is no longer viable or required. 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model  helps determine the options that are available to 
a biotech firm as it commercialises an innovation, as well as how those options may be 
developed over time.  The choices a firm makes within this model are driven by the 
strategic issues that it perceives.  Some of the factors in a firm’s context are enabling 
and some are constraining (Pettigrew, 1992).  Practitioners tend to use the term ‘SWOT’ 
meaning strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats borrowing it from the design 
school of strategic management theory (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998).  
Strengths and weaknesses are facets of a firm’s internal context whilst opportunities and 
threats are facets of its external environment.  Diced another way, strengths and 
opportunities are enabling factors whilst weaknesses and threats are constraining 
factors.  The enabling and constraining factors surrounding a firm (it’s SWOT position) 
determine the range of commercialisation options available to it.  I have chosen to use 
an enabling/constraining framework in my model rather than SWOT as it changes the 
lens through which strategic elements are viewed from internal-external (SWOT) to 
positive-negative (enabling/constraining). 
 
Stage one 
 
Stage one is the most intensive phase of the model as it sets the scene and paves the way 
for the commercialisation options the firm will have in the future.  Stage one A of the 
Commercialisation Options Model involves identifying up front as many ‘what’, 
‘when’, and ‘how’ choices as possible that the company will have in bringing a product 
to market.  Stage one B involves evaluating those potential choices and deciding which 
to invest in, i.e. turning them into options. 
Stage one A 
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Commercialisation strategy is composed of a number of strategic choices that have been 
made or are intended along the path of bringing a product to market.  Three of the most 
critical decisions a biotech firm must make in its commercialisation journey are ‘what’ 
product or service it will offer, ‘when’ in the development path it will choose to earn a 
return, and ‘how’ it will interact with the greater value chain.  Stage one A of the 
Commercialisation Options Model aids a firm in considering the choices it may have 
with regard to each of these critical parameters.  ‘What’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ are now 
examined in turn. 
 ‘What’ 
 
‘What’ describes the final product offering.  In the pharmaceutical sector this involves 
the therapeutic indications that will be sought with regulatory agencies.  For example, in 
the case of a product for relieving pain ‘what’ will need to differentiate between acute 
pain and chronic pain, the type of underlying disease that will be targeted (e.g. cancer 
pain or lower back pain) and the presentation of the product (e.g. tablet, transdermal 
patch or injection).  
 
It is difficult to provide pre-emptive advice about ‘what’ to bring to market due to the 
vast range of unique commercialisation projects and their related possibilities within the 
biotech sector.  However, in evaluating alternatives, there are often trade-offs to 
consider.  The following table outlines typical trade-offs that drug development 
companies face.  
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Advantages Trade‐offs Disadvantages
Market 
opportunity may 
be significantly 
larger
Pursuing chronic 
indications
Clinical trials take 
longer and cost 
more
VS
Clinical trials are 
quicker and cost 
less
Pursuing acute 
indications
Market 
opportunity often 
smaller
also consider
Less risk
Indications with 
well defined 
biomarkers or easily 
measured end‐
points
Low‐hanging fruit 
attracts more 
competition
Regulatory burden 
may be lower, and 
period of 
protection after 
launch
Orphan vs mass 
market
Market is smaller
What' to commercialise (plug in)
 
Figure 6-4 ‘What’ to commercialise  
 
‘When’ 
‘When’ describes the point in the value chain at which the company intends to earn a 
return on its innovation.  The firm often (but not always) hands control of its innovation 
to another party at this point.  Popular ‘when’ points for plugging into the value chain 
are after phase II clinical trials or during phase III.   
 
Evaluating ‘when’ to plug into the value chain starts with understanding the full value 
chain.  The company then evaluates the factors that enable or constrain it in plugging in 
at different points in the value chain.  Figure 6-5 shows a generic value chain and the 
names of typical business models that are used by firms participating in various parts of 
the value chain. 
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Figure 6-5 Generic value chain & typical names of business models 
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Companies that choose to plug in during the preclinical phase (i.e. prior to a phase I 
clinical trial) are employing a RIPCO business model.  Firms that straddle the 
development phases from discovery through to clinical stage development employ a 
FIDDO strategy and those covering the full spectrum of discovery, development and 
commercial phases employ a FIPCO strategy.  More recent business models include 
NDRO which involves acquiring early stage product development assets and taking 
them through clinical development and possibly to market launch, or the FIPNET model 
where many parts of the development process are outsourced but the firm retains control 
over the whole development process. 
 
Many enabling and constraining factors influence a firm’s decision as to ‘when’ to plug 
into the value chain.  The next diagram (Figure 6-6) shows how various factors push a 
company toward certain typical business models, or perhaps leave the company with a 
wide range of options.  
 
It is well recognized that the majority of biotech start-ups operate under significant 
financial constraint. Surprisingly, the biotech sector’s focus on cash flow and how 
financial constraints affect a firm’s commercialisation strategy does not appear to be 
reflected in the strategic management literature. Accordingly, Gans and Stern’s (2003a) 
model of commercialisation does not place any focus on the role that cash constraint 
plays in a firm’s strategy.  It may be that Gans and Stern consider capital as merely 
another complementary asset required to facilitate research, development and 
commercialisation.  This implies that firms that lack sufficient capital will 
commercialise their innovation in the market for ideas.  This may well be true; but I 
would argue that capital should be considered separately from other complementary 
assets.  It is likely that access to capital is closely related to commercialisation strategy 
through the options a firm has for plugging into the value chain.  Those options can only 
be fully explored if capital constraint is initially put aside.  In doing this a firm is able to 
understand all possible alternatives for commercialisation and then determine the 
optimal amount of capital to raise.  Being unable to raise the optimal amount of capital 
will constrain the alternatives that are feasible in practice, but separating capital from 
other complementary assets will at least ensure that all possibilities are considered. 
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Identifying 'when' options
Constraining Factors Enabling
Preferred options Preferred options
FIPCO 
weak
Robustness of IP 
protection strong
Any
RIPCO (because the 
firm is  less likely to raise 
the funds or bet the 
company) high
Level of scientific risk
low
Any
License or partner 
earlier
chronic
Acute vs chronic 
indication (assume acute = 
shorter lower cost trials, 
chronic = longer higher cost 
trials) acute
Any
FIPCO end of scale
high
Amount of tacit 
knowledge involved in 
partnering low
Any
RIPCO
no
Complementary assets  
exist in‐house, or can 
be contracted yes
Any
FIPCO
no
Complementary assets 
exist in the sector
yes
Any
License or sell 
before product 
launch large
No. of physicians the 
product has to be 
marketed to  small
Any
FIPCO
no
A distribution channel 
to the target market 
already exists yes
Any
FIPCO
Market acceptance of 
science and 
development plans
Any
RIPCO or FIDDO
Market size in terms of 
patients is modest
FIPCO (opportunity to 
capture full value).
Fewer options, 
RIPCO or FIDDO 
more likely
Company is located in 
a premier biotech hub
Greater options
no
Novel research 
methodology or tools
yes
Fee for service or 
integrate vertically by 
developing proprietary 
moelcules and plugging 
into the value chain at 
any point
Look at the enabling and constraining factors that may help you determine the possible options 
 
Figure 6-6 Identifying ‘when’ options 
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‘How’ 
 
Next a firm needs  to consider options for ‘how’ to plug into the value chain.  ‘How’ 
refers to the transaction that the firm uses to create a financial return on its innovation. 
Like ‘when’ options these are choices that are exercised at stage three of the ROR 
model but have to be considered at stage one, so that seeds can be planted and nurtured. 
‘How’ options are listed in figure 6-7.  Firms need to be creative in thinking about 
‘how’ options as these may be highly context specific.  
 
 'How' options
Sale of IP
Sale of product
Sale of company
Out‐licensing
JV arrangements
 
Figure 6-7 ‘How’ options 
 
 
At the end of stage one A all the potentially viable choices that have been identified 
should be noted in a register.  These choices can be thought of as options that are 
available but have not yet been taken (invested in).  During stage one B the firm 
evaluates each of the potential options in its register and decides which ones to invest in. 
Stage one B 
 
A firm may discover that it has many potential choices or options, in ‘what’, ‘when’ and 
‘how’ to earn a return on its innovation.  Some of these options may be mutually 
exclusive whilst others may continue to exist in parallel right up until the point in time 
at which the firm exercises one of these options by plugging into the value chain.  
During stage one B a firm evaluates its options and decides which options to invest in.  
These decisions are very important because at this very early stage in the 
commercialisation journey the firm may already be creating path dependencies – 
shutting the door on strategic choices that will no longer be available further into the 
journey. 
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The evaluation and decision making process for determining which options to invest in 
is worthy of a thesis of its own.  Many methods and tools may be applicable.  I suggest 
that a combination of decision trees and scenario analyses may be appropriate.  By way 
of example, figure 6-8 depicts a process for drawing out all the combinations of ‘what’, 
‘when’ and ‘how’ options identified in stage one A.  It suggests calculating risk adjusted 
net present values (NPVs) for each combination of options after considering the 
inherent costs, risks and rewards.  Most likely firms will undertake some kind of trade-
off between the options/combinations with the highest NPVs and those with the lowest 
cost of investment (today).  
 
Evaluating options – an example
What
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
CABG
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
stroke
When
After phase I
After phase II
After phase III
Launch to market
Etc.
How
Sell company
JV
Out license
Consider
COSTS
‐ Amount of finance  
required
‐ Cost of capital
RISKS
‐ Science risk
‐ Operational risk
‐ Market risk
‐ Likelihood of getting 
finance
REWARDS
‐ Financial return
Calculate 
risk ‐
adjusted 
NPVs
Cost of 
option 
today
 
Figure 6-8 Evaluating options – an example 
 
Whilst NPV calculations are frequently used in the biotech sector it needs to be 
recognised that their use is fraught with a fundamental problem.  The very long time-
frames that are involved together with high levels of risk means that NPVs are very 
sensitive to the choice of discount rate.  There is no point in calculating an NPV and 
assuming you’ll get the correct answer.  However, they are useful for sensitivity 
analyses and for comparing options.  The challenges associated with the use of formal 
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financial tools implies that there is a large role for reasoning supported by professional 
judgement and intuition in the biotech sector. 
 
There is no doubt that stage one B involves a lot of work and skills often not available 
within a start-up (although they may be available through consultants).  By building an 
understanding of the resources and actions that will be required to nurture various 
options it may be possible to identify those options most likely to lead to commercial 
success.  Plotting each option to its exercise point may uncover unexpected actions that 
need to be initiated earlier in the commercialisation process.  For example, if a firm 
wants to out-license its IP to a large pharmaceutical company at the end of Phase II 
clinical trials and earlier step may be to clearly identify what data expectations these 
companies have from proof-of-concept clinical trials.  Another step may be to 
commence dialog and engage the interest of large pharmaceutical companies well ahead 
of the time the firm plans to plug into the value chain.  The type and extent of finance 
likely to be available in the future may influence options adopted today. 
 
Another reason for analyzing the full commercialisation process upfront is that a firm 
may be able to purposefully alter its SWOT position in order to create new options that 
may not be immediately available, or to ensure the viability of current options further 
down the track.  Thus aspects of a firm’s commercialisation strategy may be actively 
targeted at changing its enabling and constraining factors. 
 
After detailing all potential options and modeling the financial implications (to the 
extent possible) it is time for the firm to decide which options it will invest in.  The 
Commercialisation Options Model is predicated on the belief that there is no ‘best’ 
strategy especially in the volatile context of biotech commercialisation.  The strategy 
that appears best today may not even be viable tomorrow if the capital markets suffer a 
downturn, or it may be a less favourable option as the pendulum of negotiation power 
swings back and forth between big pharma and small biotech firms.  Therefore, the 
Commercialisation Options Model supports flexible strategy where options are 
purposefully developed and nurtured, and then exercised or terminated in response to 
changes in the firm’s internal or external environments. 
 
 160
Intentionally the model does not place any emphasis on conventional strategies within 
the field.  As chapter two has shown, these dominant logics can change abruptly in the 
field of biotech commercialisation.  Gans and Stern’s model tends to equate 
conventional or institutionalized strategies with optimal strategies.  As I have discussed 
earlier, their model fails to adequately capture biotech commercialisation strategy in the 
past or current contexts and we have no way of anticipating how applicable it will be as 
the commercialisation environment evolves in the future.  Whilst the Commercialisation 
Options Model cannot select the best strategy I do hope it promotes best practices. 
 
So at the conclusion of stage one the firm chooses a portfolio of attractive options to 
invest in.  To reduce overall commercialisation risk, I propose that this portfolio 
supports a variety of options for ‘when’ and ‘how’ to plug into the value chain so that 
the firm may adapt its commercialisation strategy to the ever changing industry and 
macro-economic environment.  From the firm’s survival perspective, the portfolio will 
ideally contain more than one option of ‘what’ to commercialise.  However, due to 
financial and technical constraints this is not always possible. 
Stage two 
 
Stage two is about nurturing the options that were invested in at the end of stage one.  
The goal is to increase the value of each option or decrease the risk inherent in the 
option through strategic action and possibly further investments.  Sometimes it is just a 
matter of letting time pass and no further actions or investments are required.  For 
example, the value of an option may be dependent on an external event such as the 
passing of new legislation or the actions of a competitor. 
 
Actions and investments to increase value and/or decrease risk are once again highly 
contextual in nature.  The Commercialisation Options Model is therefore a process to 
stimulate strategic thinking rather than a pre-defined set of directives.  My model also 
aims to instill the routines required by real options reasoning within the firm that are 
required to support flexible and adaptive commercialisation strategies.  Thus there is a 
heavy emphasis on dynamic capabilities. 
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Regrettably the case studies demonstrated few dynamic capabilities to support the 
increasing of value/decreasing of risk in commercialisation options.  This may have 
been because such capabilities did not exist within these firms or because my research 
methodology was not appropriately focused on observing these processes as data was 
collected.  I suspect the answer lies somewhere in between.  Thus, in this initial 
proposal of the Commercialisation Options Model I draw on the strategic management 
literature reviewed in chapter three to propose ways in which companies may amplify 
value or reduce risk in their options and to translate this into dynamic capabilities which 
a firm can employ so that it may flexibly recognize and respond to opportunities to 
increase value/decrease risk.  However, I also looked to seasoned veterans of the 
practitioner community to suggest actions firms could take to increase value/decrease 
risk or to routines firms could employ to improve their chances of doing so.  These 
findings from my second phase of research are presented in chapter seven and 
incorporated into the final version of the model in chapter eight. 
 
Looking to the literature, Gans and Stern provide several suggestions as to how firms 
may enhance value or decrease risk.  These include establishing a reputation (for 
example through public relations initiatives or through publishing articles in reputable 
scientific publications), outsourcing certain functions to those with higher skill sets, 
running the company as a virtual organization and engaging a big pharma company as a 
cornerstone investor or collaborator to provide credibility.   
 
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) and McGrath and MacMillen (2000) suggest ‘drop dead’ 
experiments or forays into the market as ways to reduce uncertainty.  These are 
experiments where if the outcome is acceptable the project will be kept alive until the 
next drop dead experiment.  This concept is particularly applicable to drug development 
where a project moves sequentially through a fairly formal progression of experiments 
and clinical trials as part of the product development process.  Each stage of 
development can be viewed as a drop dead experiment.  Taking this perspective within 
an ROR framework may help ensure that each experiment or trial is structured to 
answer the most critical outstanding question and that the minimum investment is made 
in the project until that question has been answered. 
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Building value and decreasing risk 
Dynamic capability to develop 
 
What does it look like?  (Examples) 
Establishing credibility • Publishing science in reputable 
journals 
• Engaging big pharma as a 
cornerstone investor or strategic 
alliance partner 
Critical questioning • Drop dead experiments 
• Always making the minimum 
investment needed to address the 
most critical information needed 
Table 6-1 Dynamic capabilities for building value and decreasing risk 
 
Table 6-1 suggests dynamic capabilities that may aid biotech companies in building 
value and decreasing risk in strategic options.  Whilst these suggestions likely apply to 
all biotech companies, dynamic capabilities may also be specific to certain companies.  
For example a dynamic capability to function as a virtual organisation, outsourcing 
certain functions to those with higher skill sets – this may be a critical dynamic 
capability to some companies and irrelevant to others. 
Stage three 
Stage three is the point at which each option moves out of stage two (where it was being 
nurtured) and is either exercised or terminated.  Sometimes an option preserves other 
options, so that by exercising a given option the company is taken further down a 
strategic path.  However, the ultimate option is to plug into the value chain – this is 
where the ‘when’ and ‘how’ options are exercised. 
 
When the exercise of an option involves plugging into the value chain to earn a return 
on the investment this is done either by making the full investment required to bring an 
end-product to market or by selling the option in the market for ideas.  As alluded to 
earlier, selling an option in the market for ideas may be achieved via a number of 
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mechanisms such as the sale of intellectual property, sale of the entire company, 
franchising and out-licensing. Partial sale of an option may be achieved through some 
sort of joint venture mechanism.  This list is not intended to be exhaustive – other 
creative mechanisms may also be possible. 
 
On the other hand, the termination of an option involves letting it lapse by no longer 
nurturing it with actions or investments.  Occasionally there may be a financial cost 
involved in terminating an option.  In the biotech sector this often happens when an 
option has been in-licensed.  Often there is a psychological bias against disengaging 
from options that the firm has previously invested resources in, rather than treating these 
resources as sunk.  This suggests that firms adopting my Commercialisation Options 
Model approach to commercialisation strategy will need to build a dynamic capability 
to avoid over commitment to a course of action in decision making (Ross and Staw, 
1985). 
 
The choice of which options to terminate, continue to nurture, or to exercise is highly 
context dependent. To weigh up the pros and cons of nurturing, terminating or 
exercising each option at any given point of time the firm can return to its original 
scenario analyses, decision trees and financial models, updating them to reflect the 
current internal and external environments (SWOT position). 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the implications of strategic issues on biotech 
commercialisation strategy, identifying financial constraint, access to complementary 
assets,  regulatory burden and credibility as the key drivers of commercialisation 
strategy.  It then looked at how firms ‘do’ strategy in this context.  I have proposed and 
described in detail a model that biotech practitioners could use to guide them in 
commercialisation strategy.   
 
Biotech commercialisation is a very high risk process.  Using the Commercialisation 
Options Model to guide strategy development is no guarantee of success.  Indeed, 
further research could be aimed at determining if employment of the processes 
contained in this model do in fact increase the chances of satisfactory commercial 
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outcome.  Such a test is outside the scope of this thesis because of the long time frames 
involved in the commercialisation of innovation in the biotech sector and the sample 
size that would be required considering the presently high failure rate.  Instead, this 
model is validated through evaluation by experienced practitioners from the field 
including a venture capitalist, biotech company CEOs and professionals.  The feedback 
from this testing is presented in the next chapter and the additional knowledge is 
included in the final Commercialisation Options Model presented in chapter eight.
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7 A practitioner critique – second results chapter 
 
The prototype Commercialisation Options Model described in the previous chapter was 
presented for practitioner critique as a way to extend and improve the model and to 
provide an external validation of its utility to practitioners in the biotech sector. 
The cohort of practitioners involved in this second phase of research comprised one 
commercialisation consultant (Mr. Maruyama), one venture capitalist (Dr. Hirshorn), 
two serial entrepreneurs/CEOs (Dr. Holaday and Dr. Teoh) and one senior business 
development executive (Dr. Soriano). All five participants have enjoyed substantial 
careers in the biotech and life sciences sectors. Between them they have experience 
across many geographies including the U.S., Europe, Australia, Japan and Singapore.  
Four of them have earned doctorates in science or medicine, and there was one MBA 
between them.  A brief curriculum vitae for each practitioner can be found at appendix 
C.  In addition, the opportunity arose to interview a former Commissioner of the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration on how companies can reduce regulatory risk.  This 
unique opportunity has provided some useful advice that has led to revision of stage two 
of the Commercialisation Options Model. 
 
Each participant was presented with a briefing document (see appendix D) one to two 
weeks before taking part in an interview where their feedback would be sought.  During 
the interview, the participant was taken through a powerpoint presentation (see 
appendix E) summarising the key findings of my research and the Commercialisation 
Options Model in particular.  Comments were sought and recorded along the way.  
Interestingly, whilst each practitioner was given the same briefing document, taken 
through the same presentation and asked the same questions, the focus of their 
responses varied widely.  Some had a lot more to say about the first stage of my model, 
whilst others focused more intensely on the later stages.  This chapter summarises the 
critique provided by the industry practitioners.  The next chapter discusses how their 
feedback has been used to refine my model and presents the final version of the 
Commercialisation Options Model. 
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7.1 A practitioner critique 
 
There was strong support for my observations that biotech firms often do strategy in an 
ad hoc way, without fully understanding all the options open to them.  In particular, it 
was felt that firms often do not have a good knowledge of the market and do not 
understand who their customer actually is.  For example, in the U.S. the customer may 
be the reimbursement agencies that decide which products will be paid for.  For 
companies planning to commercialise (earn a return on their innovation) in the market 
for ideas their customer will probably be a large or middle-sized pharma or biotech 
company.  It is important to understand the customer needs of these potential acquirers 
as they add another layer of complexity to a firm’s understanding of its market.  Dr. 
Teoh reminded me that although it’s important to have a strategic view, a company still 
needs to be able to react ad hoc to unexpected opportunities.  There was also strong 
support for the need for the type of research embodied in this thesis and the need for 
improved strategic processes.   
 
The concept of an options approach to commercialisation strategy was well received 
and quickly understood.  Dr. Hirshorn and Dr. Teoh commented that venture capitalists 
tend to think or work in terms of options – they invest their money in tranches – the first 
tranche is an option in a company or technology that reserves the right to make further 
investments later down the track.  ROR reminded Dr. Holaday of two seminal papers 
that have influenced his life as a scientist and a businessman.  They are The Method of 
Multiple Working Hypotheses by T.C. Chamberlain (1897) and Strong Inference by J.R. 
Platt (1964).  “I think there are multiple working hypotheses, multiple options.  You try 
to disprove as many as possible – try to make sure you eliminate the negatives so that 
the positives shine through”.  I have since read these articles and will discuss their 
applicability in the next chapter. 
 
‘Where’ and ‘Who’ 
 
The practitioners agreed that ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ are key parameters of a 
commercialisation strategy.  ‘Where’ was also suggested to be an important parameter 
by Dr. Teoh, Dr. Soriano and Dr. Hirshorn and ‘who’ by Dr. Hirshorn. 
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‘Where’ a company chooses to locate itself can have an important impact on its 
commercialisation strategy in terms of its ability to access human and other resources, 
and its operational costs (compare virtual locations with incubators and regular 
commercial premises in low-cost or high-cost cities).  Furthermore, it may be possible 
to generate value ahead of the curve in certain geographies e.g. less regulated markets. 
 
Dr. Hirshorn was adamant that ‘where’ is better defined as the firm’s environment 
rather than solely its physical location.  In this way ‘where’ captures dimensions beyond 
geography and includes the economic environment, political and regulatory 
environment and even the granting environment.  ‘Where’ was uncovered as a strategic 
factor in my literature review but I had chosen not to include this in the prototype 
Commercialisation Options Model as it was not particularly salient in the three case 
studies.  It is now included in the final model presented in the next chapter. 
 
‘Who’ refers to the shareholders of the company, those that will reap the rewards of 
successful commercialisation.  Finance is provided by investors, who are anticipating a 
financial reward and have a call on future revenue streams of the firm.  In the biotech 
sector, venture capital and angel investors are common, as are corporate investors.  
These investors are frequently not nameless, silent providers of dollars – they may have 
requirements or stipulations that affect commercialisation strategy beyond the face-
value purchasing power of their dollar.  The personal objectives or motivations of key 
shareholders may bear directly on ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’ and ‘where’ an innovation is 
commercialised.  By way of example, venture capitalists are usually driven by time 
constraints – the funds they invest in a biotech start-up need to be returned to their fund 
investors by a given date.  Venture capitalists may influence ‘what’ and ‘when’ in a 
commercialisation strategy to shape an opportunity so it fits within their own time 
constraints.  As another example, the location of a new biotech venture is quite often the 
home town or country of one of the founding shareholders rather than the optimal 
location from a strategic view point.   
 
‘What’ options 
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Between them, the practitioners suggested many additional parameters and trade-offs to 
consider when a firm evaluates its ‘what’ options.  These are described below and have 
been included in the final Commercialisation Options Model. 
 
Time was described as an important driver of ‘what’ choices from several perspectives.  
Firstly, how long does the firm’s intellectual property protection have to run?  Patent 
protection typically expires 20 years after an initial patent filing.  As the typical 
development time for a new drug is around 12 years it’s not hard to see that the shorter 
the remaining patent protection period the stronger the bias toward drugs that can be 
brought to market more quickly.  Factors such as the length of clinical trials for different 
indications or the availability of regulatory exclusivity become critical. 
 
The group also made suggestions regarding the types of therapeutic area and indication 
a firm could pursue.  A product’s indication is the claim it can put on its label, or 
package insert, after gaining the appropriate regulatory approvals.  Mr. Maruyama 
suggested that the choice of therapeutic area carried associated chances of success or 
failure and is also typically associated with certain levels of costs and duration of 
clinical development.  He kindly provided figures, 7-1 and 7-2 below as evidence.  The 
first figure shows that anti-infective drugs are significantly more likely to pass phase I 
(first human dose), phase II (first patient dose) and phase III (first pivotal dose) clinical 
trials than cardiovascular, anti-cancer or nervous system drugs.  However once drugs 
from these categories have been submitted to the health authority for approval they all 
have approximately 75-80% chance of making it to market.  The second figure shows 
that drugs for infectious diseases tend to be cheaper and faster to develop while CNS 
(central nervous system) drug development projects tend to be expensive and lengthy in 
duration.  Indications with an unmet clinical need or that allow the company to be first 
in market were considered worthy of consideration.  Another consideration is how 
quickly can you get to market with a niche indication and then add other indications. 
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Figure 7-1 Cumulative success rates to market by therapeutic area  
Source: CMR International Institute for Regulatory Science 
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Figure 7-2 Mean clinical study time vs cost for selected therapeutic groups 
Source: DataEdge, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
 
Competitiveness of the market and exclusivity – how many horses are in the race? – 
should be reviewed.  Other market considerations suggested were products suitable for 
developed versus mature emerging/developing country markets and products that would 
be funded by reimbursement agencies, NGOs or paid for by individual patients.  The 
amount that could be charged for the end-product was a closely related issue. 
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The trade-off between small molecule versus biological drug is an important one where 
a choice exists.  The manufacturing costs associated with biologics are very high and 
these costs come early in the development program.  However biologic drugs are less 
exposed to generic competition.  Other trade-offs worth considering if development 
costs are a particular concern are developing a known chemical entity (for a new 
indication) versus a new chemical entity, developing an OTC product versus a 
prescription product, or a diagnostic product versus a therapeutic product.  Various 
administration routes (presentations such as oral, IV, transdermal, buccal, per rectal) 
and whether a product will be used for determining a diagnosis or prognosis may also 
require consideration (the latter for a diagnostic test rather than a therapeutic). 
 
Mr. Maruyama described a situation whereby a cash-constrained company with a library 
of candidates or a number of early stage compounds could lend them out to big pharma 
companies and see what potential products could be identified.  He said “It seems that 
many companies are too scared or too greedy to do this.  Perhaps they miss out on 
options.  The companies that are successful in doing this don’t make it too onerous for 
big pharma companies to collaborate.  This is also a way to open a door to a 
relationship with large pharmaceutical companies.” 
‘When’ options 
 
An interesting perspective that was offered during this phase of research was that the 
notion of ‘when’ to plug into the value chain is viewed differently by management than 
by investors.  This is because investors consider the time value of the money they have 
invested, calculating the internal rate of return on their investment.  Whether a 
difference in perspective exists probably varies company by company rather than being 
a general phenomenon.  Management teams using sophisticated financial modelling 
techniques such as those proposed in phase two of the Commercialisation Options 
Model will be considering the time value of money in their strategic decisions.  
However those following more ad hoc approaches to strategy probably are not. 
 
The industry practitioners did not come up with many additional enabling or 
constraining factors that would drive ‘when’ options in my model.  However, they did 
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make the following suggestions which have been included in the final model.  The level 
of market acceptance of a firm’s science and development plans can be an enabling or 
constraining factor – do people understand your story?  If understanding or acceptance 
is low, the firm will be pushed toward the FIPCO end of the business model spectrum.  
The size of the market in terms of patients or doses was also suggested as a factor for 
consideration, with a low number of patients or doses enabling a FIPCO strategy if so 
desired.  Geography was suggested as either enabling or constraining depending on the 
variety of options it provided.  The entrepreneur’s (or shareholder’s) appetite for risk is 
another factor.  Finally, it was suggested that a company in an early life-stage should 
sell off its first-born candidate quickly (after a phase one clinical trial) so that the firm 
will have revenue to produce a few more compounds rather than having all its eggs in 
one basket. 
 
Dr. Teoh suggested that access to finance should be at the very top of my table of 
enabling and constraining factors.  Dr. Teoh is right, finance is probably the leading 
constraint in the sector.  However, I purposely left finance out of the process of 
identifying options as there is a high risk that firms will perceive this constraint to be so 
large that they will not challenge themselves to think of different options for 
commercialising their innovation and thus will not come up with creative ways to 
employ their options.  Firms may have more options than they think they have.  As a 
firm progresses down the development path, building value and reducing uncertainty, 
financing opportunities may emerge that were not available to the company in its 
infancy. 
‘How’ and ‘with whom’ options 
 
Dr Holaday and Mr. Maruyama suggested IPO (initial public offering) as a ‘how’ 
mechanism for plugging into the value chain.  I had purposefully refrained from listing 
IPO as a possible ‘how’ option in the initial Commercialisation Options Model.  This is 
because I perceive IPO as either selling (a part of) the company (harvest) or as merely a 
method for raising capital. Upon further reflection, to the extent that IPO is used for 
capital raising it reduces uncertainty and could be considered a stage two strategy.  
There are arguments for and against including IPO in a list of ‘how’ options but due to 
popular request it will appear in the final model. 
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Other ‘how’ suggestions included hybrid transactions, sale of a royalty stream following 
out-licensing and a mechanism described as a ‘rental’.  Mr. Maruyama described how 
companies that have lacked the skill set or financial resource to fully develop a product 
sometimes license it out to another firm, maintaining an option to buy the product back 
at a later stage.  In this way risk is transferred to another party and finance may be 
available at a later less riskier stage of product development.  This model could 
contribute to the basis for competitive advantage for a firm with dynamic capabilities in 
ROR. 
  
‘With whom’ was another parameter of commercialisation strategy that emerged during 
the practitioner interviews.  This refers to strategic partners, an essential element for 
bringing most biotech innovations to market.  Mr. Maruyama recommended weighing 
up the pros and cons of big pharma versus middle-sized pharma or a large biotech firm.  
The smaller companies take more risks but pay smaller money.  Big pharma take a long 
time in negotiations, prefer later stage opportunities but pay larger dollars. Mr. 
Maruyama also suggested considering an option agreement versus investment from a 
pharmaceutical company.  It can be good enough for the purpose e.g. credibility or 
small revenue, and easier to achieve.  Dr. Teoh suggested out-licensing rights to a 
compound in a non-core market such as Korea, while sharing development costs with 
the licensee as one way to build value/decrease uncertainty in the commercialisation 
process at modest cost; he also suggested carrying out some of the development work in 
lower cost geographies, partnering with a CRO (clinical research organisation) or 
licensing alternative indications to help build a safety database were also proposed as 
ways to amplify value. 
Evaluating options – stage one 
 
Only Dr. Holaday had significant suggestions to make about how the various options 
identified in the first stage of my model could be evaluated whilst the other practitioners 
either implicitly or explicitly agreed with a general framework of using decision trees 
and financial modelling.  Dr. Holaday suggested a rating system (high, medium, low) 
against various elements of each option combination – costs, risks and rewards.  He 
particularly focused his discussion on evaluating risk, mentioning patent risk, 
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management risk, market risk, manufacturing risk, financial risk, competitive risk and 
science risk.  He then broke down science risk to include technology risk, medical risk 
and the risk of obsolescence.  He also suggested considering time risks with regard to 
patent expiry and development delays.  Dr. Holaday suggested selecting the more 
attractive options and repeating the process.  Furthermore, combinations of options 
could be ranked considering all costs, risks and rewards.  The use of such a rating 
system is discussed in the next chapter.   
 
Nurturing options – stage two 
 
Stage two of the Commercialisation Options Model is about enhancing the value and/or 
decreasing the uncertainty in the options the firm has invested in.  There was unanimous 
support for the use of drop dead experiments as a way of doing this.  As Dr. Teoh says 
“Not enough companies do drop dead experiments.  The company may not want to do 
this as negative data could finish the company.  You need to clearly define the go/no-go 
criteria and abide by them. What are the minimum criteria beyond which you will kill 
the project?” 
 
Dr. Soriano recommended that stage two of the Commercialisation Options Model 
require the definition of the critical path of the commercialisation project, integrating 
the perspectives of the various disciplines in the company e.g. marketing, finance, 
clinical development, regulatory.  Firstly identifying all the critical issues and then 
ranking and integrating them into a critical path.  He suggested that representatives of 
each discipline need to be involved in deciding the next most critical objective in the 
commercialisation strategy.  Drop dead actions need to be identified and undertaken at 
each step in the critical path. 
 
Clinical proof of concept is an important milestone in drug development – it is the 
subject of an important drop dead experiment.  Equally important, but frequently 
underestimated is commercial proof of concept suggested Dr. Hirshorn.  “Who is going 
to buy your idea or product?”   
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Having an experienced and credible management team was seen as an essential way to 
reduce risk in phase two of the model.  It is important to recognise that at some point the 
founder may not be the right person to lead the company forward.  Dr. Hirshorn 
described the importance of the CEO, “when you hire the CEO you are bringing 
onboard a whole model or style of commercialisation, which is building on all his 
experience, his network and ability to bring all sorts of people in.”  Key opinion leader 
meetings and publications in academic journals were also suggested as ways to gain a 
reputation and credibility. 
 
Dr. Soriano and Dr. Hirshorn suggested that finding ways to overcome your constraints, 
including changing the external environment, were ways to increase value.  An example 
was provided where a company had successfully lobbied for a change in regulations to 
mandate the use of their product as a control in laboratory testing.  Companies were also 
recommended to be aware of disruptive changes in their environment.  Not just 
technological but also legal or regulatory changes. 
 
Other suggestions for increasing value or reducing uncertainty were to get government 
support (e.g. grants or other privileges), to understand the reimbursement environment 
and to test the company against the market by benchmarking against competitors.  In a 
similar view, internationalising the company’s presence – going to conferences and 
talking widely with different parties was suggested as a way to reduce uncertainty if the 
company doesn’t know how to value its innovation. 
 
Exercise or terminate – stage three 
 
There was strong support from the practitioner group that companies need to be 
competent in terminating options.  “One of the hardest things to do is to stop a project” 
said Dr. Hirshorn.  “Too many people keep too many options open too long, and they 
pay for those that are not viable because they don’t want to make the hard choices of 
which ones they are.  That’s part of founder’s syndrome.  Killing a project should be 
approached with as much vigour as advancing a project” offered Dr. Holaday. 
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Stage three of the prototype model was seen as tactical rather than strategic – it is 
operational in nature.  Dr. Holaday suggested that the decision to exercise or terminate 
an option automatically falls out of the stage three, whereas Dr. Teoh and Dr. Soriano 
talked about a decision making process for making exercise/termination decisions.  
Setting criteria for when the firm will exercise or terminate an option at the beginning of 
a project, with regular revision along the way was also suggested.  Important criteria 
would include cost, time and competition for resources.  Dr. Soriano stressed that 
reviews need to be multidisciplinary (e.g. including the marketing, finance and clinical 
teams).  Termination should be done in a way that doesn’t destroy value where possible.  
Termination may be just abandonment of an option but the decision and its implications 
still require evaluation. 
A rare opportunity  
 
During the course of my research I was fortunate to have the opportunity to interview a 
former Commissioner of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) – Dr. Lester 
Crawford.  This was an opportunistic interview rather than one prescribed by the 
methodology laid out in chapter four – an opportunity too good to let pass by.  Dr. 
Crawford was kind enough to give me his advice on how biotech firms can reduce their 
regulatory risk.  His advice is summarised in the paragraphs below. 
 
Historically the FDA has been slow to provide regulatory approval for new classes of 
therapy, e.g. antibiotics and benzodiazepams.  “If they are not familiar with a class of 
therapy they were not in a hurry to approve it” said Dr. Crawford.  He advises that if a 
company is involved with a new technology, and there are others working in the same 
field, then they could form a trade association to develop a strategy for helping the FDA 
understand and prepare for the technology.  The trade group should attach itself to 
leaders in the field and could provide seminars for FDA staff.  It could also consider 
presenting to congressional staff if it’s a significant breakthrough in technology. 
 
Dr. Crawford talked about the importance of regulatory strategy and drew a distinction 
between a regulatory strategist and a regulatory technician.  He suggested it’s important 
to be pro-active with regulatory strategy – a firm can’t afford to wait to the end.  It’s 
critical for the CEO to be involved in regulatory strategy.  Getting the right regulatory 
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consultant or advisor is important but be careful of word-of-mouth as the consultant 
may not have experience in the required regulatory field.  “Worst is someone who 
advertises.  If you need to advertise in this field it means you have no experience.” 
 
Lastly Dr. Crawford talked about meeting with the FDA.  “FDA meetings are collegial 
and open – surprising rapport can develop.  However, it’s important to understand that 
the minutes of the meeting form a contract.  It may be a contract to do nothing, or they 
may say that if you do this, and it comes out right, then we will move on to the next 
phase and so forth.”  He suggests that the company anticipates the FDA’s questions and 
has the answers scripted.  “Preparation is critical, and never keep the FDA waiting!”  
Dr. Crawford’s suggestions for minimising regulatory risk are included in stage two of 
my final model, presented in chapter eight. 
 
Extending the Commercialisation Options Model 
 
Practitioner feedback has provided significant additional content for my model.  This 
content has been described in detail above and is summarised in tables 7-1and 7-2 
below. 
 
Additional content for the existing sections of the               
Commercialisation Options Model 
 
‘What’ – trade offs 
• Oral vs IV presentation 
• Known chemical entity vs New chemical entity 
• OTC vs Prescription medicine 
• Historically high success rate indications vs Low success rate 
• Small molecules vs Large molecule (biological) 
• Developed markets vs Emerging markets 
 
‘What’ – other considerations 
• How long is your remaining patent life?  If it’s short, consider acute indications. 
• Can you meet an unmet medical need?  Regulatory barriers may be lower and 
product pricing higher 
• Can you choose an indication where there are fewer horses in the race or some 
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form of market exclusivity is possible? 
 
‘When’ – constraining/enabling factors 
• Market acceptance of science and development plans 
• Modest market size in terms of patients 
• Company is located in a premier biotech hub 
 
‘How’ – transaction mechanisms 
• Initial public offering 
• Rental 
• Hybrid transactions 
 
Table 7-1 Additional content for the existing sections of the model 
 
New content sections for the Commercialisation Options Model 
 
‘With whom’ options 
• Big pharma – advantages and disadvantages 
• Mid-size pharma or big biotech – advantages and disadvantages 
 
‘Who’ options 
• Older shareholders vs Younger shareholders 
• Venture capitalists vs Angel investors 
 
‘Where’ options 
• Convenience vs Access to critical resources 
• Virtual vs Bricks and mortar 
• Home territory vs Low cost geography 
• Highly regulated vs Less regulated country 
 
Table 7-2 New content sections for the Commercialisation Options Model 
 
7.2 Summary 
 
The second phase of research reported in this chapter proved a productive and time 
efficient way to refine and extend the prototype Commercialisation Options Model 
presented in the last chapter.  I wish to extend my sincere thanks to those who shared 
their extensive experience and views on biotech commercialisation with me.  Their 
critique extended both the content of my model, as has largely been described above, 
and the processes in my model as will be described in more detail in the next chapter. 
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8 A model for biotech commercialisation strategy – 
second discussion chapter 
 
The practitioner critique described in the last chapter reported the results of the second 
phase of research in this project. Its objective was to seek validation for the 
Commercialisation Options Model at the same time as refining and extending it.  The 
feedback largely fell into two categories.  The first category was ‘content’ feedback, 
where the industry practitioners provided additional examples of trade-offs for ‘what’ 
options, enabling or constraining factors for ‘when’ options or alternative transaction 
mechanisms for ‘how’ options.  They also made suggestions about ‘where’, ‘who’ and 
‘with whom’.  This feedback was described fully in the last chapter and does not require 
further discussion here although it has been incorporated where appropriate into the 
final model. 
 
The second category of feedback was process-oriented in nature.  It largely revolved 
around evaluating options (stage one B), ways to enhance value/reduce uncertainty 
(stage two) and decision making regarding the exercise or termination of options (stage 
three).  The feedback was described in chapter seven and a discussion regarding the 
implications of this feedback ensues below.  The final Commercialisation Options 
Model is then presented.  It is a synthesis of academic and practitioner knowledge that, 
whilst can never be perfect, provides value to both communities.   
 
8.1 Is commercialisation building value or plugging in? 
 
Dr. Soriano suggested that perhaps commercialisation strategy is about building value in 
the firm’s intellectual property assets rather than specifically being linked to plugging 
in.  I argue that building value is an important part of commercialisation strategy – in 
fact it is the key objective of phase two of the Commercialisation Options Model – 
however a firm needs to keep a firm eye on the end goal of providing a financial return 
to shareholders.  Importantly, a firm needs to understand the entire path from inception 
to plug-in and maintain a number of options along the way.  Thus, our perspectives on 
commercialisation strategy are not divergent – we both agree that building value is 
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important – but rather, my view of commercialisation strategy reaches further into the 
future and I believe is closer aligned with the goals of shareholders. 
8.2 Strategic processes for the Commercialisation Options 
Model  
A complementary philosophical approach to ROR 
 
During the second phase of field research Dr. John Holaday referred me to two classic 
essays on scientific method that he thought might help me in thinking about real options 
reasoning – in particular how to evaluate and choose amongst options and also how to 
reduce uncertainty and grow value in the chosen options.  The first essay was The 
Method of Multiple Working Hypotheses by T.C. Chamberlain (1897) and the other was 
Strong Inference by J.R. Platt (1964). 
 
Chamberlain calls for the progression of science through the simultaneous evaluation of 
multiple hypotheses.  He does not believe that simple explanations of complex 
phenomena are viable – there are no quick fixes or magic bullets.  As the case studies 
reported in chapter five have shown, there is no single explanation of commercialisation 
strategy that predicts the chosen business model, but rather, it is better explained by a 
complex multi-factorial process model such as that I have suggested in chapter five.  
Chamberlain describes the danger of a singular explanation for a phenomenon, that 
appears satisfactory, being adopted for widespread use despite not having being tested 
for its applicability in every situation.   
 
Chamberlain’s multiple hypotheses methodology involves first conceiving every 
rational explanation of a phenomenon, then developing every tenable hypothesis 
relative to its value, cause or origin.  Each hypothesis in the family should be treated 
impartially with the investigator “morally forbidden to fasten his affections unduly upon 
any one.” (p.352)   The investigator then proceeds: 
knowing well that some of his intellectual children (by birth or adoption) must needs 
perish before maturity, but yet with the hope that several of them may survive the 
ordeal of crucial research, since they are often conjoined in the production of the 
phenomena (p.352). 
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I hope that the parallel with ROR and commercialisation strategy is obvious.  My model 
recommends that the strategist consider all options up-front, investing in and keeping 
open many options with the full knowledge that many will perish (be terminated) either 
actively or through abandonment and in the hope that one or more will reach maturity 
and be exercised.  But how does the strategist or entrepreneur cope with the 
development of multiple options?  Here, the second essay recommended by Dr. Holaday 
describes a crucial process for the rapid advancement of science.  It may equally be 
applied to options as a way to distill and refine the most valuable from amongst a 
myriad of options. 
 
Platt (1964) describes the critical path for “rapid and powerful progress [in science]” as 
being to devise alternative hypotheses, then to conduct a crucial experiment, with 
alternative possible outcomes, which will exclude one or more alternative hypotheses 
and finally to repeat this procedure as many times as needed to refine the possibilities 
that remain.  This concept is the essence of the ‘drop dead’ activities that I have 
advocated in the second stage of the Commercialisation Options Model. 
 
Platt describes this process as being like climbing a tree – at each fork in the “logical 
tree” there may be multiples choice (e.g. a right fork, a left fork, a middle fork), the 
outcome of each crucial experiment telling us which fork we must choose.  To quote 
Platt:  
It consists of asking in your own mind, on hearing any scientific explanation or 
theory put forward, “But sir, what experiment could disprove your hypothesis?” or, 
on hearing a scientific experiment described, “But sir, what hypothesis does your 
experiment disprove?” (Platt, 1964, Aids to Strong Inference, para.2) 
 
Platt’s scientific reasoning can be applied to real options in commercialisation strategy. 
‘What’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ options can be mapped out like a tree and crucial 
experiments or next steps can be devised with a view to trying to disprove or terminate 
the viability of various options at each fork in the tree, thus inferring that remaining 
options have greater value. 
 
Together, Chamberlain and Platt suggest a rigorous approach to scientific explanation 
that first relies on identifying all possible hypotheses and then conducting crucial 
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experiments that will exclude one or more alternative hypotheses.  This is the essence of 
the Commercialisation Options Model presented in chapter six.  However, with the 
practitioner feedback generated in the second phase of research, together with the 
eloquent insights of Chamberlain and Platt, I am now better able to articulate the 
essential processes underlying the Commercialisation Options Model. 
 
Processes synthesized from academic and practitioner sources 
 
The first stage of the Commercialisation Options Model involves identifying all 
possible options that the firm has in commercialising its innovation (this is analogous to 
identifying all possible hypotheses according to Chamberlain’s methodology).  I had 
initially provided the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ framework to help in this process.  
Addressing the practitioner feedback I have added ‘where’, ‘who’ and ‘with whom’ to 
this framework. 
 
Stage one B of the model involves evaluating the comprehensive range of options 
identified and deciding which to invest in.  There are many ways to undertake this 
evaluation.  I had previously suggested mapping out the various combinations of ‘what’, 
‘when’ and ‘how’ options and then calculating risk adjusted NPVs for each, taking into 
account the inherent risks, costs and rewards. 
 
An alternative process was suggested during practitioner review of the model.  It 
employs qualitative measures rather than quantitative calculations for ranking the 
attractiveness of alternate options.  Each combination could be ranked as 
low/medium/high with regard to its rewards, costs and risks.  A quick run through 
would allow a majority of options to be discarded.  The process could be repeated to 
rank the remaining options, or a more detailed quantitative process could be employed 
to evaluate the more attractive options.  Companies may determine their own criteria for 
ranking options.  An example is provided later in this chapter. 
 
The company should then map out the options it has chosen to invest in, or keep open.   
This is more likely to resemble a tree than a set of distinct linear paths.  The trunk of 
each tree will symbolize the company’s core innovation, the lowest/thickest branch(es) 
will fork out to include the various ‘what’ options the company is considering.  Those in 
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turn branch out into the various ‘when’ options available to the company.  Lastly the 
highest twigs on the tree will symbolize the ‘how’ options the company wants to keep 
open for plugging into the value chain. 
 
Once investments have been made in the chosen options the firm’s attention turns to 
nurturing those options by increasing their value or reducing their inherent uncertainty.  
This is stage two of my model.  Feedback from the practitioner review suggested the 
first step in this stage should be to define the critical path for each option, integrating 
the perspectives of all functions of the business. (e.g. finance, manufacturing, 
regulatory, clinical development, business development etc.)   Drop dead experiments or 
actions need to be determined for each step on the critical path.  Care should be taken to 
double check that a crucial experiment  or action falls at every fork in the option tree as 
the company must eventually exercise some options and terminate others as it moves 
towards its optimal interaction with its value chain. 
 
Drop dead or crucial experiments or actions are the equivalents of Platt’s testing of  
alternative hypotheses.  The key to this process is that following the drop dead or crucial 
activity the company undertakes it should be in the position to make go/no-go decisions 
on further investments.  The challenge being to structure these activities for the greatest 
reduction in risk at the lowest cost as advocated by McGrath, (2009). 
 
As the firm maps out the critical path and the drop dead or crucial activities at each 
juncture it should clearly define go/no-go criteria.  These should consider cost, time and 
competition for resources.  Such criteria will greatly facilitate the termination of options 
– an activity that the practitioners generally thought was poorly done in practice. 
 
The practitioner critique suggested that commercial proof of concept is an important 
element that needs to be built into the critical path for each commercialisation option.   
This means a firm needs to be very sure that the customer for their product offering is 
really going to be prepared to meet the firm’s price expectation.  The customer can vary 
greatly from one commercialisation project to another.  A firm commercialising in the 
market for ideas will be selling, licensing or partnering their  product to another 
company.  In this instance the other company is the customer.  Commercial proof of 
concept includes gaining assurance that other companies will be interested in buying or 
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licensing the project under acceptable terms.  If a firm is commercialising a project in 
the product market its customers may be either patients that will pay for the product 
directly or the customers may be pharmaceutical reimbursement agencies.  Each will 
have its own criteria for making buy/reimbursement decisions and commercial proof of 
concept involves achieving a reasonable level of assurance that financial returns from 
the project will exceed development costs. 
8.3 The final model – a guide to helping biotech firms do 
strategy better 
 
Taking into account the feedback and advice from the practitioner interviews I am 
pleased to present the final version of the Commercialisation Options Model. 
Stage one 
 
Stage one of the Commercialisation Options Model involves identifying all options 
available to a firm in commercialising an innovation.  A framework is provided in the 
following tables to guide biotech entrepreneurs in considering their options in the 
following six strategic commercialisation parameters. 
- ‘what’ to commercialise? 
- ‘when’ to plug into the value chain? 
- ‘how’ to transact with the value chain? 
- ‘with whom’ to transact? 
- ‘who’ are desired as shareholders? 
- ‘where’ will the company operate?  
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Trade‐offs
Advantages Trade‐offs Disadvantages
Market opportunity 
may be signficantly 
larger
Pursue chronic indication Clinical trials take longer and cost more
vs
Clinical trials are 
quicker and cost less
Pursuing acute indication Market opportunity often smaller
Less risk
Indications with well defined biomarkers 
or easily measured end‐points
Low‐hanging fruit attracts more 
competition
vs
High risk (and often 
costly)
Difficult to model indications
Lucrative markets with less 
competition
Regulatory burden may 
be lower and period of 
protection after launch
Orphan drug Market is smaller
vs
High regulatory burden 
& highly competitive
Mass market Large market
Well accepted by 
market
Route of administration                      
For example oral
Formulation costs may be high
vs
May be quicker and 
easier to develop
IV Less desirable from market perspective
Faster development 
track with lower 
regulatory hurdles
Known chemical entity
Higher exposure to generic 
competition
vs
Longer and more 
expensive 
development path
New chemical entity Strong patent protection
Can be faster and 
cheaper to market
Over‐the‐counter medicine Limits marketing claims
vs
Slower and more 
expensive path to 
market
Prescription medicine Strong marketing claims
Higher chance of 
success
Indications with historically higher success 
rates
Market size (prize) is often smaller
vs
Lower chance of 
success
Lower success rates Market size (prize) is often higher
Lower development 
costs
Small molecule Generic imitation more likely
vs
Higher development 
costs
Large molecule (biological) Lower risk of generic imitation
Patients may be able to 
afford
A product for developed markets
More difficult to get grants to support 
development costs
vs
May be able to access 
grants
Product for emerging or NGO market
Patients may not be able to afford 
product, reliance on NGO funders
Other elements to consider
•
•
•
How long is your remaining patent life?  If it is short, consider acute indications because clinical trials development time is shorter.
Can you meet an unmet clinical need? Regulatory barriers may be lower and product pricing higher.
Can you choose an indication where there are fewer horses in the race?  Or where you can get some form of market exclusivity?
 'What' to commercialise (plug in)
 
Figure 8-1 Identifying ‘what’ options 
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Constraining Factors Enabling
Preferred options Preferred options
FIPCO 
weak
Robustness of IP 
protection strong
Any
RIPCO (because the 
firm is less likely to raise 
the funds  or bet the 
company) high
Level of scientific risk
low
Any
License or partner 
earlier
chronic
Acute vs chronic 
indication (assume 
acute = shorter lower cost 
trials, chronic = longer 
higher cost trials) acute
Any
FIPCO end of scale
high
Amount of tacit 
knowledge involved 
in partnering low
Any
RIPCO
no
Complementary 
assets  exist in‐
house, or can be 
contracted yes
Any
FIPCO
no
Complementary 
assets exist in the 
sector yes
Any
License or sell 
before product 
launch large
No. of physicians the 
product has to be 
marketed to  small
Any
FIPCO
no
A distribution 
channel to the target 
market already exists
yes
Any
no
Novel research 
methodology or tools
yes
Fee  for service  or 
integrate  vertica l ly by 
developing proprietary 
molecules  and 
plugging into the  va lue  
cha in at any point
Look at the enabling and constraining factors that may help you determine the possible 
options the company has at each stage of product development
 'When' options
 
Figure 8-2 Identifying ‘when’ options 
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 'How' options
Sale of IP
Sale of product
Sale of company
Initial public offering
Out‐licensing
JV arrangements
Rental
Hybrid transactions
 
Figure 8-3 Identifying ‘how’ options 
 
 'With whom' options
Advantage Disadvantage
Pay larger 
money
Big Pharma
Take a long time in 
negotiations 
Prefer late stage 
opportunities
Take more 
risks
Mid‐size pharma or big 
biotech
Pay smaller 
money
 
Figure 8-4 Identifying ‘with whom’ options 
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 'Who' options
Advantages Trade‐offs Disadvantages
May have more money 
to put at risk
Older shareholders
May be looking for an 
earlier return to enjoy 
during their retirement
vs
May be more tolerant 
of plugging in later in 
the development 
process
Younger shareholders
Often have less money 
to invest
May have fewer 
requirements of 
management
Angel shareholders
Generally invest lower 
amounts
vs
Can bring management 
expertise and 
connections
Venture capitalists
May exert controls over 
management and can 
have time constraints 
that dictate 'what', 
'when' and 'how' 
choices
 
Figure 8-5 Identifying ‘who’ options 
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 'Where' options
Advantages Trade‐offs Disadvantages
Convenience, local 
network
Home‐town
Possibly poor access to 
capital & other 
resources
vs
Access to critical 
resources incl. capital 
and talent
Biotech hub
Founders may have to 
up‐root lives to move
Low cash burn, 
flexibility
Virtual
Loss of control as 
critical functions are 
outsourced
vs
Critical functions can be 
managed intensively in‐
house
Bricks & mortar
Higher cash burn and 
less flexibility
Low cost
Development in low cost geography e.g. 
China
Can be difficult to 
maintain high quality 
standards
vs
Outsourced work is 
done to high regulatory 
standard
Higher cost geography e.g. USA High cost
Proof of concept is 
gained faster and at 
lower cost
Less regulated geography
Development work 
done to less stringent 
regulatory standards 
will not be accepted in 
developed countires
vs
Enterprise value is 
higher as development 
will be acceptable in all 
markets
Highly regulated geography
Development costs are 
very high
 
Figure 8-6 Identifying ‘where’ options 
Stage one B – evaluating options  
 
What is important at this stage of the model is that a firm develops a systematic 
approach to evaluating their options.  They may choose to adopt a rigorous quantitative 
financial model as described in chapter six as part of the prototype Commercialisation 
Options Model, or  a more qualitative evaluation approach as suggested earlier in this 
chapter, or perhaps a combination of the two.  Examples of a quantitative and 
qualitative approaches are shown in figures 8-7 and 8-8 below. 
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Evaluating options – an example
What
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
CABG
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
stroke
When
After phase I
After phase II
After phase III
Launch to market
Etc.
How
Sell Co.
JV
Out license
Consider
COSTS
‐ Amount of finance  
required
‐ Cost of capital
RISKS
‐ IP protection risk
‐ Market risk 
(incl.competition
and obsolescence)
‐ Financial risk (being 
able to raise capital)
‐ Science/technology 
risk
‐ Operational risk
REWARDS
‐ Financial Return
Calculate 
Risk ‐
adjusted 
NPVs
Cost of 
option 
today
 
Figure 8-7 Evaluating options – a quantitative example 
 
 
Rewards
Financial Hi / Med / Lo
Humanitarian (if relevant to company) Hi / Med / Lo
Costs
Near term Hi / Med / Lo
Medium term Hi / Med / Lo
Long term Hi / Med / Lo
Cost of reducing key uncertainties Hi / Med / Lo
Risks
IP protection risk Hi / Med / Lo
Market risk (incl. competition and obsolescence) Hi / Med / Lo
Financial risk (being able to raise capital) Hi / Med / Lo
Science/technology risk Hi / Med / Lo
Operational risk Hi / Med / Lo
Criteria for ranking options
 
Figure 8-8 Evaluating options – a qualitative example 
 
Stage two –amplifying value and reducing uncertainty 
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At the end of stage one B the company selects a portfolio of options and makes the 
necessary investments.  The practitioner interviews helped to clarify that the most 
important dynamic capability in stage two of Commercialisation Options Model is the 
one I have termed ‘critical cross-functional questioning’. 
 
The first step in amplifying value/reducing risk is to map out the critical path for each 
chosen combination of options.  This should be developed to over-lie a decision tree 
showing all options that the firm has invested in or decided to keep open.  The tree 
should also show the ‘drop dead’ experiments or crucial actions that must be undertaken 
at each juncture.  The critical path/experiments should be designed where possible to 
have the lowest cost/greatest risk reducing activities performed as early as possible 
along the path.  Clear go/no-go criteria should be developed for each critical experiment 
or action.  This sets up the decision-making in stage three where options are exercised 
or terminated. 
 
Whilst critical cross-functional questioning is the most important dynamic capability a 
firm can adopt in stage two, other useful dynamic capabilities are listed in the table 8-1 
below.  The last dynamic capability derives from the discussion in the literature review 
on systematically working the elements of an options value.  This dynamic capability 
was not included in the prototype model as an oversight.  I had not observed many 
examples of dynamic capabilities in the case studies and had hoped to uncover more 
useful routines during the practitioner interviews – which I did.  However, as part of my 
inductive research approach, which involved cycling back and forth between my 
empirical research and the literature, I re-discovered this important way to build value in 
options. 
 
Building value and decreasing risk 
Dynamic capabilities What does it look like? 
Examples 
Critical cross functional questioning • Map out critical path with 
contribution from cross functional 
team 
• Design drop-dead experiments for 
each critical point 
• Always make the minimum 
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investment to address the most 
critical information need 
• Challenge internal and external 
constraints 
• Establish commercial proof of 
concept 
Understanding critical path • Mapping the critical path to 
commercialisation taking into 
account cross –functional input 
Establish credibility • Publishing science in reputable 
journals 
• Engaging big pharma as a 
cornerstone investor or strategic 
alliance partner 
• Communicate mission 
• Hold key opinion leader  meetings 
• Build experienced medical team 
Creative problem solving • Sell a development project with an 
option to buy back at more 
advanced stage 
• Out-license rights to non-core 
market to generate cash and data 
Manipulate option value drivers • Increase PV of future cash inflows 
by extending drug indications 
• Decrease PV of future 
expenditures by developing drug in 
lower cost environment e.g. China, 
India 
• Increase upside by building in 
exploratory aspects to clinical trials 
• Push significant expenditures out 
as far as possible 
Table 8-1 Useful dynamic capabilities in building value and decreasing uncertainty 
 
Stage three – exercising or terminating options 
 
In stage three options are either exercised or terminated in accordance with go/no go 
criteria established in stage two.  Establishing these criteria up-front will aid in 
preventing a psychological bias against disengaging from options with inherent sunk 
costs.  Stage three is tactical rather than strategic in nature.  The operational actions and 
their outcomes are shown in table 8-2. 
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Stage three actions and outcomes 
Review of options against go/no go criteria 
 
 
Exercise option by 
making the full 
investment 
 
Plug into the value 
chain with a 
product 
Sell option in the 
market for ideas 
 
 
Plug into the value 
chain with 
intellectual property 
Continue to hold 
option 
Let option lapse or 
actively disengage 
Table 8-2 Stage three actions and outcomes 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model is a process for guiding biotech firms in 
identifying, evaluating and managing strategic options.  My objective is that 
entrepreneurs follow the model more in spirit than by dogged literal application.   
 
I envisage the starting point in generating a commercialisation strategy to be a 
brainstorming session where the various options around ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, ‘who’ 
and ‘with whom’ are considered and perhaps captured on a white board.  More than 
likely a few preferred combinations of options will emerge.  The critical paths, costs and 
anticipated rewards for these option combinations should be modeled in detail.  I 
strongly recommend the company to challenge its assumptions and comfort zones and 
to consider alternative options to those they readily identify with.   
 
When choosing the options that the firm will invest in I recommend that the firm also 
consider the opportunity cost of keeping open other, less preferred options.  If the 
opportunity cost is low, then keeping such options open (and not losing sight of them) 
will allow the company to be more flexible in adapting its commercialisation strategy to 
changes in its internal and external environments during the long commercialisation 
journey.  It is essential that the firm develop the dynamic capabilities described in the 
Commercialisation Options Model for amplifying value and reducing uncertainty in the 
invested options e.g. critical cross functional questioning, understanding the critical path 
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and designing drop-dead experiments.  It is also essential that the company regularly 
reviews its options against go/no go criteria and terminates options that become 
unviable.   
 
By thinking about commercialisation strategy in terms of options the company will 
constantly question its opportunities and decisions and be aware of path dependencies as 
they are created.  I hope that the Commercialisation Options Model will bring a more 
structured approach to commercialisation strategy making in biotech firms and will 
assist companies in doing strategy better. 
8.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided the final version of the Commercialisation Options Model 
incorporating the refinements and extensions acquired in the second phase of research 
with industry professionals.  The model’s content was expanded through the description 
of additional ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘who’ and ‘with whom’ options that firms 
may consider.  The model’s processes were also improved by the veterans’ feedback, 
particularly with regard to evaluating options (stage one B), mapping the critical path as 
part of enhancing value/reducing uncertainty (stage two) and decision making regarding 
the exercise or termination of options (stage three).  
 
I don’t offer this model as the final word.  Rather, it is a tool that can be refined with 
implementation and repetitive use.  Critics offer the opportunity for improvement of the 
model.  Meanwhile the Commercialisation Options Model offers a focused synthesis of 
academic and practitioner knowledge on commercialisation strategy in the biotech 
sector. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarises the key findings of this research project and concludes with 
separate sections discussing the implications for academia and practice, followed by a 
discussion on its limitations and recommendations for further research. 
 
Financial performance in the biotech sector to date has been disappointing with 
accumulated losses of approximately USD 40 billion over the past 30 years (Hamilton, 
2004).  Whilst there are several obvious potential reasons for these losses this thesis has 
assumed that better organisation and commercialisation strategy will improve overall 
returns within the biotech sector.  Commercialisation strategy in the biotech start-up 
involves the decisions a biotech firm makes about how to interact with (plug into) its 
value chain. 
 
Plugging into the value chain is the commercial event that high tech start-ups use to 
generate a return on an innovation.  The ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ of plugging in is the 
crux of commercialisation strategy and the firm’s intentions with this regard are 
articulated in its business model.  These intentions are formed in response to (perceived) 
strategic issues.  The questions addressed in this thesis are: What are the perceived 
strategic issues facing biotech firms?  How do biotech firms do strategy and recognising 
the cumulative losses of the sector to date, how could they do strategy better? 
 
Strategy is the domain of the strategic management discipline which examines the 
development, implementation and content of strategy.  A review of the strategic 
management literature uncovered only a little useful theory on commercialisation 
strategy in the biotech sector.  On the other hand, a wealth of experience and knowledge 
exists dispersed across a body of seasoned industry veterans that is not easily accessed 
by the many first-time CEOs and executive managers in the sector.  Thus there seems to 
be a chasm between academic theory and the needs of practitioners in the biotech 
sector.  A primary goal of this research has been to formalise and generalise practitioner 
knowledge regarding commercialisation strategy and to synthesise it with academic 
knowledge to provide a tool (the Commercialisation Options Model) that may aid 
biotech entrepreneurs in improving their commercialisation strategies. 
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9.1 Literature on commercialisation strategy in the biotech 
sector 
 
There have been few contributions to the strategic management literature focused on 
commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector.  Gans and Stern (2003a, 2003b) have 
mainly considered two strategic issues at the firm level (appropriability of IP and access 
to complementary assets) to explain cooperative versus competitive strategies.  Kasch 
and Dowling (2008) significantly extended Gans and Stern’s work by looking for 
different types of cooperative strategies and at different parts of the value chain, whilst 
Pisano (2006a) has looked at the strategic issues facing the industry as a whole (risk 
management, integration and learning).  Deeds and his various collaborators (1996, 
1997, 1999, 2000) have developed an implicit understanding of some of the issues 
facing biotech companies by examining firm characteristics that are correlated with the 
rate of new product development (number and type of alliances, past performance of 
management and science team).  Deeds taught us that the choice of where to locate a 
new biotech venture is an important aspect of commercialisation strategy. 
 
Gans and Stern assume the market for ideas functions efficiently when the degree of 
appropriability is low.  However, appropriability is not the only issue for the smooth 
functioning of the market for ideas.  Tacitness of knowledge (Pisano, 2006a) and the 
challenges in negotiating and enforcing contracts in the face of uncertainty (Williamson, 
1985) also challenge the efficiency of the market for ideas.  Firms tend to vertically 
integrate when the costs of transacting in the market for ideas exceed those of vertical 
integration (Pisano, 1990).  Furthermore, Gans and Stern assume efficiency of the 
capital markets and that small firms will be able to access capital when transaction costs 
would drive them toward integration.  However, this is often not the case - Kasch and 
Dowling show that lack of financial resource drives firms towards cooperation and 
away from integration.  The works of Deeds et al suggest a belief that the market for 
ideas does not work perfectly but works adequately.  Pisano explicitly discusses an 
inefficiency of the market for ideas and the capital markets. 
 
Whilst Gans and Stern, Kasch and Dowling, Pisano and Deeds have all made important 
contributions to the understanding of strategic issues in the biotech sector only Kasch 
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and Dowling have begun to capture the complexity of commercialisation strategy at the 
firm level, and none have provided a particularly actionable agenda for individual 
biotech entrepreneurs.  The strength of these approaches is that they are relatively 
simple to articulate (less so for Pisano as his industry level review is fairly 
comprehensive) and are somewhat generalisable.  They have tended to concentrate on 
structures and relationships at the industry level, and at the firm level on ‘content’ of 
strategy rather than the ‘process’ of strategy.  A firm grasp of the process will allow the 
bio-entrepreneur to develop strategies in completely unique situations.  The importance 
of strategy process is highlighted in the next section. 
 
9.2 An industry review of strategic issues and business 
models 
 
It seems that the ultimate goal for many biotech companies is still to pursue a traditional 
FIPCO structure controlling the value chain for their product offering.  This seems to 
have become very difficult to do, both for the traditional pharmaceutical companies and 
for entrepreneurial biotech firms, due to the significant costs involved in bringing a 
product through the entire drug development and marketing chain.  Therefore, the basic 
options seem to be to either find a niche in the value chain or control a relatively narrow 
slice of the market.  
 
A review of the historical development of the biotech sector showed that the key 
strategic issues that start-up firms have faced are the need for credibility and capital, 
access to specialised complementary assets and imposing regulatory hurdles.  Biotech 
firms need to develop strategies and business models that give them the best chance of 
success within this context.  But how do they do this?  Which biotech business models 
work best?  There are no easy answers or good data to demonstrate which models work 
best in a given set of circumstances.  The knowledge and data is simply not available 
because the biotechnology sector is too early in its life cycle to observe stable patterns 
of performance (Pisano, 2006a).  Even amongst the early successful biotech firms there 
have been significant differences in strategies – Amgen commercialised a few 
blockbuster drugs, Genentech focused on smaller markets (e.g. specific cancer 
therapeutics) and Genzyme focused on drugs for very rare diseases (Pisano, 2006a).   
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The critical commercialisation decisions revealed by the industry level analysis are 
‘when’ and ‘how’ to plug into the value chain.  In order to best understand 
commercialisation strategy at the firm level it was necessary to undertake research 
within individual biotechnology companies.   
9.3 Strategic issues at the firm level 
 
Case studies of three New Zealand biotech firms confirmed ‘when’ and ‘how’ as critical 
commercialisation decisions but also revealed ‘what’ as a critical strategic choice.  An 
inductive approach was taken to analysing the case data collected in this first phase of 
research.  Capital constraint, access to complementary assets, regulatory hurdles and a 
need for credibility were consistent themes that emerged as key strategic drivers behind 
the business models of the firms.  These strategic issues had significant bearing on 
‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ the firms intended to interact with the value chains for their 
innovations.  All firms had options around ‘what’ to commercialise but to a lesser extent 
‘when’ or ‘how’ options as strategic issues constrained their options. 
9.4 How biotech firms do strategy 
 
Biotech firms generally follow typical business models such as RIPCO (research 
intensive/royalty income pharmaceutical company), FIDDO (fully integrated drug 
discovery) or NRDO (no research development only) or FIPCO (fully integrated 
pharmaceutical company as described in chapter two.  Out-licensing before or during 
clinical development is common. 
 
Biotech firms often pursue ad hoc opportunities rather than strategic directions.  They 
sometimes have a blinkered approach to strategy and decision making and do not 
consider or fully evaluate all their options. 
 
There are some individuals in the biotech sector with valuable knowledge and industry 
experience, but there are also a lot of CEOs and boards ‘feeling’ their way with regard 
to commercialisation strategy.  This can lead to a lot of chopping and changing of 
priorities and directions. 
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As analysis of the case study data progressed and themes emerged I returned to the 
strategic management literature many times to look for theories and frameworks that 
would help make sense of my findings.  Real options reasoning and dynamic 
capabilities emerged as frameworks that would be useful in proposing a model to help 
biotech firms improve the way in which they approach commercialisation strategy.   
 
Not surprisingly none of the companies consciously employed a real options reasoning 
approach to strategy.  However, to varying degrees, they had adopted processes that 
would help support an ROR strategy framework.  Although value enhancement and 
reduction of uncertainty is inherent in the process of drug development, I did not 
observe any strong consistent processes to support this aspect of an ROR framework.  I 
suspect this is due in part to my research design and focus, and in part because such 
processes were not well developed in the firms. 
9.5 How biotech firms could do strategy better 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model was developed in a two stage process.  First, a 
prototype model was developed after the historical review of the development of the 
biotech sector, together with three case studies, identified ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ as 
the critical strategic choices a firm had to make in developing a commercialisation 
strategy.  The model was then validated through a review process with five highly 
experienced industry veterans who helped refine and extend the model.  ‘Where’, ‘who’ 
and ‘with whom’ were identified as further strategic choices that may need to be 
considered during the development of a commercialisation strategy.   
 
The Commercialisation Options Model is based on a real options reasoning framework 
that uses a three stage process to identify/evaluate options to invest in, amplify the value 
of invested options and then exercise or terminate options.  Stage One A of the model 
involves identifying all possible ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘how’, ‘where’, ‘who’ and ‘with 
whom’ options that the firm (or project) may have available to it.  Tables are provided 
to help guide firms in identifying options and considering either, the advantages and 
disadvantages of each, or recognition of the enabling or constraining factors that would 
recommend certain business models over others. 
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Stage One B of the model involves evaluating all the options and deciding which 
options to invest in.  An example each of a qualitative and a quantitative evaluation 
method is provided. 
 
Stage Two describes various dynamic capabilities that a firm may develop in order to 
facilitate the building of value and reduction of risk in the invested options.  Such 
dynamic capabilities include critical cross-functional questioning (e.g. through drop-
dead experiments or establishing commercial proof of concept), understanding the 
critical path or manipulating option value drivers. 
 
The third stage of the Commercialisation Options Model involves exercising or 
terminating options in accordance with pre-established go / no go criteria.  Stage three is 
tactical rather than strategic in nature and will lead the company to either exercise the 
option by plugging into the value chain with a product or service, sell the option in the 
market for ideas, let the option lapse or actively disengage by terminating the option. 
 
The Commercialisation Options Model offers a focused synthesis of academic and 
practitioner knowledge on commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector.  It is a tool 
that can be refined with implementation and repetitive use.   
9.6 Implications for academia  
 
A review of the strategic management literature showed that only a small number of 
theorists have commented on commercialisation strategy in the biotech sector (e.g. Gans 
and Stern, 2003a; Kasch and Dowling, 2008; Pisano, 2006a; Deeds et al 1996, 1997, 
1999).  Furthermore, none have bridged the gap between academia and practice by 
providing actionable advice for practitioners. 
 
This thesis has, for the first time, provided a detailed review of the strategic issues 
facing small biotech firms through analyses at both the firm and industry levels.  It has 
identified common patterns between sets of strategic issues and common business 
models.  The main output of this thesis has been the proposal of a model, based on real 
options reasoning, that outlines a process that biotech firms could follow and that may 
lead to improved commercialisation strategy.  In proposing this model I have suggested 
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organisational routines, or dynamic capabilities, that biotech firms may benefit from 
adopting. 
 
The structure of the biotech sector is that it is composed of many small firms, most 
remaining in the start-up phase for many years.  A proportion of successful firms may 
sell or license one or two lead candidates and may continue to commercialise a pipeline 
of projects, meaning that they have the opportunity to re-deploy dynamic capabilities 
serially over time.  Of the successful firms another proportion are acquired by large 
pharmaceutical companies meaning that their dynamic capabilities are probably lost.  
To the extent that the founders or managers of this group of companies are serial 
entrepreneurs, they have the opportunity to re-deploy their dynamic capabilities in 
successive ventures. 
 
Although the dynamic capabilities identified in this thesis are applicable at the firm-
level they are for the most part industry-specific rather than firm-specific or product 
specific.  This means that there is an entrepreneurial opportunity of its own to redeploy 
these dynamic capabilities in lots of different settings.  Chandler (2005) observed that 
dynamic capabilities exist at the firm level (in pharmaceutical and chemical companies) 
but my research shows that while they may exist within firms, dynamic capabilities 
could exist at the level of the individual. 
 
9.7 Implications for biotech practitioners 
 
Entrepreneurs in the biotech sector operate in an industry that has provided poor 
aggregate financial returns over the thirty-odd years since its inception and where the 
failure rate for individual companies is very high.  Potential reasons for this poor 
performance were discussed in the introduction to chapter three.  A key assumption 
underlying the work in this thesis is that better business strategy and organisation in the 
sector will lead to better performance.  This assumption is not empirically tested by my 
research, nor is the implicit assumption that utilising the Commercialisation Options 
Model will increase the likelihood of better commercialisation performance outcomes.  
However, my model encourages biotech practitioners to adopt a more considered 
approach to commercialisation strategy and provides a framework that explicitly 
connects strategic issues to the important dimensions of commercialisation strategy. 
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A question that needs to be considered is whether the Commercialisation Options Model 
is a realistic and practical model for biotech practitioners.  The answer is for some yes, 
and probably for some it is not.  It will depend on the experience of the management 
team or their ability to access or afford experienced consultants.  The industry now has a 
fair mixture of seasoned veterans and first time scientists-turned-entrepreneur. 
9.8 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
 
The research reported in this thesis has achieved two key objectives.  The first objective 
uncovered historical and contemporary strategic issues perceived at the industry and 
firm levels, and theorised the relationships between the perceived issues and choices of 
business model.  This was achieved by undertaking a historical review of the 
development of the sector and in-depth case studies of three New Zealand biotech start-
ups.  This New Zealand centric approach obviously begs the question as to how 
generalisable my findings are to the global biotechnology sector? 
 
A limitation of case study methodology is that case studies (like experiments) are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes (Yin, 2009).  
Thus conclusions drawn from this research are not generalisable to contemporary global 
biotech markets without further research.  Such research would involve determining 
whether biotech companies in major hubs perceive the same strategic issues as New 
Zealand biotech companies and whether these issues drive the choice of business 
models in similar ways. 
 
The second objective of this research was to develop a tool to help biotech firms 
improve their development and implementation of commercialisation strategies.  The 
Commercialisation Options Model was developed through a synthesis of academic and 
practitioner knowledge. 
 
Another clear limitation of my work is that the Commercialisation Options Model has 
not been empirically tested to determine if adopting it as the basis for developing and 
implementing commercialisation strategy leads to better performance.  Testing of the 
Commercialisation Options Model in this way has been outside the scope of this 
doctoral research project.  Ideally, it would require a longitudinal study of 
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commercialisation strategy in a large number of companies.  The study may have to 
span up to two decades as the average drug takes 12 – 15 years to commercialise.  
Furthermore, it would need to cover dozens of companies in both the test and control 
groups as the failure rate in biotech commercialisation has so far been high.  I certainly 
expect that these practicalities will prevent the model from ever being fully empirically 
tested.  A less positivist approach to testing the model could involve testing the effect of 
the model on firm behaviour.  Alternatively, a limited test could be undertaken using 
financial outcome as a dependent variable by measuring the valuation of intellectual 
property assets over time as the firm selects, invests and builds value in options related 
to these assets. 
 
A further limitation of this work is that it is only applicable to the biotech sector.  My 
research has been purposefully targeted to this sector for two reasons.  Firstly, as I 
argued in chapter three the biotech sector is unique because it is comprised mainly of 
small start-up companies that operate in a margin between university-based basic 
research and the established pharmaceutical giants.  They face an extraordinarily long, 
expensive and risky product development cycle.  Secondly, in order to narrow the gap 
between academic theory and the needs of biotech practitioners, I have argued that my 
research and recommendations needed to be highly contextual in nature.  I believe this 
is the only way to develop an actionable agenda for biotech practitioners.   
 
An opportunity for further research to extend my work would be to apply McGrath and 
Boisot’s (2005) concept of ‘options complexes’ to commercialisation strategy in the 
biotechnology sector – the use of multiple interaction options that extend the power of 
ROR to cover more complex and uncertain situations.  Another opportunity for further 
research would be the examination of commercialisation strategy in other high 
technology industries, with the application of ROR to propose a parallel model to my 
Commercialisation Options Model.   
 
Finally, a focused study of the dynamic capabilities that support ROR based strategy in 
biotech firms could provide a much needed extension to my model.  During the case 
studies, I collected and analysed a wide range of data as I sought to uncover the key 
drivers behind commercialisation strategies and business models.  Due to the wide net I 
cast and the iterative process of theory generation I employed I was not able to observe 
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how the resource configurations in the case studies had changed over time, nor observe 
in any detail the organisational structure and management practices in which their 
dynamic capabilities reside.  Research with such a focus would likely be informative for 
both management theory academics and biotech practitioners. 
 
Despite the many benefits of a longitudinal case study design, the historical research 
element risks introducing bias through the retrospective recall of interviewees.  Bias 
may occur in interviews relying on retrospective recall whereby interviewees may 
reconstruct the past to make it consistent with subsequent performance results and 
beliefs (Golden, 1992). The approach used in this project has attempted to reduce this 
bias where possible by checking recollections against documents, talking to multiple 
informants, and collecting data over periods of up to 18 months.  Thus triangulation of 
data from multiple sources was used to add validity (Jick, 1979). 
9.9 Final words 
 
This thesis has explored the commercialisation of common biotechnologies as at the 
first decade of this millennium.  These biotechnologies typically revolve around ‘parts’ 
of a biological system, e.g. genes, proteins, antibodies and their corresponding tools, 
techniques and applications.  Systems biology is on the horizon – it integrates all the 
elements of biological systems in ways that cannot yet be understood.  It will take drug 
development to new levels of understanding as well as complexity.  Industry value 
chains will evolve and so will the business models that biotech firms use to generate a 
financial return on their innovation. 
 
With continual refinement the Commercialisation Options Model should find 
application in the sector for decades to come because at its core real options reasoning is 
a philosophical approach that appreciates that there are multiple ways to tackle a 
problem.  It emphasises evaluation and disciplines a process of critical testing to 
determine the most successful path.  The dynamic capability of real options reasoning 
will support the commercialisation strategy of biotechnologies not yet imagined.
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Appendix A – information sheet, consent form 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
On the following pages, you will find: 
 
• Information sheet 1 – used with case study participants 
• Information sheet 2 – used with industry practitioners 
• Consent form 1 – used with case study participants 
• Consent form 2 – used with industry practitioners 
• Research co-operation agreement – signed with the case study companies 
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Massey University 
Doctoral Student: M J Dixon 
92015556 
 
 
DRIVERS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGIES 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Janette Dixon is a part time doctoral student at Massey University, enrolled in 
the Doctor of Business Administration course.  The course requires the student 
to undertake original research with the objective of submitting a doctoral thesis 
for examination.  Janette has chosen the strategic management of the 
commercialization process for intellectual property as her field of study, drawing 
on examples from the biotechnology industry.  Her objective in this case study is 
to abstract strategic elements and contextual drivers from the case’s business 
model in order to compare and contrast them to a) the strategic management 
literature and b) other case studies from the biotech sector. 
 
Disclosure:  Janette is Dixon is employed by Pacific Pharmaceuticals Ltd, a 
subsidiary of the Merck Generics Group (Merck KGaA, Darmstadt) in the role 
of General Manager. 
 
2.0 Contact details 
 
Researcher:  Janette Dixon (Ph 021 536-355) 
Supervisor:  Professor Ralph Stablein, (Ph 06 350-5799 extn 2795) 
         Department of Management, Massey University, Palmerston North 
 
3.0 Nature and duration of participant involvement 
 
The participant is invited to engage in the research project as an interviewee, 
providing information regarding the commercialization strategy(s) in his/her 
organization.  Participation will initially involve a series of several 1-2 hour 
interviews spread over four to eight weeks.  However, with the participant’s 
agreement the engagement may extend over one to two years with periodic 
interviews that would allow the researcher to follow the evolution of the 
organization’s commercialization strategy over time.  With permission, all 
interviews will be tape recorded, and later transcribed by the interviewer or 
nominee (under confidentiality agreement). 
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4.0 Selection process 
 
Case study companies are drawn from the New Zealand biotechnology set, 
comprising companies in engaged in principally human therapeutic and 
diagnostic commercialization objectives. 
 
5.0 How the information will be used, and on completion of the project 
 
Information obtained in the interview will be analysed for content and meaning 
and compared to existing theories relating to strategic management and 
commercialization.  Ultimately the information collected may be used to 
substantiate findings or proposed theory in the researcher’s doctoral thesis.  
References to the participant or his/her organization may be disguised in the 
final thesis at the participant’s request.  The finished thesis will be reviewed by 
Janette’s supervisor(s) and examiners.  An embargo may be placed on the 
finished thesis to delay its addition to the Massey University library.  Raw data 
collected during the case study process will be kept confidentially by Janette 
following completion of the thesis, and will not be used subsequently without 
permission of the participant.  Tapes and transcripts will be returned to the 
interviewee on completion of the thesis at the interviewee’s request. 
 
6.0 Confidentiality 
 
Information provided will be confidential to the research project undertaken.   
A formal non-disclosure agreement will be entered into by the researcher with 
the participant and his/her organization, recognizing that commercially sensitive 
information will need to be shared.  All care will be taken to ensure the 
anonymity of the participant if permission has not been obtained to use his/her 
name. 
 
7.0 Interviewee’s rights 
 
You have the right to: 
• Decline to participate 
• Decline to answer any question 
• Withdraw from the study prior to, or during the interview or any 
subsequent stage of the case study 
• Ask any questions about the study at any time during participation  
• Provide information on the understanding that your name will not be 
used unless you give express permission 
• Be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is 
concluded 
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Massey University 
Doctoral Student: M J Dixon 
92015556 
 
 
DRIVERS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGIES 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
Janette Dixon is a part time doctoral student at Massey University, enrolled in 
the Doctor of Business Administration course.  The course requires the student 
to undertake original research with the objective of submitting a doctoral thesis 
for examination.  Janette has chosen the strategic management of the 
commercialization process for innovation in the biotech sector (predominantly 
therapeutics).  Her objective in this interview is to seek feedback and 
constructive criticism on a model that could assist biotech entrepreneurs in 
developing commercialization strategies for their innovations. 
 
Disclosure:  Janette Dixon holds general management and business development 
roles in several pre-clinical and clinical stage drug development companies. 
 
9.0 Contact details 
 
Researcher:  Janette Dixon (Ph +65 9827 6436) 
Supervisor:  Professor Ralph Stablein, (Ph +64 6 350-5799 extn 2795) 
         Department of Management, Massey University, Palmerston North 
 
10.0 Nature and duration of participant involvement 
 
You are invited to engage in the research project as an interviewee, providing 
feedback on a presentation to be given by Janette and in response to specific 
questions.  Participation will involve a single interview, taking one to two hours. 
With your permission, the interview will be recorded, and later transcribed by 
Janette or her assistant (under confidentiality agreement). 
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11.0 Selection process 
 
Your participation in this research project has been sought due to your standing 
in the sector as an experienced entrepreneur, manager and/or investor. 
 
12.0 How the information will be used, and on completion of the project 
 
Information obtained in the interview will be analysed for content and meaning 
and compared to existing theories relating to strategic management and 
commercialization.  The information collected will be used to either substantiate 
the proposed theory in Janette’s model or to refine and improve it.  References 
to the participant may be disguised in the final thesis upon request.  The finished 
thesis will be reviewed by Janette’s supervisor(s) and examiners, and ultimately 
the thesis will be made available in the Massey University Library.  Raw data 
collected during interview will be kept confidentially by Janette following 
completion of the thesis, and will not be used subsequently without permission 
of the participant.  Recordings and transcripts will be returned to the interviewee 
on completion of the thesis at the interviewee’s request. 
 
13.0 Confidentiality 
 
Information provided will be confidential to the research project undertaken.   
All care will be taken to ensure the anonymity of the participant if permission 
has not been obtained to use his/her name. 
 
14.0 Interviewee’s rights 
 
You have the right to: 
• Decline to participate 
• Decline to answer any question 
• Withdraw from the study prior to, or during the interview or at any 
subsequent stage of the case study 
• Ask any questions about the study at any time during participation  
• Provide information on the understanding that your name will not be 
used unless you give express permission 
• Be given access to a summary of the project findings when it is 
concluded 
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Massey University  
Doctoral Student: M J Dixon 
92015556 
 
CASE STUDY – COMMERCIALISATION STRATEGIES  
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
THIS CONSENT FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE (5) YEARS 
 
 
I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the study explained to me.  
My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask 
further questions at any time. 
 
I agree to the interview being audio taped and understand that I may ask for the tapes to 
be returned to me at any time. 
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Full name printed: 
 
Date: 
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Massey University  
Doctoral Student: M J Dixon 
92015556 
 
 
 
 
COMMERCIALISATION OPTIONS MODEL – FEEDBACK INTERVIEW  
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
THIS CONSENT FORM WILL BE HELD FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE (5) YEARS 
 
 
I have read the Information Sheet and have had the details of the interview explained to 
me.  My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may 
ask further questions at any time. 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded and understand that I may ask for the recording 
to be returned to me at any time. 
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Signature: 
 
Full name printed: 
 
Date: 
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RESEARCH CO-OPERATION AGREEMENT 
 
Drivers of Commercialization Strategy in Biotechnology Firms 
 
 
1. Background 
 
 1.1 Janette Dixon, of Maungatapere, Whangarei is a part-time doctoral student 
in Massey’s University’s DBA program.  She is undertaking case study 
research regarding the drivers of commercialization strategy in 
biotechnology firms as a part of her doctoral thesis. 
 
 1.2 Living Cell Technologies Limited (“LCT”) a for-profit organization located 
in Otahuhu, Auckland, New Zealand as a biotechnology company operating 
in New Zealand, has agreed to participate in the Research Programme. 
 
2. Undertaking the Research 
 
 2.1 LCT will participate in the Research Programme, initially for one year from 
August 2005, and thereafter by further agreement. 
 
 2.2 Contact with LCT will be through the Managing Director (Dr Paul Tan). 
 
 2.2 Contact with Janette Dixon will be with herself directly, or her supervisor, 
Professor Ralph Stablein at Massey University.  
 
 2.3 Research data will be collected through face-to-face interviews with 
company personnel and members of LCT’s Board of Directors, to be 
conducted at mutually agreeable times.  Interviews will be transcribed by a 
contract typist after a confidentiality agreement has been signed.  Access 
may also be granted to company documents. 
 
 2.4. Raw data will be stored securely in locked cupboards (or similar 
arrangement) under the control of Janette Dixon.   
 
 2.3 LCT’s Managing Director will receive copies of interviews after 
transcription, and may remove any information from the programme at that 
time. 
 
 2.4 Material collected for the programme is intended to illustrate how 
commercialization strategy is developed in a biotechnology firm. 
 
3. Intellectual Property  
 
 3.1 All intellectual property owned by either party before the start of the 
programme remains the property of that party. 
 
 3.2 All other new intellectual property developed during the course of the 
programme remains the property of the party or parties by whom it is 
developed.  (For the avoidance of doubt, transcripts will be jointly owned by 
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the researchers’ respective organisation and LCT.  Copies may be retained 
by each party.) 
 
4. Confidentiality 
 
 4.1 In this Agreement, “Confidential Information” shall include any information 
(whether communicated orally or visually) and regardless of the manner in 
which it is recorded relating to: 
 
  4.1.1 The science, business, affairs, financial or commercial 
arrangements of either party, and in particular related to 
patentable intellectual property and commercial arrangements, 
and 
 
  4.1.2 Research proposals, contracts, funding applications, research 
grants or arrangements of either party;  
 
  Other than information which: 
 
  4.1.3 At the time of disclosure was in the public domain or which 
subsequently enters the public domain without fault on the part of 
the receiving party; or 
 
  4.1.4 At any time is received in good faith by the receiving party from 
a third party lawfully in possession of the information and having 
the right to disclose the same; or 
 
  4.1.5 The receiving party can establish by reasonable proof was in the 
receiving party’s possession or known to the receiving party or 
developed by the receiving party without knowledge of or 
reference to the information; or 
 
  4.1.6 The parties agree in writing to release from the terms of this   
                                    Agreement. 
 
4.2    Both parties agree that Confidential Information as defined in 4.1.1 and 4.1.2    
   above will not be disclosed to any third party and that such information will    
   only be used for the purpose of the Programme. 
 
  
5. Publication 
 
 5.4 Janette Dixon agrees to apply for an embargo on the release of her 
completed thesis at the request of LCT.  LCT acknowledges that the duration 
of any embargo is at the discretion of Massey University.  
 
 5.5 LCT will receive a copy of all publications arising from this agreement 
(including journal articles, conference presentations, media releases or any 
other publication intended for the public domain) for review prior to 
submission for publication.  LCT will respond to Janette Dixon within 30 
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days of receipt, to advise whether or not the publication may be released in 
its current version. 
 
 5.6 If LCT does not wish to release the publication, the parties shall endeavour 
to negotiate an acceptable version within a further 60 days.  To preserve the 
integrity of the research, LCT may only require the removal of any specific 
Confidential Information obtained from LCT or the amendment of general 
material which directly or indirectly identifies LCT which if requested for 
confidentiality reasons as defined in section 4 above will be complied 
however this can not unreasonably be with held.  
 
 5.7 LCT’s support will be acknowledged in all publications, unless LCT 
specifically requests otherwise.   
 
6 Contact Points 
  
 6.1 The contact details for each of the parties are as follows:  
 
Research Contacts: 
 
Janette Dixon 
PO Box 33 
Maungatapere 
Whangarei 
Ph 021 536-355 
Janette.D@xtra.co.nz 
 
Professor Ralph Stablein 
Massey University 
Palmerston North 
R.Stablein@massey.ac.nz 
 
LCT 
Dr Paul Tan 
PO Box 23 566 
Papatoetoe 
Fax:  09 276-2691 
Phone: 09 276-2690  
 
Addresses for Notices: 
  
Janette Dixon 
76 Leonard Rd 
Penrose 
Auckland 
Ph: 021 536-333 
 
The Managing Director 
Living Cell Technologies Ltd 
16 Laureston Rd 
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Otahuhu 
Auckland 
Fax:  09 276-2691 
Phone: 09 276-2690  
 
7. Terminating this Agreement 
 
7.1 Prior to 1 September 2005, this agreement may be terminated by mutual 
agreement; by either party giving three months notice to the other; or with 21 
days notice upon breach by either party providing that the breach has not 
been remedied within that 21-day period. 
 
7.2 Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 will survive termination of this agreement. 
 
 
8. Dispute Resolution 
 
8.1 In the first instance, the parties will attempt to resolve any disputes through 
discussion.  Failing that, disputes will be referred to mediation. 
 
9. Disclosure 
 
9.1 Janette Dixon discloses that she is employed by Pacific Pharmaceuticals Ltd 
in the role of General Manager, and that her employer has no interest in her 
research. 
 
 
Agreed for on behalf of 
 
JANETTE DIXON: 
 
         
Signature 
Janette Dixon 
 
 
 
MASSEY UNIVERSITY: 
 
         
Signature 
Ralph Stablein 
 
 
LIVING CELL TECHNOLOGIES LTD:      
 
           
Signature      
Dr Paul Tan  
Managing Director – Living Cell Technologies Ltd      
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Appendix B – interview questionnaire 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
General 
 
• Can you please give me a 10 minute introduction to your company – what the 
company is about, its structure, history, products etc.? 
 
• Can you give me your definition of commercialization strategy? 
 
• Can you please give me an overview of your business model? 
 
• How do you view the industry that you are competing in? 
 
• What do you see as your organization’s unique competitive advantage? 
 
• What do you think your chances of successful commercialization are? 
 
• Why might you fail? 
 
• What documents or knowledge is associated with commercialization strategy? 
 
• What was the process, or what were the activities involved in developing your 
commercialization strategy? 
 
• What kind of events were involved, e.g. strategy meetings? 
 
• Who has been involved in developing this strategy? (look for governance) 
 
• What factors influenced your initial decision of ‘what’ to innovate? 
 
• Do you recall at what point in your firm’s life commercialization strategy (or the 
business model) was first considered? 
 
• Do you recall what your strategy looked like at that time? 
 
• Has this strategy changed at all over time?  How?  Why? 
 
• How much did you know about business strategy when you got into this 
venture?  How much do you think you know about business strategy now? 
 
• What factors external to your organization have played a role in your 
commercialization strategy?  What internal factors?  Why?  What is the relative 
weight of each factor’s influence? 
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Q’s around Porter’s approach 
 
• Can you tell me about your four most important competitors? 
 
• Can you rank them as threats? 
 
• Do you expect any new entrants?   Who? 
 
• Who are your suppliers?  What do they supply? 
 
• How have they influenced your business model / commercialization strategy? 
 
• Can you please describe your customer? 
 
• Who else is competing for that customer? 
 
• Are you trying to replace already established products? 
 
• If so, what advantages would your product provide? 
 
• Do you see substitution of another company’s products for yours as a threat?  
How? 
 
• Do you compete with other companies other than for customers?  i.e. for 
resources (employees, suppliers, money)?   
 
• How has this competition influenced your commercialization strategy or 
business model? 
 
Q’s around RBV’s approach 
 
• Can you please outline your firm’s capital structure? 
 
• Have financial constraints influenced your business model?  How?  What 
haven’t you been able to do? 
 
• Have you experienced other resource constraints? 
 
• How have these other resource constraints influenced your business model? 
 
• Have any resource constraints affected your estimates of commercial viability?  
Which constraints and why? 
 
Q’s around other constructs 
 
• How important is the speed with which you get your innovation to market?   
 
• What are the implications of being too fast?  Too slow? 
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• How have these factors shaped your commercialization strategy? 
 
• Please describe how and to what extent you are able to protect your firm’s 
intellectual property from appropriation?   
 
• What is more important – securing IP protection or time to market?  Do they 
depend on each other? 
 
• How have these two issues shaped your commercialization strategy? 
 
• At what stage of the innovation process have you chosen to generate revenues?   
 
• Why have you chosen this stage over others? 
 
• Are there any past decisions that have shaped your commercialization options? 
 
• Are there past events that you have had little control over that have shaped your 
commercialization options? 
 
More general Q’s 
 
• What options have been available to you as alternative routes for 
commercialization? 
 
• How did you decide between these alternatives? 
 
• Have there been any attempts to maximize returns?  How? 
 
• How do you measure how you are doing with regard to your commercialization 
strategy?  What variables to you look at? 
 
• Can you tell me about the composition of your board of directors?  What is each 
director’s skill base and why is he/she there? 
 
• What skills are missing from your board of directors?  Management team? 
 
• Can you describe the relationship between the board of directors and the 
management of your firm? 
 
• What input or influence has the board of directors had over your 
commercialization strategy / business model? 
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Appendix C – practitioner C.V.s 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
On the following pages, you will find brief C.V.s of the practitioners who took part in 
the second phase of field research: 
• Dr John Holaday 
• Dr Jesus Soriano 
• Dr Mike Hirshorn 
• Dr Robert Teoh 
• Mr Katsumi Maruyama 
 220
Curriculum Vitae of Dr John Holaday 
 
Dr. John Holaday is the Managing Director and CEO; founding Director of QRxPharma 
(QRX, ASX), a specialty pharmaceutical company headquartered in Sydney, Australia.  
He served as co-founder of HarVest Bank of Maryland, EntreMed, Inc. (ENMD, 
NASDAQ) in 1992, Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. (MRX, NYSE) in 1988. He also 
founded MaxCyte, Inc. and is a member of the Board of Directors of Qbit, CytImmune 
Sciences, Accelovance and Exosome Diagnostics. He has raised over $400MM in 
private and public rounds of financing for these companies that have a collective market 
capitalization in excess of $1.5 billion.  Dr. Holaday served as a Captain in the US 
Army, and was at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research as an officer and civilian 
for 21 years. Dr. Holaday obtained his BS (1966) and MS (1968) from the University of 
Alabama (UofA), and his PhD from the University of California, San Francisco in 1976. 
He was Professor of Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine at the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Medicine (until 1996) and is Professor of Psychiatry at the 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. He is former Chair of the 
BioAlliance of the Tech Council of Maryland, and serves on the Board of that 
organization and the MdBio Foundation.  Dr. Holaday serves on the Leadership Board 
for the College of Arts and Sciences, UofA, the Leadership Board of the University of 
Maryland Biotechnology Institute, and the Judges Panel for the Ernst and Young 
Entrepreneur of the Year (2003-2007). He serves on the Advisory Board of Harbert 
Investments and is a partner in Hudson Brightwaters.  Dr. Holaday was awarded the 
Algernon Sydney Sullivan Award by the University of Alabama (2008), and was named 
to the Ernst&Young’s Entrepreneur of the Year 2006 Hall of Fame.  Dr. Holaday holds 
over 65 patents and published over 230 scientific articles, book chapters and four books. 
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Curriculum Vitae of Dr Jesus Soriano 
 
Dr. Soriano is the Executive Vice President of QRxPharma, Inc., and a board member 
of BioAuthentic, Inc.  Previous board memberships included BioDominion (subsidiary 
of International Bioresources Group), BioPharmance, Inc. (Scientific Advisory Board), 
International Bioresouces Group (Chair, Institutional Review Board) and Woodley Park 
Community Area (Treasurer; Chair, Finance Committee).   
 
A results-oriented Business Development Executive with over 18 years of experience in 
healthcare management, clinical research, licensing, and distribution, including 
negotiating and executing deals valued at more than $1 Billion, and due diligence or 
partnerships valued over $2.3 Billion for Phase II, III and post-approval drugs.  
 
Dr. Soriano qualified as a Medical Doctor with the University of Alacant Medical 
School, has a Ph.D. in Medical Sciences from the University of Geneva Medical School 
and has an MBA in Corporate Finance from John Hopkins University Carey Business 
School.  He won the Best Thesis Award, Geneva University Medical School in 1997. 
 
His professional affiliations include the American Society of Microbiology, Licensing 
Executive Society, Association of University Technology Managers, External RNA 
Consortium, American Society of Cell Biology, American Society of Matrix Biology, 
Society for Development Biology, European Association for the Promotion of Science 
and Technology, Academic Society of Geneva, Fondation du Present. 
 
 
 
 
 222
Curriculum Vitae of Dr Mike Hirshorn 
 
Dr. Mike Hirshorn has a 30 year career founding, building, managing and investing in 
technology companies.  These include Cochlear in which he was a founder and CEO 
and Resmed in which he was a founding Director.  These two companies have a 
combined market cap over $4 billion.  Mike is a leader in the Australian life science 
industry. 
 
Mike has significant international management expertise in all operational areas from 
manufacturing to research and development, intellectual property, worldwide marketing 
and sales, regulatory affairs, government relations, business development and 
developing strategic alliances with major multinationals. 
 
Mike has over eight years of private equity experience.  As a private equity investor, he 
has raised a fund, invested in companies, played a hands-on role in their growth and 
achieved exits and IPOs.  Mike has been a director on the board of many companies 
including six portfolio companies.  His current directorships include Dynamic Hearing 
and TGR BioSciences. 
 
In 1988 he won BRW Businessman of the Year (Technology) for establishing Cochlear 
in the US Europe and Japan and in 2004 Mike was awarded an Order of Australia 
Medal for his work in commercialising medical technology. 
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Curriculum Vitae of Dr Robert Teoh 
 
Robert Teoh, MBBS MD FRCP, has 20 years experience in the bio-pharmaceutical and 
CRO industries in Asia, Switzerland & the USA.   He was founder & managing director 
of two pan-Asian contract research organizations: ProPharma, and Pacific Pharma 
Partners which he sold profitably and as growing concerns to PPD (NASDAQ: PPDI) 
and i3, a unit of United Health (NYSE: UNH), respectively.    His earlier industry 
experience involved the start-up and establishment of the Quintiles operation in East 
Asia, and positions in Sandoz Pharmaceuticals (now Novartis) in Hong Kong & 
Switzerland, and Tanox Inc in the USA.  Robert sat on the boards of CombinatoRx 
Singapore (a joint venture between CombinatoRx Inc & Bio-1 Capital, an investment 
arm of the Singapore government); the Institute of Molecular & Cell Biology, (the 
premier biomedical research institute in Singapore); and on advisory committees of the 
Economic Development, and National Science & Technology Boards in Singapore.    
Robert qualified in medicine (1971) from the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
England and trained in neurology in London at the National Hospital for Nervous 
Diseases; Royal Postgraduate Medical School, Hammersmith Hospital; and Guys 
Hospital.  Following a UK Medical Research Council fellowship, he held faculty 
positions at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong.  He has published over 55 papers in peer reviewed journals and contributed three 
chapters in books.  
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Curriculum Vitae of Mr Katsumi Maruyama 
 
 
Katsumi Maruyama is a founding director of V2V Pty Ltd headquartered in 
Melbourne. V2V is a boutique corporate advisory firm specializing in corporate & 
business development between Australia and Japan in the field of life-science and 
healthcare. V2V has completed over 20 business deals since 2001 and has also led its 
clients to achieve clear commercial milestones across many projects.   Katsumi has 
approx. 20 years experiences in the facilitation of business between Japan and 
Australia.  Prior to founding V2V, he was the founding CEO of an agro-startup 
company and has worked as a senior manager at KPMG gaining significant corporate 
advisory experience.  Katsumi has also worked for an international trading house and 
government investment advisory commission.  
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Appendix D – briefing document - background to my 
research 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
Background to participating in Janette’s research… and a few questions! 
 
Thank you for agreeing to help me with my doctoral research project.  This document 
will provide you with some background to the objectives of my research and some of 
the concepts I have employed in developing a model that biotech firms may use to 
improve their commercialization strategies.  Through discussions with practitioners in 
the biotech sector, I am looking to test and refine the model I have developed.  I have 
included specific questions that I’d appreciate your feedback on, but please feel free to 
comment on any aspect of this document. 
 
The biotech sector has accumulated losses of greater than USD40 billion over the past 
30 years.  Possible reasons for this could be: 
- Because the science is not good enough 
- There are flaws in business strategy or organizational elements 
- Because biotech science is not viable (i.e. the costs to develop it overwhelm the 
returns) 
- Because the institutional environment is not conducive to biotech 
commercialization (e.g. regulatory and venture capital environments) 
 
The premise of my thesis is that it is the role of business strategy and organization to: 
- Evaluate and manage science risks 
- Evaluate and manage the viability of investment 
- Take into account and deal with the existing institutional climate 
 
I therefore surmise that better organization and commercialization strategy will improve 
returns to the sector. 
 
In my research I’ve conducted a small number of case studies on start-up biotech firms 
and I’ve studied the trends in business models in the biotech sector from its inception 
until now.  I’ve made some observations, interpretations and assumptions.  I’d 
appreciate your view on these. 
 
I’ve noted several significant drivers that influence a firm’s commercialization 
strategies: 
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Some of these drivers are inter-related.  Regulatory burden (the regulatory hurdles a 
product has to pass in order to come to market) drives the cost of drug development.  
This generally means a large amount of capital is required to develop drugs, particularly 
because a firms needs to access complementary assets.  Complementary assets is an 
academic term used to describe the skills and resources required to bring an intellectual 
property asset to market such as clinical development capabilities, manufacturing and 
sales and distribution capabilities.  To some degree a firm’s ability to access 
complementary assets affects its ability to meet the regulatory burden. 
 
Q1: Are there other drivers influencing commercialization strategy? 
 
At the same time a company is dealing with the issues of regulatory burden, capital 
requirements and access to complementary assets, it also has to contend with the rate of 
technological change which seems to keep moving the regulatory goal posts and also 
threatens to make a firm’s own innovations obsolescent. 
 
Q2: Besides the rate of technological change what other factors contribute to risk?   
Or change the drivers of commercialization strategy? 
 
In proposing how biotech firms could improve their commercialization strategy I have 
employed a real options reasoning (ROR) framework.  Let me introduce you to this 
concept. 
 
Start-up firms can be thought of in terms of  options – they are investments in real assets 
that preserve the right to make a decision at some point in the future.  If conditions turn 
out to be unfavorable, resources can be withdrawn and redeployed – losses will only 
amount to the sunk costs.  If conditions are favorable further resources can be invested.  
The cost of an option is small compared to the full investment.  Thus, with limited 
resources more opportunities can be explored using options. 
 
Options increase in value when uncertainty increases because while the downside is 
fixed, the upside performance distribution increases.  This implies that having options in 
the biotech sector will have value, as uncertainty is certainly high throughout the 
commercialization process. 
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I don’t intend to apply a formal options methodology to biotech commercialization 
strategy because of the complexity of the calculations and because of complications 
surrounding the underlying assumptions.  However, I want to apply the concept of 
options as a strategic process.  This process recognizes that resource allocations can be 
made at different times in a product’s journey along the development path and that there 
are many answers to the question of when on how to plug into the value chain.  Because 
investments in options occur sequentially, it can be thought of as a process involving 
four stages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I like to think of this process in terms of a gardening metaphor.  The first stage of the 
process is planting seeds.  The second stage involves nurturing the seedlings with water 
and fertilizer.  Along the way, some of the seedlings are weeded out.  Finally one or 
more of the seedlings is harvested. 
 
This ROR model underpins the Commercialization Options Model that I am going to 
propose as a framework to help biotech companies develop commercialization 
strategy… as you’ll see in a little while. 
 
I suggest that commercialization strategy is about ‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ to plug 
into the value chain.  I will first explain value chain and then come back to the concept 
of “plugging in”. 
 
The value chain for drug development describes all the activities required to take an 
innovation from discovery through to final product.  Typically, in the process of biotech 
drug development firms will take up one or a number of the activities required to take a 
product from discovery to market.  The value chain can be markedly different from one 
product development project to another, but the commonly understood ‘generic’ value 
chain for drug development looks like this: 
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Each firm aims to insert their product, service or intellectual property into the value 
chain at the point, and using a transaction mechanism, that will maximize value 
creation.  I’ve used the term ‘plugging in’ to describe the interaction with the value 
chain whereby the company earns a financial return on its innovation.  Full integration 
is not an option for most biotech firms due to financial limitations.  One of the tasks in 
the development of a commercialization strategy is to evaluate the costs, rewards and 
risks of participating further along the value chain where the firm controls more of the 
product development, manufacturing and marketing activities. 
 
A firm’s commercialization strategy outlines ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ it will interact 
with its value chain to create value.  These decisions are described in its business model.  
‘What’ describes the final product offering.  In the pharmaceutical sector this involves 
the therapeutic indications that regulate approval, will be sought for, as well as the 
product presentation format.  For example, in the case of a product for relieving pain 
‘what’ will need to differentiate between acute pain and chronic pain, the type of 
underlying disease that will be targeted (e.g. cancer pain or lower back pain) and the 
presentation of the product (e.g. tablet, transdermal patch or injection).  
 
‘When’ describes the point in the value chain at which the company intends to earn a 
return on its innovation.  The firm often (but not always) hands control of its innovation 
to another party at this point.  Popular ‘when’ points for plugging into the value chain 
are after phase II clinical trials or during phase III.   
 
‘How’ refers to the transaction mechanism that the firm uses to create a financial return 
on its innovation.  Examples include direct physical product sales, licensing of 
technology for royalty payments, sale of technology and outright sale of the entire firm.   
 
Q3: Do you agree that ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ are the critical parameters of 
commercialization strategy?  Are there others?  Please comment if you have a 
different perspective. 
 
Up until here in this document I’ve mainly been setting the scene for the model I am 
developing to help biotech firms think about commercialization strategy.  It’s a fairly 
detailed model because during the research for my thesis I’ve discovered that many 
biotech firms have an almost ad hoc approach to strategy – sometimes they are more 
opportunistic than strategic, and often they do not consider all the options available to 
them.  It’s likely that my detailed framework will not be slavishly adhered to in the 
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development of commercialization strategy – that’s fine – but hopefully it will provoke 
well thought out strategies.  
 
I want this model to be applicable over a wide range of biotech projects, but having said 
that it is particularly targeted toward drug development.  It is modeled around the four 
stage real options reasoning model that I explained above.  The diagram below shows a 
top level overview of the model.   
 
 
 
 
I will now work through each of these stages in turn seeking your feedback.  My 
thoughts are most developed around Stages One A and One B.  I am looking for 
additional input there and especially around Stages Two, Three and Four.  
 
Stage One A 
 
In Stage One A of the model the company needs to identify all the potential ‘what’, 
‘when’ and ‘how’ options it has, whilst in Stage One B the company will evaluate and 
invest in chosen options. 
 
Let’s firstly consider the ‘what’ options a firm may have.  It’s difficult to provide 
preemptive advice due to the vast range of unique biotech projects.  However, it might 
be worthwhile considering the following trade-offs: 
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Trade‐offs 'what' to commercialise (plug in)
Advantages Disadvantages
Market 
opportunity may 
be significantly 
larger
Pursuing chronic 
indications
Clinical trials take 
longer and cost 
more
VS
Clinical trials are 
quicker and cost 
less
Pursuing acute 
indications
Market 
opportunity often 
smaller
also consider
Less risk
Indications with 
well defined 
biomarkers or easily 
measured end‐
points
Low‐hanging fruit 
so market may not 
be the most 
lucrative
Regulatory burden 
may be lower, and 
period of 
protection after 
launch
Orphan vs mass 
market
Market is smaller
 
 
  
Q4: What else is important in deciding ‘what’ to commercialise? 
 
The first step in identifying ‘when’ options is done by understanding the full value chain 
for the product/technology.  The company can then evaluate the factors that enable or 
constrain it from plugging in at different points in the value chain.  The diagram below 
shows a ‘generic’ value chain and the names of typical business models that are used by 
firms participating in various parts of the value chain.  
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The next diagram shows how various enabling and constraining factors push a company 
toward certain typical business models, or perhaps leave the company with a wide range 
of options. 
 
  
Identifying 'when' 
options            
           
  
The enabling and constraining factors that may help determine the possible 
options the company has at each stage of product development 
  
           
   Constraining  Factors  Enabling    
  
Preferred 
options      
Preferred 
options   
  
FIPCO  
 
weak   
Robustness of 
IP protection  
 
strong  
Any 
  
           
  
RIPCO 
 
low   
Level of 
regulatory and 
clinical trial 
experience 
 
 
high  
Any 
  
           
  
RIPCO 
(because the firm 
is less likely to 
raise the funds or 
bet the company) 
 
high   
Level of 
scientific risk  
 
low  
Any 
  
           
  
License or 
partner 
earlier 
 
chronic   
Acute vs 
chronic 
indication (assume 
acute = shorter lower 
cost trials, chronic = 
longer higher cost 
trials) 
 
 
acute  
Any 
  
           
  
FIPCO end 
of scale 
 
high   
Amount of tacit 
knowledge 
involved in 
partnering 
 
 
low  
Any 
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RIPCO 
 
no   
Complementary 
assets  exist in-
house, or can 
be contracted 
 
 
yes  
Any 
  
           
  
FIPCO 
 
no   
Complementary 
assets exist in 
the sector 
 
 
yes  
Any 
  
           
  
License or 
sell before 
product 
launch 
 
large   
No. of 
physicians the 
product has to 
be marketed to  
 
 
small  
Any 
  
           
  
FIPCO 
 
no   
A distribution 
channel to the 
target market 
already exists 
 
 
yes  
Any 
  
           
  
 
 
no   
Novel research 
methodology or 
tools 
 
 
yes  
Fee for service 
or integrate 
vertically by 
developing 
proprietary 
molecules and 
plugging into the 
value chain at 
any point 
  
                
 
 
Q5: Can you suggest any other constraining or enabling factors? 
 
Next the firms needs to consider the ‘how’ options of plugging into the value chain.  
‘How’ describes the transaction mechanism that the company will use to earn a return 
on its innovation.  Like “when” options these are exercised at Stage Three of the model 
but have to be considered at Stage One so that the appropriate strategies can be seeded 
and nurtured.   
 
Examples of ‘how’ options are: 
- Sale of intellectual property 
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- Sale of product 
- Sale of the company 
- Out-licensing 
- JV arrangements 
- Franchising 
 
Q6: Can you suggest any other ‘how’ options? 
 
Stage One B 
 
Once all potential ‘what’. ‘when’ and ‘how’ options have been identified it is a matter 
of evaluating the options and deciding which ones to invest in.  Some options may be 
mutually exclusive whilst others may exist in parallel right up until exercise or 
termination.  I see this evaluation process involving decision trees and scenario analysis.  
I don’t intend to ‘teach’ these techniques as part of my model but I’ve provided an 
example below to help get the concept across. 
 
 
 
 
Stage Two 
 
Stage two is about nurturing the options that were invested in at the end of Stage One.  
The goal is to increase the value of each option or decrease the risk inherent in the 
option through strategic action and possibly further investments (investments should 
always be the minimum required).  Sometimes it is just a matter of letting time pass and 
no further actions or investments are required. 
 
How is value increased or risk reduced? 
This can be done by: 
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- ‘Drop dead’ experiments, trials or forays into the market 
- Establishing a reputation (through academic publications or publicity) 
- Engaging ‘big pharma’ through investment or collaboration to gain credibility 
 
Unfortunately during my field research I didn’t have the opportunity to observe other 
activities that firms pursue to increase the value or decrease the risk in their ‘what’, 
‘when’ and ‘how’ options…. but I suspect there are a lot more.  I’d be grateful if you 
could give the following question extra consideration – what advice would you give 
inexperienced biotech entrepreneurs? 
 
Q7:  What other ways can a company increase the value or decrease the risk in its 
‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘how’ options? 
 
Q8:  What capabilities or processes can a company build to focus them on 
opportunities to build value or decrease risk?   
 
Stages Three and Four 
 
Stages Three and Four are binary events – a firm either exercises or terminates an 
option (otherwise the option is still at Stage Two).   
 
Stage Three and Four
Stage Three
Exercise one or more 
options
Stage Four
Terminate one or 
more options
OR
 
 
Sometimes an option preserves other options, so that by exercising a given option the 
company is taken further down a certain strategic path.  However, the ultimate option is 
to plug into the value chain … this is where the ‘when’ and ‘how’ options are exercised.  
The companies that I studied during my research did not purposefully build their 
commercialization strategies around options, which has made it difficult for me to 
observe the processes around how options are exercised and terminated.  I think what 
might be important here is how they decide whether to exercise or terminate an option. 
 
Q9: Do you have any suggestions for helping biotech entrepreneurs to decide 
whether to exercise or terminate an option?  Processes they could use? 
 
 
Thank you for your assistance!  I welcome feedback on any aspect of this document. 
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Appendix E – presentation for practitioner interview 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Commercialisation Strategy
Copyright © Synergy Pharmaceuticals Pte Ltd 2008
How can biotech firms do it better ?
A synthesis of academic and practitioner knowledge
1
 
 
 
 
Observations on how biotech firms do
commercialisation strategy:
• Generally follow typical models e.g. RIPCO, FIDDO with out‐
licensing before or during clinic
• Often pursue adhoc opportunities rather than strategic
• Sometimes have a blinkered approach and do not consider or fully 
evaluate all options
• There are some individuals with valuable knowledge & experience 
in the industry, and a lot of CEOs and boards ‘feeling’ their way
• Fair amount of chopping and changing of priorities and indications
2
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The biotech sector has accumulated losses
> USD40 Billion over the past 30 years
The premise of my thesis is:
It is the role of business strategy and organisation to 
‐ Evaluate and manage science risks
‐ Evaluate and manage the viability of investment
‐ Take into account, or ‘deal with’ the existing institutional climate
Therefore:
Better organisation and commercialisation strategy will improve returns 
in the biotech sector
Proposing:
The Commercialisation Options Model
1
 
 
 
 
Assistance Required!
• Limited case studies
• I’ve made observations, interpretations, assumptions
• Seeking further ideas and ‘practitioner knowledge’
• Refinement of the Commercialisation Options Model
Are they right?
Feedback and suggestions 
gratefully invited
4
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The Commercialisation Options Model will provide a framework for 
developing commercialisation strategies.
It is based on Real Options Reasoning (ROR)
I am seeking sage wisdom at each of these stages.
5
 
 
 
 
Garden Metaphor
Stage One
Plant Seeds Stage Two
Nurture
Stage Three
Harvest
Stage Three
Weed
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‘what’, ‘when’, and ‘how’ to plug‐in to the value chain are the 
essential parameters of commercialisation strategy
Firms can develop options around each of these parameters 
7
 
 
 
 
Developing commercialisation strategy around options
Stage One A
Identifying 
feasible 
‘what, ‘when’, 
‘how’ options
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Stage One B
Evaluating all 
feasible 
options and 
choosing 
which to 
invest in
Stage Two
Reducing 
uncertainty 
and 
amplifying 
value 
especially in 
the ‘what’ 
options
Stage Four
Terminate 
options no 
longer 
viable or 
required
Stage Three
Exercise 
‘when’ and 
‘how’ 
options by 
plugging 
into the 
value chain
What 
organisational
processes 
support this 
stage?
8
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Stage One A
Identifying ‘what’ options
Difficult to be pre‐emptive due to vast range of unique biotech projects. 
options.  However, it may be useful to consider the following trade‐offs
What else is important 
in deciding ‘what’ to 
commercialise?
9
 
 
 
 
Stage One A
Identifying ‘when’ options
This is done by understanding the full value chain for the 
product/technology (e.g. below), initially assuming the company can plug in 
at any point, and then removing options through an evaluation of the 
constraining factors that make some options un‐viable.
10
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Identifying ‘when’ options cont’d
Can you suggest any other 
constraining or enabling 
factors?
11
 
 
 
 
Stage One A
Identifying ‘how’ options
Like ‘when’ options these are exercised at stage three of the ROR model 
but have to be considered at stage one, so that seeds can be planted and 
nurtured.
Examples of ‘how’ options
• Sale of IP
• Sale of product
• Sale of company Can you think of other
• Out‐licensing ‘how’ options?
• JV arrangement
• Franchising
12
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Stage One B
Evaluating all options and deciding which to invest in.  Some options may 
be mutually exclusive whilst others may exist in parallel right up until 
exercise or termination.
Use decision trees and scenario analyses.
These modeling techniques are not part of my thesis but see next slide for 
a brief example.
13
 
 
 
 
Evaluating options – an example
What
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
CABG
A drug for 
improving 
cognitive 
recovery after 
stroke
When
After phase I
After phase II
After phase III
Launch to market
Etc.
How
Sell Co.
JV
Out license
Consider
COSTS
‐ Amount of finance  
required
‐ Cost of capital
RISKS
‐ Science risk
‐ Operational risk
‐ Market risk
‐ Likelihood of getting 
finance
REWARDS
‐ Financial Return
Calculate 
Risk ‐
adjusted 
NPVs
Cost of 
option 
today
14
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Stage Two
Nurturing options through actions and investments that strategically 
amplify value and/or decrease risk.
How is this done?
• ‘Drop dead’ experiments or forays
• Establish a reputation (academic publications, P.R.)
• Engaging with “large pharma” through investment or collaboration for 
credibility
How else?
15
 
 
 
 
Stage Three and Four
Stage Three
Exercise one or more 
options
Stage Four
Terminate one or 
more options
OR
16
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Appendix F – Case study data inventory 
…………………………………………………………………….. 
 
The following data inventory provides an overview of the documentation collected and 
the interviews that were undertaken during the first phase of this research project.  All 
interviews were conducted in Auckland, New Zealand. 
 
                 
   Kiwi Ingenuity ‐ Data Collected      
             
   Interviews    
  
Interview No.  Interviewee  Date 
No. pages of 
transcript 
  
                
   1  Stephen Henry  8/3/04  17    
   2  Stephen Henry  10/3/04  22    
   3  Stephen Henry  15/3/04  21    
   4  Stephen Henry  23/3/04  11    
   5  Eric Henry  17/5/04  18    
   6  Stephen Henry  28/7/04  18    
   7  Stephen Henry  10/8/04  16    
   8  Stephen Henry  22/11/04  11    
   9  Stephen Henry  16/12/04  14    
   10  Stephen Henry  2/5/05  19    
   11  Stephen Henry  10/5/05  32    
   12  Stephen Henry  28/6/05  9    
   13  Stephen Henry  19/7/05  6    
                
             
   Documents    
                 
   GSF grant application  2001       
   TBG grant application  2003       
   Business plan    April 2002       
   Business plan    Sept 2002       
   Stephen Henry C.V.    2004       
   Eric Henry C.V.    2004       
   Annual report    Mar 2005       
   Business plan    Mar 2006       
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   Neuren Pharmaceuticals ‐ Data Collected      
             
   Interviews    
  
Interview No.  Interviewee  Date 
No. pages of 
transcript 
  
                
   1  David Clarke  31/8/04  6    
   2  David Clarke  19/9/04  14    
   3  David Clarke  27/9/04  16    
   4  David Clarke  21/12/04  18    
   5  David Clarke  15/5/05  19    
   6  David Clarke  15/7/05  20    
   7  Doug Wilson  30/8/05  8    
                 
             
   Documents    
                 
   Company website ‐ www.neurenpharma.com       
   Company overview    April 2004       
   Executive summary    April 2004       
   Company presentation  Aug 2004       
   Prospectus    Nov 2004       
   Investment statement  Nov 2004       
   Taylor Collison analyst report  June 2005       
   Company announcement  Aug 2005       
   Annual report ‐ 2006    Mar 2007       
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   Living Cell Technologies ‐ Data Collected      
             
   Interviews    
  
Interview No.  Interviewee  Date 
No. pages of 
transcript 
  
                
   1  Paul Tan  16/8/05  no transcript    
   2  Paul Tan  29/11/05  19    
                
             
   Documents    
                 
   Company website ‐ www.lctglobal.com         
   Annual report  2003/2004       
   Prospectus  May 2004       
   Taylor Collison anaylst report  Sept 2004       
   Annual report  2004/2005       
   Notice of AGM  April 2005       
   Company presentation  May 2005       
   Business plan synopsis  Aug 2005       
   Henting Party Securities analyst report  Aug 2005       
   Taylor Collison anaylst report  Sept 2005       
   Company presentation  Nov 2006       
   Presentation at AGM  Nov 2006       
  
Various company annoucements and 
newsletters between 
Mar 2005 and Nov 
2006       
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